| WTAI Model | Profit Model | Plain Model | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Main Card | Undercard | Full | Main Card | Undercard | Full | Main Card | Undercard | Full |
| 50.0% | 80.0% | 63.64% | 33.33% | 100.0% | 63.64% | 0.0% | 80.0% | 36.36% |
Charles Oliveira
Win
-106
Ricardo Ramos
Win
-215
Total Odds
2.85x
Return on $10 Bet
$18.47
The tables below show how the model predictions performed. Confidence scores indicate the model's certainty.
Correct predictions are shown in normal text, incorrect predictions are highlighted in red.
Click on any fight below to expand the detailed AI analysis and SHAP chart explaining the prediction.
Score: 1
Odds:
Charles Oliveira: -106
Mateusz Gamrot: -120
Oliveira enters this fight in a precarious position after getting knocked out by Ilia Topuria in his last outing. That June 2025 loss exposed a fundamental problem: at 35 years old, "Do Bronx" stands too tall and doesn't move his head enough against patient, precise boxers. Topuria opened a cut over Oliveira's eye early, then landed a right-left combination that toppled him at 2:27 of Round 1. Before that, Oliveira had bounced back with a dominant win over Michael Chandler at UFC 309, where he controlled four rounds with his grappling before surviving a wild fifth-round rally.
Oliveira's signature techniques remain lethal. His jumping knee-to-clinch-to-takedown sequence has been a staple since his Beneil Dariush knockout, where he landed a leaping knee followed by devastating elbows from mount. Against Chandler, he showcased his rear-naked choke setup from back control, nearly finishing it in Round 3 after landing 12-6 elbows. His guillotine choke from standing caught David Teymur in Round 2 after Oliveira landed a stiff jab, and he used the same technique to submit Dustin Poirier in Round 3 after wearing him down with body shots.
His distance management with oblique kicks and teeps has evolved significantly. Against Arman Tsarukyan, Oliveira used cut kicks to disrupt rhythm, targeting the standing leg when opponents stepped up. His unconventional guard work includes the "hand on heart" grip to control wrists and regain position, plus creative guillotine setups using free-hanging support hands that confuse defensive reactions.
Oliveira's defensive striking remains his Achilles heel. He's been knocked down five times in his UFC career and finished in eight of ten losses. Against Topuria, he marched forward with pressure but didn't move his head enough for an elite fighter, getting caught with Spanish punches that made him wilt immediately. His tendency to stand tall and stationary leaves him vulnerable to patient boxers—there's a difference between luring brawl-happy fighters like Chandler and Gaethje into exchanges versus facing precise counter-strikers.
His susceptibility to power punches was evident when Chandler landed a furious right hand to the eye in Round 5, nearly finishing the fight with a huge combination. Oliveira also struggles with early cuts that compound throughout fights—Topuria's eyebrow cut in the opening minutes became a significant factor. When hurt, Oliveira's willingness to engage in exchanges creates dangerous moments, as he's not a fighter who knows how to avoid fighting fire with fire 45 fights into his pro career.
Gamrot brings relentless wrestling pressure and elite cardio to every fight. His head-outside single leg takedown is his bread and butter, specifically designed to avoid counter knees from dangerous strikers. Against Ludovit Klein in May 2025, Gamrot landed six takedowns despite Klein's 95.2% takedown defense rate—the best among active lightweights. He secured a high-crotch takedown with 90 seconds left in Round 3, sealing a dominant 30-27 unanimous decision.
His chain wrestling sequences are exhausting for opponents. When Dan Hooker stuffed his initial attempts, Gamrot immediately transitioned to secondary and tertiary attacks, never remaining static. Against Rafael Dos Anjos, he showcased a single-leg to inside trip sequence where he steps deep behind the opponent's leg in a "run the pipe" motion, using the cage as leverage. His positional control from half-guard is suffocating—he kept Klein trapped for three minutes in Round 2, landing quality ground and pound.
Gamrot's striking has evolved beyond basic 1-2 combinations. Against Hooker, he threw extended four-punch sequences where the third or fourth shots frequently found their mark. His stance-switching to set up takedowns creates unpredictable entry angles, particularly his left straight/overhand from southpaw while stepping outside the opponent's lead foot, which lines up both the punch and his takedown entry.
Gamrot's striking defense shows significant gaps. He absorbs 3.22 significant strikes per minute—nearly equal to what he lands (3.23). Against Klein, he was hurt early by a punch and later dropped momentarily by a knee in Round 3. His susceptibility to counter-striking was exposed when Hooker repeatedly threatened guillotines off Gamrot's head-outside single leg entries, forcing defensive gator rolls to escape.
His ground control without finishing is a persistent issue. Despite dominant positions against Klein, the finish didn't materialize. He struggles to maintain top position against defensively savvy opponents—Hooker repeatedly returned to his feet after being taken down. This pattern suggests technical gaps in transitional control sequences and an inability to chain positions together effectively.
Gamrot's predictable striking patterns make him readable. He relies almost exclusively on 1-2 combinations with limited variety, rarely throwing kicks with purpose. Against Dariush, his limited combinations became predictable, and Dariush's left hand repeatedly found its mark, dropping Gamrot near the end of Round 3. His natural orthodox reset after exchanges creates a consistent timing vulnerability where opponents can target his right side with body kicks.
This fight presents a fascinating clash between Oliveira's submission wizardry and Gamrot's relentless wrestling. Gamrot's head-outside single leg creates vulnerability to Oliveira's guillotine expertise—the same technique that finished Dustin Poirier and David Teymur. When Gamrot shoots with his head outside, Oliveira can punch through to position his elbow on Gamrot's throat, threatening the high-risk front guillotine.
Oliveira's unconventional guard work could exploit Gamrot's struggles to maintain top position. The "hand on heart" grip and creative overhook sequences from guard that frustrated Tsarukyan would give Gamrot problems, as he tends to allow scrambles when opponents work defensively from bottom. Oliveira's 12-6 elbows from back control would be devastating if he catches Gamrot's back during a scramble—something Gamrot exposed against Hooker.
However, Gamrot's relentless takedown chains could wear down Oliveira's 35-year-old body. The Polish fighter averages 5.81 recent takedowns per fight with 16.21 attempts, and his cardio allows him to maintain this pace for 15 minutes. Oliveira's recent takedown defense of 73.18% suggests Gamrot will get him down multiple times, though keeping him there is another matter.
Oliveira's body kick game could exploit Gamrot's tendency to leave his midsection exposed when advancing. The cut kicks that disrupted Tsarukyan's rhythm would target Gamrot's body as he shoots, potentially slowing his wrestling output. But Gamrot's improved striking combinations mean Oliveira can't just stand and trade—those extended four-punch sequences could catch Oliveira's stationary head.
Early rounds (1-2): Gamrot will immediately pressure with takedown attempts, looking to establish his wrestling dominance. Oliveira's best bet is using front kicks and body shots to keep distance while threatening guillotines on Gamrot's entries. If Gamrot secures early takedowns, Oliveira's guard work and scrambling ability will be tested. Expect Gamrot to control position but struggle to land significant damage, with Oliveira hunting submissions from bottom.
Mid-fight adjustments (3): This is where Oliveira's experience and Gamrot's cardio clash. If Gamrot hasn't secured dominant rounds, he'll increase his takedown volume, potentially becoming more predictable. Oliveira will look to time a big knee or elbow as Gamrot shoots, similar to how he caught Dariush. The fighter who makes better tactical adjustments here likely takes control.
Championship rounds (4-5 if applicable): In a three-round fight, this doesn't apply, but if extended, Oliveira's recent cardio issues (getting hurt in Round 5 against Chandler) would be concerning. Gamrot's relentless pace typically overwhelms opponents late, as seen against Tsarukyan where he won Rounds 4-5. However, Oliveira's submission threats never diminish—he finished Gaethje in Round 1 and Poirier in Round 3, showing he can end fights at any moment.
The model heavily favors Oliveira based on several key factors:
The model sees Oliveira's submission threat and reach advantage as decisive factors that outweigh Gamrot's wrestling volume. The striking impact differentials (Oliveira +2.35 recent, Gamrot +15.17 recent) suggest both fighters land hard, but Oliveira's finishing ability from any position gives him more paths to victory.
WolfTicketsAI has a mixed record with both fighters. For Oliveira, the model correctly predicted his wins over Chandler (0.69) and Gaethje (0.58), but incorrectly favored Tsarukyan (0.71) and Makhachev (0.34) against him. It also incorrectly predicted Dariush to win (0.30), missing Oliveira's first-round KO. This suggests the model sometimes underestimates Oliveira's finishing ability.
For Gamrot, the model correctly predicted his wins over Klein (0.53), Dos Anjos (0.74), and Turner (0.70), but incorrectly favored him heavily against Hooker (0.73) and Dariush (0.30). It also incorrectly predicted Tsarukyan to beat him (0.76). The model tends to overrate Gamrot's wrestling-heavy approach against elite competition.
Given this history, the model's confidence in Oliveira (1.0) should be viewed cautiously. It may be overcompensating for previously underestimating Oliveira's finishing ability while potentially undervaluing Gamrot's ability to grind out decisions against dangerous submission artists.
Charles Oliveira presents too many finishing threats for Mateusz Gamrot to navigate over 15 minutes. While Gamrot's relentless wrestling will secure takedowns, Oliveira's guard is a minefield of submission attempts—guillotines, triangles, and arm bars that have finished elite competition. Gamrot's head-outside single leg entries play directly into Oliveira's guillotine expertise, the same technique that submitted Poirier and Teymur. Even if Gamrot secures top position, his struggles to maintain control against scrambly opponents mean Oliveira will create opportunities to threaten from bottom or reverse position. The reach advantage allows Oliveira to land body kicks and knees as Gamrot shoots, potentially catching him clean like he did to Dariush. At 35 years old with a recent knockout loss, Oliveira's durability is questionable, but his submission skills never age. Gamrot's improving striking isn't enough to keep this standing, and on the ground, he's entering Oliveira's world. WolfTicketsAI predicts Charles Oliveira finishes Mateusz Gamrot via submission in Round 2.
Score: 28
Odds:
Deiveson Figueiredo: +220
Montel Jackson: -295
Figueiredo arrives at bantamweight after a brutal stretch—he's lost three of his last four, including a devastating second-round heel hook loss to Cory Sandhagen in May 2025 that exposed catastrophic gaps in his leg entanglement knowledge. Before that, Petr Yan systematically outboxed him over five rounds, and Brandon Moreno finished him via doctor's stoppage after landing a left hook counter that Figueiredo never saw coming.
The former flyweight champion's signature tools remain dangerous when he can impose them. His Pantoja-style leg entries from half guard—scooping under the opponent's leg, throwing his own leg over centerline, and reaping inward—create scramble opportunities. Against Marlon Vera, he executed flawless punch-to-wrestling transitions, throwing combinations, pulling back from counters, then shooting takedowns. His body shot accumulation slowed Vera throughout three rounds, and he dropped him in the final frame.
But Figueiredo's technical evolution has been incomplete. His guillotine hunting from bottom position against Sandhagen left him eating ground strikes for entire rounds. When he secured back body lock standing against Sandhagen in round two, simple hand separation reversed the position—a fundamental hand-fighting failure. His 50/50 leg entanglement knowledge proved catastrophically deficient, allowing Sandhagen to execute the backside 50/50 transition and finish the inside heel hook.
His striking has atrophied during his grappling evolution. The counter right hand that once troubled Moreno now arrives less frequently. His 68-inch reach provides theoretical advantages, but he's absorbed 2.43 head strikes per minute recently while landing only 1.75—a negative striking differential that's worsened as he's moved up in weight.
Left Hook Blindness: Figueiredo "has never slipped or blocked a left hook in his life," per technical analysis. Moreno exploited this repeatedly across their four fights, landing counter left hooks that accumulated damage. In their fourth meeting, Moreno caught a kick, parried it across, and jumped in with the left hook that damaged Figueiredo's eye and led to the doctor's stoppage. This defensive gap has persisted throughout his entire UFC run.
Back-Taking Overcommitment: Against Sandhagen, when his opponent deliberately turned his back from guard—a defensive tactic Sandhagen refined against elite wrestlers—Figueiredo immediately jumped over to secure back control. He fell to the floor in compromised position and spent the remainder of round one absorbing ground strikes. He reads deliberate back exposure as vulnerability rather than recognizing it as a defensive technique.
Submission Position Over Control: Figueiredo holds submission attempts far too long from disadvantageous positions. Against Moreno in their fourth fight, he held guillotine chokes from half guard and closed guard for extended periods rather than working to improve position or land strikes. This stubbornness creates opportunities for opponents to escape, reverse, or accumulate control time while he refuses to abandon failed attempts.
Jackson brings a five-fight win streak into this bout, though his most recent performance against Daniel Marcos raised questions about his offensive consistency. That unanimous decision win (30-27 across all scorecards) featured conservative wrestling-heavy tactics rather than the explosive striking that earned him 11 knockdowns in UFC bantamweight history—the division record. The 18-second demolition of Da'Mon Blackshear in July 2024 showcased his true finishing ability, but against Marcos he threw combinations sparingly and relied on positional control.
His 75.5-inch reach creates massive problems for shorter opponents. Jackson lands 2.28 head strikes per minute while absorbing only 0.42—a 5-to-1 ratio that's nearly unprecedented in the division. His jab-to-combination sequences establish distance before he explodes with power shots. Against Rani Yahya, he identified Yahya's awkward inside low kick-to-jab combination, recognized it was thrown from ineffective range, and countered for the knockout.
Jackson's wrestling credentials are elite—56.2% takedown accuracy (division record) and 3.20 takedowns per fight. Against Marcos, he immediately established grappling as his primary weapon, securing early takedowns and pursuing a late d'arce choke that nearly finished the fight. His chain wrestling sequences—shooting single legs immediately after initial takedown attempts are defended—force opponents into defensive shells.
But Jackson's recent inactivity is concerning. He fought just once in the 24 months before the Marcos bout, and that fight lasted 18 seconds. Against Marcos, he struggled to find offensive rhythm, threw minimal combinations, and allowed rounds to become competitive through low output. His striking volume inconsistency when not pursuing finishes could allow durable opponents to hang around.
Takedown Defense Gaps: Jackson's 47.83% takedown defense ratio is exploitable. Against JP Buys, he absorbed multiple takedowns despite his offensive wrestling prowess. Brett Johns outwrestled him to a unanimous decision loss in 2020, exposing his vulnerability to opponents who can match his grappling intensity. When forced to defend rather than initiate wrestling exchanges, Jackson's defensive technique shows gaps.
Conservative Offensive Output: The Marcos fight revealed Jackson's tendency toward safety-first approaches against technical opponents. "There wasn't a ton of offence on either side over the first two rounds," and Jackson "finally started throwing his combinations, but then went in on the clinch playing it safe." This predictability allowed Marcos to survive and keep rounds competitive despite being outclassed athletically.
Pressure Wrestling Vulnerability: When opponents bring relentless forward pressure with wrestling threats, Jackson struggles to establish his preferred range. Against Ricky Simon in 2018, Simon's grappling-heavy approach neutralized Jackson's striking, leading to a unanimous decision loss. Jackson's game functions optimally when he controls distance and initiates wrestling exchanges, but aggressive grapplers who force him to defend can disrupt his rhythm.
This matchup pits Figueiredo's compromised technical game against Jackson's physical advantages and defensive striking. Jackson's 75.5-inch reach versus Figueiredo's 68 inches creates a 7.5-inch differential that favors Jackson's jab-heavy approach. Figueiredo's recent struggles with left hooks align perfectly with Jackson's counter-striking tendencies—Jackson can parry Figueiredo's right hands and counter with the left hook that's plagued Figueiredo throughout his career.
Figueiredo's punch-to-wrestling transitions that worked against Vera face a different test against Jackson's elite takedown defense (69% stuffed per Figueiredo's stats). When Figueiredo throws combinations and shoots, Jackson's chain wrestling defense and ability to sprawl into advantageous positions could reverse the exchanges. Jackson's 56.2% takedown accuracy suggests that if scrambles occur, he's more likely to end up on top.
The grappling exchanges favor Jackson significantly. Figueiredo's 50/50 leg entanglement deficiencies won't come into play unless Jackson pursues them (unlikely given his striking-first approach), but Figueiredo's tendency to hold submissions from bad positions creates opportunities. If Figueiredo secures takedowns and immediately hunts guillotines from guard, Jackson can use proper defensive technique, escape, and accumulate top control time while Figueiredo stubbornly refuses to abandon failed attempts.
Figueiredo's body shot accumulation that slowed Vera could be effective if he can close distance, but Jackson's defensive striking metrics (absorbing only 0.42 head strikes and 0.39 body strikes per minute) suggest he's exceptional at preventing opponents from landing clean shots. Jackson's distance management with his reach advantage should keep Figueiredo at the end of his punches where body work is difficult to land.
Early Rounds (1-2): Jackson establishes his jab immediately, using his reach to keep Figueiredo at distance. Figueiredo attempts his punch-to-wrestling transitions, but Jackson's sprawl and chain wrestling defense stuff the attempts. Jackson lands counter left hooks when Figueiredo throws his right hand, exploiting the defensive blindness that's plagued Figueiredo throughout his career. Figueiredo's body kicks—effective against Vera—struggle to land as Jackson's footwork keeps him out of range.
Mid-Fight Adjustments (Round 2-3): Figueiredo recognizes his takedowns aren't working and increases striking volume, but his negative striking differential (absorbing more than he lands) begins accumulating damage. Jackson's knockdown power (1.72 knockdowns per fight recently) becomes a factor as Figueiredo's compromised defensive striking leaves him vulnerable to power shots. If Figueiredo secures a takedown, he immediately hunts submissions rather than establishing control, allowing Jackson to defend properly and reverse position.
Championship Rounds (If Applicable): This is a three-round fight, but if it extends to round three, Jackson's superior recent form (100% win percentage in last five) and cardio advantages become pronounced. Figueiredo's difficult weight cuts and recent losses suggest diminished durability. Jackson's ability to maintain output (6.57 strikes landed per minute recently) while Figueiredo's has declined (3.24 recently) creates a widening gap as the fight progresses.
The model's confidence in Jackson stems from multiple statistical advantages that compound into overwhelming favoritism:
The model sees a fighter (Jackson) who's hitting his athletic prime with elite defensive metrics facing a fighter (Figueiredo) whose technical evolution has stalled and whose recent performances show declining durability. Every statistical category favors Jackson, and the betting odds reflect consensus that this is a significant mismatch.
WolfTicketsAI has a mixed record with Figueiredo, going 2-4 in predictions involving him. Most concerning: the model correctly predicted Sandhagen (0.78 confidence) and Petr Yan (0.71 confidence) to defeat Figueiredo, and both won decisively. The model incorrectly favored Figueiredo against Moreno in their fourth fight (0.74 confidence), but Moreno won via doctor's stoppage—suggesting the model underestimated Figueiredo's declining durability.
For Jackson, the model is 4-0 in predictions, including correct calls on his wins over Daniel Marcos (0.65), Da'Mon Blackshear (0.58), Rani Yahya (0.18), and Julio Arce (0.35). The model has consistently identified Jackson's advantages even when betting odds were closer, suggesting strong pattern recognition for his skillset.
The model's perfect record on Jackson and its accurate identification of Figueiredo's recent decline increases confidence in this prediction. When the model sees this level of statistical separation (28 confidence score for Jackson), it's identifying a fighter who holds advantages across multiple dimensions.
Jackson's reach advantage, elite defensive striking, and superior recent form create a nightmare matchup for Figueiredo's compromised technical game. Figueiredo's inability to defend left hooks, his tendency to hold submissions from bad positions, and his recent losses to technical strikers all point toward Jackson's counter-striking finding a home early and often. The wrestling exchanges favor Jackson's chain defense and superior accuracy, while the striking exchanges favor Jackson's massive reach advantage and defensive metrics. Figueiredo needs to land his power right hand early or secure takedowns that lead to immediate submissions—both low-percentage outcomes against Jackson's defensive toolkit. WolfTicketsAI sees Jackson controlling distance, landing counter left hooks, and either finishing Figueiredo late or cruising to a clear decision victory. The model's 28 confidence score reflects a fighter hitting his prime against a former champion whose technical gaps have been brutally exposed in recent defeats.
Score: 24
Odds:
Vicente Luque: +350
Joel Alvarez: -520
Luque enters this welterweight bout in the twilight of a once-promising career, carrying the weight of serious medical concerns and a brutal recent slide. At 33, he's already suffered a brain hemorrhage following the Geoff Neal fight—a medical reality that fundamentally altered his durability and tactical approach. His recent record tells the story: just one win in his last five UFC appearances, with devastating knockout losses to Holland and Buckley exposing a fighter whose chin can no longer cash the checks his aggression writes.
The Brazilian's signature techniques remain technically sound but increasingly dangerous to deploy. His counter left hook, once a fight-ending weapon, now requires absorbing damage he can't afford. Against Holland, that massive elbow in Round 1 opened swelling behind his ear, foreshadowing the second-round knockdown and submission. His right hook counter over the top still shows flashes—he dropped Gorimbo with it before transitioning to an anaconda choke—but these moments of brilliance are islands in a sea of defensive vulnerability.
Luque's pressure fighting built his reputation, but it's become his liability. He walks forward on predictable tracks, chin high, head on centerline when jabbing. Neal exploited this repeatedly, dropping him with clean counters as Luque marched into range. Against Buckley, his desperation takedown after being hurt—pulling guard no less—showed a fighter whose instincts betray him under fire. His clinch game against RDA demonstrated technical growth (ankle picks from fence breaks, excellent hand-fighting), but that success came against a smaller, older opponent moving up in weight.
The submission threat remains legitimate—13 career submission wins, with d'arce and anaconda chokes his specialties. But accessing grappling requires closing distance through striking exchanges he increasingly loses. His takedown accuracy sits at 52%, respectable but not dominant enough to bypass the striking phase entirely.
Deteriorated Durability Against Power: The brain hemorrhage fundamentally changed Luque's ability to absorb damage. Holland dropped him with a clean shot in Round 2 after Luque had eaten punishment in Round 1. Buckley's second-round finish followed the same pattern—accumulating damage leading to a finish. Against Joaquin Buckley, he looked "downright uncomfortable taking those shots" from a true power puncher. His wars with Price and Perry came before the medical issues; that version of Luque no longer exists.
Static Head Position and Predictable Entries: Luque's jab leaves his head on centerline with his right hand dropped to chest level, creating a highway for counter hooks and straights. Neal exploited this pattern throughout their fight, timing counters as Luque advanced. His defensive reaction—pulling straight back then leaning excessively right—became so predictable that Neal could anticipate his escape routes. Against Holland's 6'3" frame and reach advantage, Luque couldn't adjust, remaining at the end of Holland's strikes throughout.
Compromised Recovery Patterns: When hurt, Luque immediately tries to return fire rather than establishing defensive positioning. This warrior mentality, once an asset, now accelerates his demise. The Holland finish exemplified this—after being dropped, Luque dove on a leg desperately, giving up his neck to a d'arce specialist. His tendency to reset with chin high after combinations creates additional windows for opponents to land follow-up shots before he's fully recovered.
Alvarez brings a fascinating stylistic contradiction to 170 pounds. At 6'3", he possesses the frame to fight at distance but deliberately chooses close-range warfare, weaponizing his length through knees, elbows, and body work rather than jabs and kicks. This pressure-heavy approach has produced 17 submission wins and a 22-3 record, with recent momentum building through three straight finishes.
His signature sequence starts with calculated cage-cutting, herding opponents to the fence without rushing. Once there, he establishes range with body jabs, follows with jab-straight combinations to the midsection, then integrates devastating knees and elbows after conditioning the guard. Against Klose, his wide left-hand slap knocked down the lead guard hand, opening the centerline for a right straight that wobbled Klose badly. This hand-fighting integrated into striking creates openings that wouldn't exist against set defenses.
The submission threat looms large—1.35 submissions per fight in his recent run. His guillotine choke finished Diakiese in Round 2, while his ground-and-pound overwhelmed Brener in Round 3 after nearly securing a first-round submission. Against Moises, he transitioned seamlessly from striking to grappling, applying relentless pressure with elbows and punches for a first-round TKO. His Brazilian jiu-jitsu credentials (17 career submission wins) make him dangerous in any scramble or transition.
His defensive grappling has evolved significantly. Against Klose's takedown attempts, Alvarez immediately moved to the cage and executed technical stand-ups—a marked improvement from the Ismagulov fight where he was controlled and damaged along the fence. His takedown defense ratio of 1.5 (recent: 3.97) shows growing competence, though his zero percent takedown accuracy suggests he's abandoned offensive wrestling entirely.
The striking volume overwhelms opponents: 6.94 strikes landed per minute, with 4.51 significant strikes. He absorbs just 1.60 head strikes per minute (recent: 1.85), indicating either excellent defense or opponents too compromised to return fire. His 62.8% striking accuracy (recent: 66.8%) reflects precision in close quarters where his length creates leverage advantages.
Defensive Recklessness in Pocket Range: Alvarez's aggressive forward pressure comes with substantial defensive gaps. He consistently places himself in pocket range where shorter opponents can counter effectively, often overextending on attacks without proper defensive structure. His entries lack feinting or level changes that would make approaches less predictable. Against Tsarukyan, this vulnerability proved catastrophic—Arman's power counters exploited Alvarez's willingness to trade in close quarters, leading to a second-round knockout.
Overreliance on Close-Range Exchanges: For a 6'3" lightweight moving to welterweight, Alvarez spends disproportionate time in phone booth range. This negates his physical advantages and exposes him to power shots from compact strikers. His comfort in tight exchanges suggests either tactical choice or technical limitation in maintaining distance. Against Ismagulov, his inability to establish outside control allowed Damir to pick him apart at range, winning a unanimous decision by exploiting Alvarez's one-dimensional pressure.
Reactive Rather Than Proactive Takedown Defense: While improved, Alvarez's takedown defense remains reactive. He relies on fence work and standing back up rather than preventing level changes entirely. This defensive approach burns energy and cedes positional control. Against elite welterweight wrestlers—a different caliber than lightweight grapplers—this could prove insufficient. His zero takedown attempts suggest he's abandoned offensive wrestling, making him predictable in grappling exchanges.
This fight presents a fascinating collision of compromised durability versus technical vulnerability. Luque's aggressive pressure typically forces opponents backward, but Alvarez's own forward pressure creates a phone booth fight where both men want to operate. The question becomes: whose weapons are more effective in tight quarters?
Alvarez's Body Work vs. Luque's Durability: Alvarez's systematic body attack—jabs, straights, knees—targets exactly the accumulation strategy that breaks down Luque. The Brazilian's high guard leaves his midsection exposed, and Alvarez's length allows him to land body shots from angles Luque struggles to defend. Each body shot lowers Luque's hands incrementally, creating openings for the head shots that have been finishing him lately.
Luque's Hooks vs. Alvarez's Defensive Gaps: Luque's counter left hook and right cross remain dangerous if he can time Alvarez's entries. The Spaniard's tendency to overextend in pocket range creates windows for Luque's power shots. However, Luque must land these counters without absorbing damage first—a proposition his compromised chin makes increasingly unlikely.
Grappling Scrambles: If the fight hits the mat, Alvarez's submission threat (1.35 per fight) meets Luque's own credentials (0.69 per fight, but 13 career submission wins). Both men are dangerous in transitions, but Alvarez's recent activity and lack of accumulated damage give him the edge in scrambles. Luque's desperation grappling against Holland—pulling guard after being hurt—suggests his decision-making deteriorates under pressure.
Size and Reach: Alvarez's 77-inch reach versus Luque's 75 inches seems minimal, but Alvarez's height (6'3" vs Luque's 5'11") creates leverage advantages in the clinch and on the ground. Luque has never fought someone with Alvarez's combination of size, submission skills, and forward pressure.
Early Rounds: Alvarez establishes his cage-cutting patterns immediately, backing Luque toward the fence. Luque's early aggression—his best chance—meets Alvarez's own pressure, creating immediate exchanges. Alvarez's body work begins accumulating damage, lowering Luque's guard. Luque lands some counter hooks, but absorbs more than he delivers. Alvarez's youth (28 vs 33) and lack of recent damage give him the cardio edge.
Mid-Fight Adjustments: If Luque survives early exchanges, he needs to establish his jab and use lateral movement—techniques he's abandoned in favor of brawling. But his recent performances show a fighter who can't implement tactical adjustments under fire. Alvarez continues his systematic breakdown, mixing body shots with knees and elbows in the clinch. Any takedown attempts by either fighter likely result in scrambles where Alvarez's submission threat looms.
Championship Rounds: This fight likely doesn't reach deep water. Luque's recent finishes (all inside two rounds when he loses) suggest his durability fails quickly. Alvarez's three straight finishes (Rounds 1, 3, and 1) show a fighter who closes shows. If the fight somehow extends, Alvarez's superior recent activity and lack of accumulated damage give him the cardio advantage. Luque's wars—even his wins—have taken cumulative tolls his body can't repay.
Medical Reality: Luque's brain hemorrhage following the Neal fight fundamentally altered his career trajectory. This isn't speculation—it's documented medical history that manifested in subsequent knockout losses to Buckley and Holland.
Recent Form Disparity: Alvarez rides three straight finishes (all Performance of the Night bonuses) against increasingly tough competition. Luque has one win (Gorimbo) in his last five, with brutal knockout losses bracketing that victory.
Size Matters at Welterweight: Alvarez's 6'3" frame moving up from lightweight brings fresh legs and size advantages. Luque, a career welterweight with extensive damage, faces a bigger, younger, less-damaged opponent.
Stylistic Nightmare: Alvarez's body-heavy attack targets Luque's defensive gaps, while his submission threat (1.35 per fight recently) matches Luque's own credentials but with better recent execution.
Desperation Factor: Luque needs this win desperately—another loss likely ends his UFC tenure. But desperation often accelerates his worst tendencies: overaggression, defensive recklessness, and compromised decision-making when hurt.
The model's confidence in Alvarez stems from several statistical factors that paint a clear picture:
Odds decreased the prediction score by 18 points—the betting market heavily favors Alvarez (-520), and the model respects this consensus while still finding value in his profile.
Recent Win Percentage decreased the score by 3 points, acknowledging Luque's 33% recent win rate (1-2 in his last three) versus Alvarez's perfect 100% (3-0).
Recent Striking Impact Differential increased the score by 1 point—Alvarez's +7.74 recent differential versus Luque's -1.59 shows who's winning striking exchanges.
Recent Takedowns Attempted per Fight increased the score by 1 point—Alvarez's 0.47 attempts versus Luque's 1.70 suggests Alvarez won't play into Luque's grappling game unnecessarily.
Striking Defense Percentage increased the score by 1 point—Alvarez's 41.6% (recent: 45.1%) versus Luque's 48.3% (recent: 44.5%) shows both men get hit, but Alvarez absorbs less head damage (1.85 vs 3.61 per minute recently).
The model recognizes this as a striker versus striker matchup where the younger, less-damaged, more active fighter holds every meaningful advantage. Alvarez's submission threat provides an additional finishing avenue Luque can't match.
WolfTicketsAI's history with these fighters reveals important patterns:
Vicente Luque (2-4 in predictions): - Correct: RDA decision win (55% confidence), Gorimbo submission loss prediction was wrong (71% confidence—model overestimated Gorimbo) - Incorrect: Buckley KO loss (53% confidence—barely favored Luque), Neal KO loss (70% confidence—badly wrong), Muhammad decision loss (76% confidence—very wrong), Holland submission loss (65% confidence—correctly predicted Holland)
The model has struggled with Luque, particularly overestimating his chances against wrestlers (Muhammad) and underestimating his vulnerability to power strikers (Neal, Buckley). However, it correctly predicted his recent losses to Holland and Buckley's finish, suggesting improved calibration on his current decline.
Joel Alvarez (3-1 in predictions): - Correct: Klose KO win (70% confidence), Brener KO win (62% confidence), Tsarukyan KO loss (79% confidence—correctly predicted Arman) - Incorrect: Diakiese submission win (64% confidence favored Diakiese—model missed Alvarez's submission threat)
The model reads Alvarez well, correctly predicting his finishes and his lone recent loss. The Diakiese miss suggests the model initially undervalued his submission game, but recent predictions show improved understanding of his finishing ability.
Key Takeaway: The model has learned from its Luque mistakes, particularly his vulnerability to power and his declining durability. Its strong track record with Alvarez (3-1, with the loss correctly predicting his opponent) adds confidence to this prediction.
Joel Alvarez finishes Vicente Luque inside two rounds. The Brazilian's compromised durability meets a bigger, younger, less-damaged opponent whose systematic body attack and submission threat create multiple finishing paths. Luque's warrior mentality—once his greatest asset—now accelerates his demise, as he'll engage in the phone booth warfare where Alvarez's length becomes weaponized. The medical reality of Luque's brain hemorrhage, combined with recent knockout losses and Alvarez's surging momentum, makes this a dangerous mismatch disguised as a competitive fight. Alvarez by TKO or submission, Round 2.
Score: 6
Odds:
Jhonata Diniz: -106
Mario Pinto: -120
Diniz brings elite kickboxing credentials (22-7 with 15 KOs) into this heavyweight clash, and his recent bounce-back against Alvin Hines showed he can still execute his game plan under pressure. Against Hines, Diniz systematically broke down his opponent through precision jabbing that swelled Hines' eye by Round 1, then added accumulating leg kicks that welted the calf quickly. When Hines pressed forward hunting overhand rights, Diniz beat him to the punch with check left hooks—textbook counter-striking from his GLORY background.
His signature weapons remain his piston-like jab and low kicks. Against Hines, he landed 63 strikes to 45, using diverse kickboxing angles to frustrate plodding pressure. The jab opened cuts on both of Hines' eyes while the leg kicks accumulated damage that visibly slowed his opponent by Round 2. Diniz closed that fight with a head kick Hines absorbed at the bell, demonstrating his willingness to throw varied techniques even when fatigued.
Against Karl Williams at UFC Vegas 95, Diniz connected on 4.31 significant strikes per minute with 48% accuracy, managing pace effectively and maintaining defensive awareness (taking only 3.92 significant strikes per minute). His 79-inch reach allows him to work behind the jab, and his orthodox stance creates clean angles for his right hand and left hook counters.
The Austen Lane fight showcased both his power and adaptability. After getting dominated on the mat in Round 1, Diniz chopped Lane's legs until he stood up, then unleashed a devastating combination—left uppercut, right uppercut, left hook—that finished Lane at 2:12 of Round 2. This sequence demonstrated his ability to chain strikes together once he identifies openings, transitioning from leg kicks to power punches seamlessly.
1. Catastrophic Ground Game Deficiencies (Tybura Fight)
The Marcin Tybura loss exposed Diniz's most glaring weakness. After landing a hard high kick that rocked Tybura in the opening seconds, Diniz took top position but immediately got swept—a fundamental error showing complete inexperience on the ground. From that point, Tybura controlled over 7 minutes of the 10-minute fight, landing 153 strikes to Diniz's 27. In Round 2, Tybura scooped up Diniz with ease (no sprawl, no defensive footwork), then rained down elbows from mount that opened multiple cuts. The doctor stoppage came after Diniz showed wobbly legs between rounds. His 29.4% takedown defense rate (47.4% recently) confirms this isn't improving—any competent wrestler will replicate Tybura's blueprint.
2. Third-Round Cardio Collapse
Against Hines, Diniz's offense "fell off a cliff" in Round 3 after dominating the first two rounds. Both fighters were visibly tired, but Diniz's significant drop in output allowed Hines to steal the round on some scorecards (all three judges scored it 29-28, with the third round going to Hines on two cards). This pattern creates a dangerous scenario: if Diniz can't finish early, his effectiveness plummets as the fight progresses. His recent significant striking output differential of -4.89 suggests he's not maintaining volume in later rounds.
3. Defensive Lapses Under Sustained Pressure
Diniz "ate a right hand when taking too long to get his hands back up" against Hines, and both fighters "scored right hands at the same time," indicating occasional defensive breakdowns. His 48.75% striking defense (50% recently) means he's absorbing nearly as much as he's landing. Against Tybura, once the pressure mounted on the ground, Diniz showed no ability to create scrambles or improve position—he simply covered up and absorbed damage. When his primary kickboxing game gets neutralized, he has no backup plan.
Pinto enters the UFC undefeated at 10-0, bringing a patient, counter-oriented approach that relies on extended observation before explosive commitments. Against Austen Lane—the same opponent Diniz finished—Pinto spent nearly the entire first round and early second round in pure defensive shell, surrendering initiative while reading Lane's patterns. Then, mid-way through Round 2, he executed his signature entry: a fake jab immediately followed by a fake right hand, using both feints to disguise a double shuffle-step forward. This disrupted Lane's defensive timing completely.
Once Pinto closed distance through that shuffle entry, he pushed Lane to the fence and maintained offensive continuity through combination work. The finish came in open space when Pinto landed a committed overhand right that exploited Lane's defensive fragility—Lane dropped rigidly, impacting the back of his head on the canvas due to his extreme height.
Pinto's overhand right functions as his primary finishing weapon, thrown with full commitment when opponents settle into predictable rhythms. He lands 2.83 strikes per minute with 61.5% accuracy (56.5% significant striking accuracy), demonstrating economical but precise output. His 2.65 knockdowns per fight rate shows legitimate finishing power, and his perfect 100% takedown defense (though only tested with 2.65 attempts against him per fight) suggests solid defensive wrestling fundamentals.
His conditioning exceeds heavyweight division norms, allowing him to maintain the patient approach his style requires. He can afford to surrender early rounds because his cardio enables full-intensity output in later frames.
1. Extended Passivity Creating Momentum Deficits
Pinto's preference for back-foot observation creates extended periods where he surrenders offensive initiative entirely. Against Lane, he spent the majority of the first round in pure defensive shell, allowing Lane to establish rhythm and confidence. This approach proves particularly problematic against opponents with sufficient durability to weather isolated power shots. His recent striking impact differential of -20 and significant striking impact differential of -19 confirm he's getting outlanded significantly during these passive phases. Against volume strikers who can accumulate points, Pinto builds massive deficits that require near-perfect execution on limited offensive opportunities.
2. One-Dimensional Finishing Approach
Pinto's finishing ability relies almost exclusively on the overhand right. His combination work along the fence shows activity but lacks technical precision to accumulate significant damage—it primarily maintains pressure rather than threatens finishes. He lands only 0.53 leg kicks per minute and 0.35 body strikes per minute, focusing almost exclusively on head-hunting. Against opponents who successfully defend or survive the overhand, Pinto has demonstrated limited alternative paths to victory. His kicking game remains underdeveloped, and he shows minimal body attack integration.
3. Absent Clinch Game and Grappling Offense
Pinto showed no clinch game against Lane despite facing an opponent with significant size advantages where clinch work would be expected. He's attempted 2.65 takedowns per fight but landed zero, suggesting he either can't finish takedowns or doesn't seriously commit to them. He lands only 0.18 clinch strikes per minute, indicating he avoids close-range exchanges entirely. This creates a massive tactical gap—wrestlers and grinding clinch fighters can nullify his single-shot power approach by eliminating the distance required for his overhand right.
This matchup presents a fascinating clash of patient strikers with opposite approaches to accumulating damage. Diniz uses volume and systematic breakdowns (jabs opening cuts, leg kicks accumulating damage), while Pinto relies on extended observation followed by single, decisive power shots.
Diniz's Advantages:
Volume striking during Pinto's passive phases: Diniz lands 4.36 significant strikes per minute compared to Pinto's 2.30. During Pinto's extended observation periods, Diniz can accumulate massive advantages through his jab-leg kick system. Against Hines, Diniz's jab swelled the eye by Round 1 and his leg kicks welted the calf quickly—this cumulative damage approach directly counters Pinto's passivity.
Diverse kickboxing arsenal: Diniz's head kicks, body kicks, and varied combinations give him multiple paths to victory. Pinto's exclusive head-hunting (only 0.35 body strikes per minute) means Diniz can work the body and legs without fear of counters to those areas.
Superior recent activity: Diniz's 67% recent win percentage across three UFC fights provides more data points than Pinto's single UFC appearance, suggesting better adaptation to Octagon variables.
Pinto's Advantages:
Power equalizer: Pinto's 2.65 knockdowns per fight rate means he only needs one clean overhand right to end the fight. Diniz's 48.75% striking defense and tendency to eat shots when his hands drop creates openings for Pinto's signature weapon.
Cardio exploitation: If Pinto can survive into Round 3, Diniz's documented cardio collapse becomes a massive factor. Pinto's conditioning exceeds division norms, and his patient approach conserves energy early.
Takedown defense: Pinto's perfect 100% takedown defense neutralizes any desperation wrestling from Diniz, though Diniz has attempted zero takedowns in the UFC, so this is largely irrelevant.
Critical Technical Clash:
Diniz's jab-leg kick accumulation system directly exploits Pinto's extended passivity. Against Lane, Pinto allowed nearly 1.5 rounds of unopposed pressure before committing to offense. Diniz won't waste this time—he'll systematically break down Pinto's lead leg and open cuts with the jab, building advantages Pinto can't erase with a single overhand right.
However, Pinto's double-feint shuffle entry could catch Diniz during his own offensive combinations. When Diniz chains jab-body kick-head kick sequences (as he did against Hines), he momentarily drops defensive awareness. Pinto's fake jab-fake right hand entry disrupts defensive timing precisely during these transitions.
Early Round (Minutes 1-5):
Diniz establishes his jab immediately, using his 79-inch reach (matching Pinto's) to control distance. Pinto enters defensive shell, observing patterns. Diniz begins chopping the lead leg with low kicks, replicating his Hines strategy. Pinto absorbs 3.01 head strikes per minute and 2.30 body strikes per minute in his UFC data, suggesting he'll allow this accumulation initially. Diniz likely builds a clear striking advantage on the scorecards, landing 4+ significant strikes per minute while Pinto lands 2-3.
Mid-Fight Adjustments (Minutes 6-10):
This is where the fight gets decided. If Diniz has accumulated significant leg damage and opened cuts with the jab, Pinto faces a dilemma: commit to his overhand right entry while compromised, or continue observing while falling further behind. Diniz's cardio concerns haven't manifested yet, so he's still outputting 4+ strikes per minute. Pinto needs to land his overhand right during this phase, using his double-feint entry when Diniz settles into offensive rhythm. If Pinto times a counter as Diniz throws his jab-leg kick combination, the overhand right could land clean on Diniz's exposed chin.
Championship Round (Minutes 11-15):
If the fight reaches Round 3, Pinto's advantages multiply exponentially. Diniz's offense "falls off a cliff" based on the Hines fight, dropping from 4+ strikes per minute to minimal output. Pinto's superior conditioning allows full-intensity output while Diniz fades. However, if Diniz has built a substantial lead through two rounds of volume striking, Pinto needs a finish—and his one-dimensional approach (overhand right only) becomes predictable when forced to press action.
Diniz holds a 2-1 UFC record but lost his last fight via doctor stoppage after Tybura dominated him on the ground for 7+ minutes. The model shows concern about his recent win percentage dropping to 67%.
Pinto is making his UFC debut with only one Octagon appearance against Austen Lane, the same opponent Diniz finished. Both fighters stopped Lane, but Diniz did it faster (2:12 of Round 2 vs. mid-Round 2).
Significant striking impact differential heavily favors Diniz (+7.0 model impact), with his systematic damage accumulation through jabs and leg kicks creating cumulative advantages Pinto's single-shot approach can't match.
Diniz's ground game remains catastrophic (29.4% takedown defense), but Pinto has landed zero takedowns in his career and shows no wrestling offense, making this vulnerability irrelevant for this matchup.
Pinto's extended passivity allows durable opponents to build massive leads—Diniz's volume striking (4.36 significant strikes per minute vs. Pinto's 2.30) directly exploits this tendency.
Both fighters share 79-inch reach, eliminating range advantages and forcing technical execution to determine outcomes.
The model decreased confidence based on recent win percentage (-2.0 impact) due to Diniz's Tybura loss, but increased confidence significantly based on striking differentials (+7.0 significant striking impact, +3.0 recent significant striking impact).
The model's confidence in Diniz stems primarily from striking metrics that favor systematic damage accumulation over single-shot power:
Significant Striking Impact Differential increased the prediction score by 7.0—the largest single factor. Diniz's ability to land cleaner, harder shots consistently through jabs and leg kicks creates advantages Pinto's passive approach can't overcome.
Odds increased the score by 3.0, with Diniz at -106 vs. Pinto at -120, suggesting the betting market slightly favors Pinto but the model sees value in Diniz.
Recent Significant Striking Impact Differential added 3.0, confirming Diniz's recent performances (Hines fight) demonstrate the systematic striking approach that counters Pinto's style.
Recent Win Percentage decreased the score by 2.0 due to the Tybura loss, but this is outweighed by striking advantages that directly apply to this matchup.
Striking Impact Differential (+1.0) and Significant Striking Output Differential (+1.0) provide additional confirmation that Diniz's volume approach creates measurable advantages.
The model essentially sees Pinto's extended passivity as a fatal flaw against Diniz's volume striking. While Pinto's overhand right provides a path to victory, the model calculates that Diniz's systematic damage accumulation through 10-15 minutes is more reliable than Pinto landing one perfect shot.
WolfTicketsAI has struggled with Diniz predictions, going 0-2:
Predicted Diniz over Tybura (0.52 confidence): Wrong. Tybura dominated on the ground, exposing Diniz's catastrophic grappling deficiencies. However, Pinto shows zero wrestling offense, making this loss less relevant to the current matchup.
Predicted Karl Williams over Diniz (0.69 confidence): Wrong. Diniz's superior striking and pace management overcame Williams' late surge, proving the model underestimated Diniz's technical striking advantages.
The model has no prediction history with Pinto, creating uncertainty around his UFC-level performance beyond the single Lane fight. However, the model's previous errors with Diniz came against grapplers (Tybura) or when underestimating his striking volume (Williams)—neither applies here, as Pinto is a striker who allows opponents to accumulate volume during passive phases.
This prediction represents the model's attempt to correct previous underestimation of Diniz's striking advantages while facing a stylistically favorable matchup.
Diniz takes this fight through systematic volume striking that exploits Pinto's extended passivity. While Pinto's overhand right provides a legitimate knockout threat, his tendency to surrender 1-1.5 rounds of initiative allows Diniz to accumulate damage through jabs that open cuts and leg kicks that compromise mobility. By the time Pinto commits to his double-feint entry, Diniz has built advantages that a single power shot can't erase. If the fight reaches Round 3, Diniz's cardio concerns become relevant, but his early volume should secure a decision or force Pinto into desperate, predictable overhand rights that Diniz can time with counter left hooks. WolfTicketsAI predicts Jhonata Diniz wins by decision, likely 29-28 on most cards, using the same systematic breakdown approach that destroyed Alvin Hines.
Score: 12
Odds:
Ricardo Ramos: -215
Kaan Ofli: +164
Ramos brings 17 UFC fights worth of experience into this featherweight matchup, but he's limping in on a brutal two-fight skid. His recent form is concerning—he's 2-5 in his last seven and just dropped a decision to Chepe Mariscal in March. That said, when Ramos is on, he's dangerous as hell.
His signature weapon remains the spinning back elbow. Against Danny Chavez in 2022, Ramos backed him to the fence, feinted a level change to drop Chavez's hands, then uncorked a spinning elbow that ended the night. It's a high-risk move, but Ramos has the timing down—he chains it off missed lead elbows, as he did against Mariscal in Round 3, rotating through 180 degrees and catching his opponent advancing back into range.
The lead elbow entry is another staple. Ramos steps deep with his front foot, swinging the lead elbow in a committed arc to cover distance. It's unorthodox and effective when opponents are fence-backed or advancing, but he sometimes throws it in open space where opponents can retreat and counter down the centerline.
His grappling game is slick. Ramos integrates boxing-to-wrestling beautifully, using duck-unders after punch combinations to access body locks and back exposure. His inside trip game from collar-tie or underhook positions is reliable for positional advancement. Against Mariscal, he attempted a taiotoshi throw from overhook control, and when it failed, he immediately transitioned to a calf slicer attempt—showing submission creativity beyond standard attacks.
But here's the problem: Ramos's shot selection goes to hell when he's losing. Against Mariscal, down two rounds, he opened Round 3 with a rabona kick—a crossover kick with zero practical application. He's attempted this nonsense 20+ times in single fights before, sacrificing position and energy for techniques that rarely land and do minimal damage when they do. His strategic discipline collapses under pressure, and he chases highlight-reel finishes instead of grinding out wins.
1. Catastrophic Shot Selection Under Adversity (Rounds 2-3 vs Mariscal, Round 1 vs Erosa)
When Ramos faces scoreboard pressure, he abandons high-percentage techniques for spectacular garbage. Against Mariscal, entering Round 3 down on the cards, he threw a rabona kick instead of using his proven inside trips and spinning elbows. Against Julian Erosa in 2024, he dropped Erosa early but then shot a poorly-timed takedown and got guillotined in Round 1. Against Charles Jourdain in 2023, same story—guillotined in Round 1 after overcommitting. This pattern is exploitable: establish early control, get ahead on the scorecards, and watch Ramos self-destruct with low-percentage techniques.
2. Lead Elbow Entry Timing Against Open Space (Round 3 vs Mariscal)
Ramos's lead elbow requires deep penetration steps, placing both feet on a narrow line and compromising lateral mobility. Against Mariscal, he threw this in open space where his opponent could retreat, leaving him vulnerable to straight punches during recovery. The technique works when opponents are fence-backed or advancing, but Ramos doesn't consistently assess opponent state before committing. This creates counter-punching windows, especially for fighters who can read the deep step and fire straight down the middle.
3. Submission Vulnerability in Transitions (Round 1 vs Erosa, Round 1 vs Jourdain)
Ramos has been guillotined in back-to-back losses to Erosa and Jourdain, both in Round 1. His aggressive takedown entries leave his neck exposed when opponents sprawl and latch onto the guillotine. Against Erosa, he went for a takedown after dropping him, and Erosa immediately locked up the choke. His defensive awareness during wrestling transitions is poor—he prioritizes position advancement over neck safety, and competent grapplers are capitalizing.
Ofli enters the UFC at 0-2 after losses to Mairon Santos (TKO) and Muhammad Naimov (unanimous decision). He's fighting for his job, and his performances so far have been rough. Against Santos in the TUF 32 finale, Ofli got caught with an overhand right and finished on his knees. Against Naimov in February, he was thoroughly outclassed—controlled against the fence, taken down repeatedly, and held in back control for over three minutes in Round 3.
Ofli's striking centers around leg kicks and an overhand right. He uses the leg kicks to disrupt movement and set up his power hand. Against Naimov, he cracked him with a clean uppercut in Round 2, showing he can find openings in the pocket. His clinch work includes knees to the thigh and elbows over the top, and he showed decent underhook control with reversals against the fence.
His grappling is supposed to be a strength—he's got a BJJ background with submissions like rear-naked chokes and armbars. But here's the issue: his takedown offense is nonexistent (0% success rate in the UFC), and his takedown defense is catastrophic (15% defense rate against Naimov). When opponents get him down, he can defend submissions—he fought off a body triangle and rear-naked choke attempt for three minutes against Naimov—but he can't get back up or reverse position effectively.
Ofli's output is abysmal. He landed 31 significant strikes total against Naimov and averages 1.85 significant strikes per minute. Compare that to Ramos's 2.97 per minute, and you see the activity gap. Ofli darts in and out with kicks but can't sustain pressure or volume.
1. Takedown Defense Collapse (Round 2-3 vs Naimov)
Ofli's 15% takedown defense rate is UFC-bottom-tier. Against Naimov, he got taken down in Round 2 with two minutes left, immediately giving up side control. In Round 3, Naimov took him down, moved to mount, forced him to give up his back, and held him there for over three minutes. Ofli couldn't create scrambles or wall-walk—he just survived in bad positions. Ramos averages 2.57 takedowns per fight on 57.5% accuracy. Ofli will spend significant time on his back, and his inability to get up or reverse will cost him rounds.
2. Striking Volume and Output Deficiency (All UFC fights)
Ofli landed 31 total significant strikes against Naimov and averages 1.18 significant strikes per minute in recent fights. His striking defense is equally poor—32.95% in recent bouts, meaning he's eating two strikes for every one he lands. Against Santos, he got caught with an overhand because he overcommitted to his own punches, leaving his chin exposed. His footwork is poor, and he gets off-balance easily—Santos decked him with a two-punch burst when Ofli was off-balance, and Naimov did the same late in Round 1. Ramos's spinning attacks and lead elbows will find a home against someone who can't maintain stance stability.
3. Cage Control and Fence Wrestling (Round 1-3 vs Naimov)
Naimov repeatedly turned Ofli into the fence and controlled him there with short punches and body shots. Ofli managed brief reversals with double underhooks but couldn't sustain control—Naimov reversed immediately and landed five-six punch combos that forced Ofli to cover up. Ramos excels in the clinch with inside trips and duck-unders to back exposure. Ofli's inability to control cage position or win fence battles means Ramos will dictate where this fight takes place.
This is a nightmare matchup for Ofli. Ramos's takedown game directly attacks Ofli's worst vulnerability—his 15% takedown defense. Ramos will shoot early and often, and Ofli has shown zero ability to stop takedowns or get back up once grounded. Ramos's inside trips from the clinch will work perfectly against Ofli's poor cage control and fence wrestling.
On the feet, Ramos's spinning elbows and lead elbows exploit Ofli's poor striking defense (32.95%) and balance issues. Ofli gets off-balance easily and eats shots when he overcommits—exactly the scenarios where Ramos's spinning techniques shine. Against Mariscal, Ramos landed the spinning elbow when his opponent advanced back into range after a missed lead elbow. Ofli's tendency to dart in and out with kicks creates similar timing windows.
Ofli's best path is landing his overhand right early and often, hoping to catch Ramos clean like Santos did. But Ramos has eaten shots from harder hitters (Lerone Murphy TKO'd him in 2020) and survived. Ofli's 1.18 significant strikes per minute output won't generate enough offense to threaten a finish.
Ofli's grappling—his supposed strength—won't matter because he can't initiate takedowns (0% success rate) and can't stop Ramos's. Once Ramos gets top position, Ofli's defensive BJJ will keep him alive but won't win rounds. Ramos's submission rate (0.67 per fight) means Ofli will be defending choke attempts all night.
Early Rounds (1-2): Ramos establishes his takedown game immediately. Ofli's 15% takedown defense means Ramos will get him down within the first two minutes. Once there, Ramos controls position with his inside trips and back-take sequences. Ofli survives but loses clear 10-9 rounds. On the feet, Ramos's spinning elbows find openings against Ofli's poor defense. Ofli lands occasional leg kicks and maybe an overhand, but his 1.18 significant strikes per minute output isn't enough to win exchanges.
Mid-Fight Adjustments (Round 2-3): If Ofli somehow stuffs early takedowns, Ramos shifts to clinch work. His duck-unders and inside trips from collar-tie positions overwhelm Ofli's weak cage control. Ofli attempts reversals with underhooks but can't sustain them—Ramos immediately counters and lands short elbows and knees. Ofli's output drops further as fatigue sets in from defensive grappling. Ramos's cardio (he's gone to decision 7 times) allows him to maintain pace.
Late Rounds (If it goes there): Ramos's submission game becomes more dangerous as Ofli fatigues. Ramos hunts rear-naked chokes and calf slicers from back control. Ofli's defensive BJJ keeps him alive—he defended Naimov's rear-naked choke for three minutes—but he's losing rounds badly on the scorecards. If Ramos is ahead, his shot selection stays disciplined. If somehow behind, he might revert to rabona kicks and low-percentage techniques, but Ofli's lack of offense means Ramos won't face scoreboard pressure.
Takedown Dominance: Ramos's 2.57 takedowns per fight on 57.5% accuracy vs Ofli's 15% takedown defense is the fight in a nutshell. Ofli will spend significant time on his back.
Output Disparity: Ramos lands 2.97 significant strikes per minute; Ofli lands 1.18. Even on the feet, Ramos wins the volume battle.
Experience Gap: Ramos has 17 UFC fights; Ofli has 2. Ramos has faced elite competition (Zubaira Tukhugov, Lerone Murphy); Ofli got dominated by mid-tier opponents.
Submission Threat: Ramos's 0.67 submissions per fight means Ofli will defend choke attempts all night. Ofli's neck defense in transitions is untested at this level.
Heuristic Warning - Recent KO Loss: Ofli was TKO'd by Santos in August 2024, just eight months ago. His chin and defensive awareness remain questionable.
Heuristic Warning - Downward Trend: Ofli is 0-2 in the UFC and 0-2 in recent fights. He's fighting for his job with zero momentum.
Reach Advantage: Ramos has a 72-inch reach vs Ofli's 66 inches—a 6-inch advantage that helps his spinning techniques and lead elbows land from range.
The model gives Ramos a score of 12, driven primarily by the betting odds (increased score by 9 points). The odds reflect the massive skill and experience gap—Ramos is -215 for good reason.
Odds increased the prediction score by 9.0—the market correctly identifies Ramos as a heavy favorite despite his recent losses.
Recent Win Percentage increased the score by 2.0—Ramos's 33% recent win rate still exceeds Ofli's 0%.
Reach increased the score by 2.0—Ramos's 6-inch reach advantage helps his unorthodox striking land.
Recent Takedowns Attempted per Fight increased the score by 2.0—Ramos's 4.30 attempts per fight directly attack Ofli's worst vulnerability.
TrueSkill decreased the score by 1.0—Ofli's inflated TrueSkill (due to limited UFC data) slightly favors him, but the model correctly weighs other factors more heavily.
Striking Defense Percentage decreased the score by 1.0—Ramos's 50% defense is poor, but Ofli's 32.95% is worse, and his output is too low to exploit it.
The model identifies the key factors: Ramos's betting odds, takedown volume, and reach advantage overwhelm Ofli's defensive deficiencies. Even with Ramos's recent struggles, Ofli's 0-2 UFC record and catastrophic takedown defense make him a clear underdog.
WolfTicketsAI has a mixed record on Ramos. It correctly predicted his win over Danny Chavez (score 0.78) but incorrectly favored him against Julian Erosa (0.60) and Charles Jourdain (0.70)—both guillotine losses. It also incorrectly predicted Josh Culibao over Ramos (0.61), and correctly predicted Mariscal over Ramos (0.77).
The pattern: the model struggles when Ramos faces competent grapplers who can capitalize on his submission vulnerabilities. But Ofli isn't a competent grappler at this level—his 0% takedown success rate and 15% defense mean he can't implement his grappling game.
For Ofli, the model correctly predicted Naimov to beat him (0.68). This is the model's first prediction favoring Ofli's opponent besides that fight, and the data supports it.
The caution: Ramos can lose to anyone if he gets guillotined again. But Ofli's lack of takedown offense means he won't create those scenarios. The model's confidence is justified.
Ramos takes this fight by decision or submission. His takedown game overwhelms Ofli's nonexistent defense, and his experience advantage shows in every phase. Ofli's 0-2 UFC record and catastrophic grappling defense make him a sacrificial matchup for Ramos to get back in the win column. Expect Ramos to control position, rack up control time, and either grind out a decision or find a submission in Rounds 2-3. WolfTicketsAI's pick of Ramos is sound—this is a get-right fight for the Brazilian, and Ofli doesn't have the tools to stop it.
Score: 5
Odds:
Lucas Almeida: +130
Michael Aswell: -166
Almeida enters this fight in rough shape—he's lost three of his last four UFC appearances and sits at 2-3 in the promotion. The Brazilian black belt in kickboxing, Muay Thai, and jiu-jitsu has shown flashes of finishing power (0.88 knockdowns per fight) but his recent form tells a darker story.
Against Danny Silva in March, Almeida's defensive gaps were exposed systematically. Silva closed distance repeatedly, landing clean combinations that bloodied Almeida's nose by the midway point of round one. When Silva tagged him to the body in round two, it visibly caught Almeida's attention—a recurring vulnerability. Silva's pressure forced Almeida into retreat mode throughout the fight, and though Almeida likely won the third round by increasing output, he dropped the split decision.
His signature weapons include multi-level leg kicks (1.21 landed per minute) that target inside and outside calves plus body kicks to the sternum. He whipped these effectively against Cuamba, mixing them with his jab to control distance. Almeida's double collar tie clinch work can be effective when he catches opponents leaning in, delivering knees to disrupt rhythm—a technique he borrowed from Anderson Silva's playbook.
But Almeida's aggressive forward pressure comes with a price. Against Fili in December 2023, his tendency to chase knockouts left him open to counters, and Fili stopped him with strikes in the first round. Against Sabatini, his inability to keep the fight standing proved fatal—Sabatini took him down and submitted him with an arm-triangle choke in round two, exploiting Almeida's 50% takedown defense rate.
His recent stats paint a concerning picture: 33% win percentage in recent fights, absorbing 2.45 head strikes per minute while only landing 2.44, and a striking defense percentage that's dropped to 30%. He's fanning on strikes when trying to increase volume, as seen early in round three against Silva.
1. Body Defense Deficiency: Silva's body shots visibly hurt Almeida in round two of their March fight, catching his attention and slowing his output. His body strikes absorbed per minute (0.86) combined with his poor defensive posture when opponents dig to the midsection creates a clear exploitation point. When pressured against the cage, Almeida shells up but fails to protect his ribs adequately.
2. Inability to Maintain Distance Against Pressure: Silva repeatedly closed distance and landed clean despite Almeida's reach advantage. Almeida was forced to retreat throughout their fight, unable to use his leg kicks to keep the shorter fighter at bay. His striking defense has deteriorated to 30% recently, meaning he's eating seven out of every ten significant strikes thrown at him.
3. Predictable Entries When Aggressive: Cuamba exploited this perfectly, timing cross counters and hooks when Almeida pushed forward at predictable angles. When Almeida overcommits on strikes—particularly when chasing knockouts—he enters with his head on the centerline and hands low, creating openings for counters. His 0% takedown accuracy and minimal grappling attempts (0.09 recent takedowns attempted per fight) mean he has no backup plan when his striking fails.
Aswell makes his second UFC appearance after a tough debut loss to Bolaji Oki at UFC Vegas 107 in May. That fight came on four days' notice and up a weight class at lightweight, making it difficult to assess his true UFC-level abilities. But the performance revealed key characteristics.
Aswell's primary weapon is relentless forward pressure backed by exceptional durability. Against Oki, he absorbed a massive right hand that opened round three—a shot that would've dropped most fighters—and kept coming. His chin held up throughout despite eating powerful strikes, and he closed round one strong with a right-left combination that briefly stumbled Oki.
He lands 6.13 head strikes per minute with a 55% striking defense percentage—significantly better than Almeida's recent 30%. Aswell's pressure-fighting style involves stalking opponents through multiple rounds, applying volume (7.87 significant strikes landed per minute) while willing to trade in the pocket. His boxing fundamentals are solid, particularly his combination punching when he times opponents correctly.
The former Fury FC Featherweight champion is returning to his natural weight class here, which should benefit his speed and cardio. At lightweight against Oki, he struggled to land consistently against a faster, more technical opponent, but the weight disadvantage likely played a role.
Aswell's defensive metrics are solid: 1.42 strike defense to offense ratio and 55% striking defense percentage. He's never been knocked down in the UFC (0.0 knockdowns per fight) and has shown he can maintain output deep into fights without fading.
1. Body Defense Gaps: Oki targeted Aswell's body in round two and visibly hurt him, representing a clear turning point. Aswell maintained solid defense until those body attacks, suggesting his rib protection and counter-strategies against midsection targeting need work. He absorbs 2.4 body strikes per minute—nearly double what he lands (1.27).
2. Lack of Finishing Power: Despite landing clean shots on Oki and briefly stumbling him, Aswell couldn't capitalize to change momentum. Zero knockdowns in his UFC fight and limited finishing ability mean opponents remain unthreatened even when he's landing. His striking impact differential sits at -18, indicating his shots lack the power to deter aggressive opponents.
3. Failure to Adjust When Striking Fails: Against Oki, when the standup wasn't working, Aswell never mixed in takedown attempts or clinch work despite having "more competent grappling skills" per the fight analysis. He's attempted zero takedowns in the UFC and shown no wrestling integration. When his pressure-volume gameplan stalls, he has no Plan B—he just keeps walking forward into the same exchanges.
This matchup heavily favors Aswell's pressure-fighting approach against Almeida's deteriorating defensive structure. Almeida's 30% recent striking defense means he'll absorb Aswell's volume (7.87 significant strikes per minute) at an alarming rate. Silva proved the blueprint: close distance, apply pressure, and force Almeida to retreat while landing clean combinations.
Aswell's body attack could be devastating here. Almeida showed clear vulnerability when Silva dug to his midsection in round two, and Aswell lands 1.27 body strikes per minute. If Aswell targets Almeida's ribs early—mixing body jabs with his forward pressure—he can sap Almeida's cardio and limit his leg kick output.
Almeida's leg kicks (1.21 per minute) could theoretically slow Aswell's forward march, but Silva absorbed similar attacks and kept coming. Aswell's 55% striking defense is far superior to the opponents who've recently beaten Almeida, meaning he'll slip and counter many of Almeida's predictable entries.
The grappling dimension heavily favors Aswell. Almeida's 50% takedown defense and zero takedown accuracy mean if Aswell decides to mix in wrestling, Almeida has no answers. Sabatini submitted him with an arm-triangle in round two by simply taking him down and controlling him—a blueprint Aswell could follow if needed.
Almeida's best path involves using his leg kicks early to establish range, then catching Aswell with his double collar tie clinch work when Aswell pressures forward. But this requires Almeida to stand his ground and exchange—something he failed to do against Silva's pressure.
Early Rounds: Aswell will establish his pressure immediately, walking Almeida down like Silva did. Almeida will attempt to use leg kicks and jabs to maintain distance, but Aswell's superior striking defense (55% vs 30%) means he'll slip these attempts and close distance. Expect Aswell to land clean combinations in the pocket while Almeida retreats to the cage. Body shots from Aswell could pay dividends early.
Mid-Fight Adjustments: If Almeida's leg kicks start accumulating, Aswell might mix in level changes or clinch work to neutralize them—though he showed reluctance to wrestle against Oki. More likely, Aswell continues his pressure-boxing approach, targeting Almeida's body when he shells up against the cage. Almeida will try to increase output like he did in round three against Silva, but his accuracy issues when fanning on strikes could leave him open to counters.
Championship Rounds: Almeida's recent cardio concerns (absorbing 2.45 head strikes per minute while his output drops) suggest he'll fade if Aswell maintains pressure. Aswell showed no signs of slowing against Oki despite the short notice and weight disadvantage. Expect Aswell to pour it on late, potentially forcing a stoppage if Almeida's defensive structure completely collapses under accumulated damage.
Weight Class Return: Aswell drops back to featherweight after his lightweight debut, which should improve his speed and cardio advantages over the struggling Almeida
Recent Form Disparity: Almeida is 1-3 in his last four with deteriorating defensive metrics (30% striking defense recently), while Aswell showed heart and durability in his debut despite the loss
Pressure vs Retreat: Silva forced Almeida into retreat mode throughout their fight; Aswell employs a similar relentless pressure style that Almeida has consistently failed to handle
Body Attack Opportunity: Both Silva and Oki found success targeting their opponents' midsections; Almeida showed clear vulnerability to body shots while Aswell's body defense also has gaps—but Aswell's superior chin and durability give him the edge in exchanges
Defensive Metrics: Aswell's 55% striking defense dwarfs Almeida's recent 30%, meaning Aswell will land cleaner while absorbing less damage in exchanges
No Grappling Threat: Almeida's 0% takedown accuracy and minimal attempts mean Aswell faces zero wrestling threat, allowing him to focus purely on his boxing pressure
KO/TKO Warning: Almeida was stopped by strikes against Fili in round one in December 2023; his deteriorating defense and Aswell's volume make another stoppage possible
The model heavily favors Aswell based on several key factors:
The model recognizes that despite Almeida's longer UFC tenure and higher TrueSkill rating, his recent performance collapse and defensive deterioration make him vulnerable to Aswell's pressure-volume approach.
WolfTicketsAI has predicted Almeida's fights four times with a 3-1 record. The model correctly predicted losses to Silva (0.63 confidence), Fili (0.79 confidence), and Sabatini (0.66 confidence)—all fights where Almeida's defensive vulnerabilities were exploited. The model's only miss was predicting Cuamba to beat Almeida (0.62 confidence), when Almeida won by unanimous decision.
This is Aswell's first prediction from WolfTicketsAI, so there's no historical performance data. However, the model's strong track record identifying Almeida's losses—particularly against pressure fighters like Silva—suggests confidence in this prediction.
Aswell returns to featherweight with a clear path to victory: apply relentless pressure, target Almeida's vulnerable body defense, and force the Brazilian into retreat mode where his defensive structure collapses. Almeida's 30% recent striking defense and three losses in his last four fights signal a fighter trending downward, while Aswell's durability and pressure-fighting style present a nightmare matchup. The model's 5-point confidence score reflects a competitive but clear advantage for Aswell, who should break down Almeida's defense over three rounds or potentially force a stoppage if the body work accumulates. WolfTicketsAI backs Michael Aswell to hand Almeida his fourth loss in five UFC fights.
Score: 9
Odds:
Jafel Filho: -104
Clayton Carpenter: -122
Filho brings a dangerous submission game built around aggressive back-taking and methodical finishing sequences. His signature weapon is the rear-naked choke using the "Dagestani handcuff" variation—trapping one hand with both of his before punching in the choke on the exposed side. Against Ode Osbourne, Filho executed this perfectly in round 1, ignoring Osbourne's weighted hand along the fence and using both hands to trap the free hand. When Osbourne tried to flatten out and turn to defend, Filho maintained position and secured the finish.
His striking serves primarily as a setup tool, featuring calculated false entries that bait opponents into counter-striking at air. Against Daniel Barez, these false entries—partial step-ins without full commitment—created consistent openings for follow-up combinations. Filho also employs well-timed calf kicks as counters when opponents reset, compromising their mobility over time.
On the ground, Filho's butterfly half guard recovery is exceptional. He uses knee shields to prevent cross-body control, then transitions to butterfly hooks to create sweeping leverage. Against Muhammad Mokaev, despite being controlled for extended periods, Filho nearly finished a heel hook in round 3 after catching Mokaev's leg during a transition—demonstrating his ability to threaten submissions even from disadvantageous positions.
Filho attempts 2.6 submissions per 15 minutes and has finished both his recent wins by first-round submission. His recent takedown defense has improved to 93.71%, showing better underhook awareness than earlier in his career.
Catastrophic Cardio Collapse: Filho's most exploitable weakness was brutally exposed against Allan Nascimento. After dominating round 1 with two mount positions and a near-finish guillotine, Filho gassed completely. By round 2, he was "unable to break free" from bottom position. Round 3 saw him "clearly exhausted throughout the final five minutes," eventually ending up "stretched out and close to helpless" under Nascimento's control. His overzealous pace early—constantly hunting submissions from imperfect positions—creates an unsustainable energy drain.
Lead Hook Vulnerability Over Extended Jab: Against Barez in the southpaw-orthodox matchup, Filho showed consistent susceptibility to lead hooks coming over his jab. He leaves his head in the pocket momentarily after initiating combinations, creating a clear counter window. This defensive gap becomes more pronounced as he fatigues and his head movement deteriorates.
Position Maintenance Failures: Despite achieving dominant positions, Filho struggles to consolidate control. Against Nascimento, he "managed to trap Nascimento's legs with his own, nearly sitting in mount, though he couldn't hold the position." His tendency to immediately hunt submissions rather than secure position first allows opponents to reverse—Nascimento "was a little too high while trying to take his opponent's back," enabling the reversal that shifted momentum. At 32 years old with a 2-2 UFC record, these technical inefficiencies become critical against patient opponents who can weather his early storm.
Carpenter is a submission specialist with an 8-1 record, showcasing rear-naked choke finishes in both his UFC wins. Against Lucas Rocha, he demonstrated seamless transitions from striking to grappling, using aggressive jabs to gauge distance before executing takedowns. His wrestling background allows him to neutralize strikers by forcing grappling exchanges where his submission game thrives.
His clinch work is particularly effective—tying opponents against the cage to manage pace and limit their ability to create distance. Against Rocha, Carpenter's clinch control prevented clean strikes and set up multiple takedowns. Once on the ground, he displays excellent positional control, using body positioning and weight distribution to maintain top position and pass guard.
Carpenter's ground control philosophy emphasizes patience over explosiveness. He lands 3.11 significant strikes per minute with 58.96% accuracy, preferring to accumulate damage from dominant positions rather than forcing finishes. His 8.11 submissions per fight in recent outings shows increased finishing aggression, though this number is inflated by limited UFC sample size.
His takedown defense ratio of 1.33 (133%) indicates he actually scores takedowns off opponent attempts—a valuable counter-wrestling skill. Against Ronderos, Carpenter "allowed Ronderos to land an early takedown but quickly reversed position on the mat and took Ronderos' back," finishing with a rear-naked choke at 3:13 of round 1.
Insufficient Layered Takedown Defense Against Elite Wrestlers: Carpenter's defensive structure crumbled against Tagir Ulanbekov, exposing critical gaps. While he can defend initial shots with decent sprawls, he doesn't punish entries with knees, uppercuts, or front headlock attacks. This allows skilled wrestlers to chain attempts without consequence. Ulanbekov "employed varied entries throughout the fight, mixing single-leg attempts with body locks," eventually overwhelming Carpenter's reactive defense through sheer volume.
Overextension on Defensive Wrestling: When backed against the fence, Carpenter "tends to overextend his upper body when defending shots, which compromises his base and makes him susceptible to being lifted and slammed." His high stance prioritizes mobility but leaves his legs exposed to longer-distance entries. Against Ulanbekov, this resulted in extended bottom control periods where Carpenter "struggled to create meaningful scrambles or work back to his feet efficiently."
Zero Offensive Threat from Bottom: Carpenter poses no submission danger from bottom positions, allowing opponents to focus purely on control without defensive concerns. He "follows conventional escape pathways without adding layers of misdirection," working predictably toward underhooks. Ulanbekov maintained "heavy pressure and securing controlling positions that accumulated scoring without taking significant risks" because Carpenter never threatened sweeps or submissions. His -18.33 average striking output differential and -14.00 striking impact differential suggest he's consistently out-struck when fights stay standing, forcing him to rely heavily on his grappling to win rounds.
This matchup presents a fascinating grappler-versus-grappler dynamic where both fighters prefer to force submission exchanges, but their approaches differ fundamentally.
Filho's Explosive Submissions vs Carpenter's Positional Control: Filho hunts submissions aggressively from any position—flying triangles, guillotines, heel hooks, and his signature rear-naked choke. Carpenter prefers methodical positional advancement before attacking submissions. Filho's willingness to sacrifice position for submission attempts could play directly into Carpenter's counter-wrestling game. When Filho shot flying submissions against Mokaev, he often ended up in disadvantageous positions that required his butterfly half guard recovery.
The Cardio Factor: This is where the matchup tilts decisively. Filho's explosive early pace that gassed him against Nascimento by round 2 plays perfectly into Carpenter's patient, control-oriented approach. Carpenter demonstrated against Ulanbekov that he can survive grappling pressure and accumulate control time—exactly the blueprint to exploit Filho's cardio collapse. If Carpenter survives the first 5-7 minutes without getting submitted, Filho's technical execution deteriorates dramatically.
Submission Defense Comparison: Carpenter showed "resilience in defending against Rocha's submission attempts" by maintaining good positioning and controlling arms. However, he's never faced someone with Filho's submission volume (2.6 per 15 minutes vs Carpenter's opponents averaging far less). Filho's Dagestani handcuff rear-naked choke is particularly dangerous because it works even when opponents think they're defending properly by posting one hand.
Takedown Dynamics: Filho's 93.71% recent takedown defense is impressive, but Carpenter's counter-wrestling ability (1.33 takedown defense ratio) means he scores takedowns off opponent attempts. If Filho shoots aggressively early, Carpenter could reverse and establish top control—exactly what happened against Ronderos.
Early Rounds (0-5 minutes): Filho will come out aggressively, likely attempting his false entry striking to set up takedowns or flying submission attempts. This is his most dangerous phase—both UFC wins came via first-round submission. Carpenter must weather this storm without getting caught in Filho's rear-naked choke sequences. Carpenter's strategy should mirror his Ronderos fight: allow Filho to expend energy on takedown attempts, then reverse position using superior positioning fundamentals.
Mid-Fight (5-10 minutes): This is where the fight shifts dramatically. Filho's cardio issues manifest around the 7-8 minute mark based on the Nascimento fight. Carpenter's patient approach allows him to maintain energy while Filho's explosive submission hunting drains his tank. Expect Carpenter to increase takedown pressure here, knowing Filho's defensive wrestling deteriorates with fatigue. Filho's butterfly half guard becomes less effective when he lacks the energy to create explosive scrambles.
Late Fight (10-15 minutes): If the fight reaches round 3, Filho is in serious trouble. Against Nascimento, he was "clearly exhausted throughout the final five minutes" and ended up "stretched out and close to helpless." Carpenter's ground control game thrives in these situations—he can maintain top position, accumulate control time, and threaten submissions against an exhausted opponent who can't generate the explosive movements needed to escape or reverse.
The model heavily favors Filho based on several key factors:
The model's confidence stems from Filho's superior striking defense (48.31% vs 51.22%), better striking impact, and more aggressive takedown game. However, the model may be underweighting Filho's catastrophic cardio issues and Carpenter's patient control-oriented approach that exploits exactly this weakness.
WolfTicketsAI correctly predicted Filho's win over Osbourne (0.54 confidence) when Filho finished by first-round submission—validating the model's faith in his early finishing ability. However, the model also predicted Filho to beat Nascimento (0.52 confidence) and was wrong—Filho lost by unanimous decision after gassing completely. This loss came against the exact style that Carpenter employs: patient grappling with positional control.
For Carpenter, the model correctly predicted his loss to Ulanbekov (0.73 confidence for Ulanbekov), showing it accurately assessed Carpenter's vulnerability to elite wrestlers. The model hasn't predicted Carpenter to win in available data, suggesting some uncertainty about his ceiling.
The model's 1-1 record on Filho is concerning given the loss came in a stylistic matchup similar to this one. However, Carpenter's UFC sample size (only 2 fights) creates uncertainty—the model may be undervaluing his submission skills due to limited data.
Filho takes this fight by submission in round 1 or early round 2. While Carpenter's patient grappling approach theoretically exploits Filho's cardio issues, he won't survive the early storm. Filho's 2.6 submissions per 15 minutes, combined with his Dagestani handcuff rear-naked choke that works even against defending opponents, creates too many finishing opportunities. Carpenter's zero offensive threat from bottom positions means if Filho secures back control—which he does consistently—Carpenter lacks the scrambling ability to escape before the choke locks in. The Osbourne and Barez fights showed Filho can finish elite-level flyweights when he establishes his game early, and Carpenter's limited UFC experience (just two fights) suggests he hasn't faced this level of submission volume. WolfTicketsAI's pick of Filho by finish is the correct read.
Score: 12
Odds:
Vitor Petrino: -295
Thomas Petersen: +220
Petrino enters this heavyweight clash having won 2 of his last 3 UFC fights, but those two losses at light heavyweight exposed critical defensive gaps that could resurface here. His July 2025 heavyweight debut against Austen Lane showcased his elite grappling—he caught Lane's kick just past a minute in, hurled him to the canvas, and moved right into full mount like a hot knife through butter. After threatening an arm-triangle and keylock, Petrino postured up with ground-and-pound before slithering in a rear-naked choke at 4:16 of Round 1.
Signature Techniques:
Kick-Catching to Dominant Position: Against Lane, Petrino's lightning-fast reaction to catch a kick and immediately convert it into mount demonstrated his explosive takedown mechanics. This same sequence could be devastating against Petersen's leg-kick heavy approach.
Submission Chain Wrestling: Petrino threatened arm-triangles from multiple angles, keylocks, and finished with the rear-naked choke against Lane. Against Marcin Prachnio in July 2023, he set up a southpaw switch counter right hook after conditioning Prachnio with inside low kicks, dropping him before securing a Round 3 TKO finish with ground strikes.
Pressure-Based Cage Cutting: Against Tyson Pedro in March 2024, Petrino methodically cut off the cage with lateral pressure, forcing exchanges in the pocket where his combination striking overwhelmed Pedro for a unanimous decision.
Petrino's move to heavyweight addressed his brutal weight cuts at 205 pounds—he weighed 249 pounds against Lane, putting on so much muscle he actually outweighed the career heavyweight. His athleticism stands out dramatically at heavyweight, and his grappling acumen translates seamlessly to the division.
1. Chin Durability and Defensive Boxing: Against Dustin Jacoby in December 2024, Petrino landed more meaningful shots through two rounds and had Jacoby stung multiple times. But in Round 3, Jacoby found a perfect right hand that cracked Petrino's chin and instantly put him out cold. This marked his second consecutive knockout loss, following his submission defeat to Anthony Smith. When compromised, Petrino's defensive fundamentals deteriorate—he keeps his head on the centerline and relies more on counter-punching timing than pre-emptive head movement.
2. Leg Kick Defense: Against Anthony Smith in May 2024, Petrino failed to properly check an early calf kick, taking the impact on the outside of his calf rather than his shin. He stepped awkwardly after attempting an overhand right and began backing up—a significant deviation from his typical forward pressure. This compromised base led directly to a panic wrestling shot that Smith capitalized on with a guillotine choke at 2:35 of Round 1.
3. Over-Pursuit After Success: Against Anton Turkalj in March 2023, Petrino rushed forward recklessly when Turkalj was grounded, running directly into an up-kick. His eagerness to engage leads him to abandon defensive awareness when seeking finishes, creating counter opportunities for composed opponents.
Petersen brings a two-time Minnesota State wrestling champion pedigree and NCJAA national championship credentials to this heavyweight matchup. He's won 2 of his last 3 UFC fights, but that recent knockout loss to Shamil Gaziev in February 2025 revealed critical vulnerabilities. Against Mohammed Usman in July 2024, Petersen showcased his wrestling dominance—he landed all nine takedown attempts and racked up 13:49 of control time, winning a unanimous decision through relentless pressure and thudding left hands that repeatedly snapped Usman's head back.
Signature Techniques:
Volume Leg Kicks to Systematic Breakdown: Against Don'Tale Mayes in May 2025, Petersen systematically targeted Mayes's legs until the accumulated damage forced a TKO stoppage. This methodical approach exploits the reduced mobility common among larger heavyweights.
Explosive Takedown Entries: Petersen landed an explosive takedown against Gaziev just under two minutes into their fight, demonstrating his ability to time entries against dangerous strikers. Against Usman, his nine successful takedowns from various positions showcased his wrestling versatility.
Pressure Boxing with Left Hand Power: Petersen's thudding left hand was his primary weapon against Usman, landing multiple times and keeping his opponent uncomfortable. He maintains constant forward pressure, making it difficult for opponents to establish rhythm or comfortable distance.
Petersen's 74-inch reach is short for heavyweight, but his wrestling credentials give him pathways to victory against strikers who can't defend takedowns. His perfect 100% takedown defense ratio across his UFC career shows solid defensive wrestling fundamentals.
1. Inability to Hold Top Position: Against Gaziev, Petersen landed an explosive takedown and Gaziev gave up his back, but Petersen couldn't keep the big man down. Gaziev exploded up immediately, and they returned to striking where Petersen was knocked out cold at 3:12 of Round 1 by a picture-perfect right hand. For a wrestler of Petersen's pedigree, this top control failure represents a fundamental gap against explosive athletes.
2. Chin Durability Against Power Punchers: Gaziev's walkoff knockout marked Petersen's second career knockout loss (the first came against Waldo Cortes-Acosta pre-UFC), suggesting durability concerns against heavyweight power. The right hand crashed into Petersen's chin and instantly put him out, exposing defensive boxing gaps when returning to striking range after failed grappling attempts.
3. Size and Reach Disadvantage Management: At 6-foot-1 with a 74-inch reach, Petersen struggled against Gaziev's 6-foot-4 frame and 78.5-inch reach. The 3-inch height and 4.5-inch reach disadvantage prevented him from solving the range problem, and Gaziev's reach made it difficult for Petersen to close distance effectively—a dynamic that could repeat against Petrino's 77-inch reach and superior athleticism.
This matchup presents a fascinating clash between Petrino's explosive athleticism and submission prowess against Petersen's wrestling credentials and systematic leg-kick approach.
Petrino's Paths to Victory:
Petrino's kick-catching ability directly counters Petersen's leg-kick heavy approach. Against Lane, Petrino caught a kick and immediately converted it into dominant position—if Petersen commits to his systematic leg-kick strategy, he risks giving Petrino the exact entry he needs. Once on top, Petrino's submission chain wrestling poses serious problems. Petersen couldn't hold Gaziev down despite securing his back, and Petrino's ability to threaten arm-triangles, keylocks, and rear-naked chokes from multiple positions creates constant finishing threats.
Petrino's superior reach (77 inches vs 74 inches) and athleticism give him advantages in the striking exchanges. His southpaw switch counter right hook—the technique that dropped Prachnio—could exploit Petersen's tendency to pressure forward with his left hand. When Petersen rushes in with combinations, Petrino's counter-striking timing and power create knockout opportunities.
Petersen's Paths to Victory:
Petersen's systematic leg-kick approach could exploit Petrino's documented leg-kick defense issues. Against Smith, a single calf kick compromised Petrino's base and led directly to his submission loss. If Petersen can land volume leg kicks without getting caught, he could replicate that success and force Petrino into desperate wrestling—exactly where Smith capitalized.
Petersen's wrestling credentials and nine successful takedowns against Usman suggest he can potentially get this fight to the ground. However, his inability to hold Gaziev down despite securing his back raises serious questions about controlling an explosive athlete like Petrino. If Petrino explodes up like Gaziev did, Petersen returns to striking range where Petrino's power and chin vulnerability create dangerous exchanges.
The key technical mismatch: Petrino's kick-catching directly counters Petersen's primary weapon. When Prachnio threw kicks, Petrino used them to set up his counter sequences. When Lane threw a kick, Petrino caught it and finished the fight in 4:16. Petersen's reliance on leg kicks plays directly into Petrino's strengths.
Early Rounds (Rounds 1-2):
Expect Petersen to establish his leg-kick game immediately, testing Petrino's defensive reactions. Petrino will likely show patience initially, looking to time Petersen's entries with counter strikes or catch a kick for an early takedown. If Petrino catches an early kick and secures top position, his submission threats could end this fight quickly—his average of 1.0753 submissions per fight at heavyweight suggests he finishes what he starts on the ground.
Petrino's recent significant striking output differential (+7.3984) and Petersen's negative differential (-26.9722) indicate Petrino lands more meaningful strikes at range. The early striking exchanges favor Petrino's counter-punching and reach advantage.
Mid-Fight Adjustments (Round 2-3):
If Petersen survives early exchanges, his wrestling becomes more critical. His nine takedowns against Usman showed persistence, but Petrino's 38.46% takedown defense (relatively low) could give Petersen opportunities. However, Petrino's 58.62% takedown accuracy and 3.6559 takedowns per fight suggest he's comfortable initiating grappling exchanges himself.
The cardio dynamic slightly favors Petersen—against Jacoby, Petrino seemed tired and frustrated by Round 3 before getting knocked out. Petersen maintained pace through three rounds against Usman, suggesting better heavyweight conditioning. But Petrino's recent heavyweight debut showed no cardio issues through 4:16 of action, and his improved weight management at heavyweight could address previous conditioning concerns.
Championship Rounds (If Applicable):
This fight likely doesn't reach later rounds. Petrino's submission rate and Petersen's knockout vulnerability create multiple finish scenarios. If it does extend, Petersen's systematic approach and wrestling could accumulate advantages, but Petrino's power and submission threats remain constant dangers.
Petrino's kick-catching directly counters Petersen's leg-kick strategy: Against Lane, Petrino caught a kick at 1:00 and finished by 4:16. Petersen's reliance on systematic leg kicks (his finish method against Mayes) plays into Petrino's strengths.
Top control disparity favors Petrino: Petersen couldn't hold Gaziev despite securing his back. Petrino moved into mount "like a hot knife through butter" against Lane and threatened multiple submissions before finishing.
Chin concerns for both fighters: Petrino was knocked out cold by Jacoby in Round 3. Petersen was knocked out cold by Gaziev at 3:12 of Round 1. Both have documented knockout losses, but Petrino's power and counter-striking create more finishing opportunities.
Reach and athleticism advantages: Petrino's 77-inch reach and superior athleticism (evident in his explosive movements and transitions) outmatch Petersen's 74-inch reach and more plodding heavyweight style.
Wrestling credentials vs. submission threats: Petersen's two-time state champion and national champion credentials are impressive, but Petrino's 1.0753 submissions per fight and demonstrated submission chains pose serious finishing threats.
The model's confidence in Petrino stems from several key statistical advantages:
Odds increased the prediction score by 16.0—the largest single factor. Petrino's -295 odds reflect significant betting market confidence in his superiority.
Reach increased the score by 2.0. Petrino's 3-inch reach advantage creates meaningful striking advantages at heavyweight where range management is critical.
Recent Significant Striking Defense Percentage increased the score by 2.0. Petrino's 41.40% recent significant striking defense, while not elite, outperforms Petersen's defensive metrics when combined with his offensive output.
Recent Takedowns Attempted per Fight increased the score by 1.0. Petrino's 6.0128 recent takedown attempts per fight show his willingness to initiate grappling, giving him multiple pathways to victory.
Recent Win Percentage decreased the score by 2.0. Petrino's 33% recent win percentage (1-2 in his last 3) and Petersen's 67% (2-1 in his last 3) create some uncertainty, but the model still heavily favors Petrino's overall skill advantages.
Striking Defense Percentage decreased the score by 2.0. Both fighters have defensive vulnerabilities, but Petrino's offensive capabilities and finishing ability outweigh these concerns.
WolfTicketsAI has predicted Petrino in 6 previous fights, going 4-2 overall. The model correctly predicted his heavyweight debut victory over Lane (0.77 confidence) and his wins over Pedro (0.67), Bukauskas (0.75), and Prachnio (0.71). However, it incorrectly predicted him to beat Jacoby (0.68 confidence) and Smith (0.78 confidence)—both fights where Petrino's defensive vulnerabilities were exploited.
For Petersen, the model has limited history. It correctly predicted Gaziev to knock him out (0.68 confidence) but incorrectly predicted Usman to beat him (0.54 confidence)—Petersen's wrestling dominance wasn't fully captured in that prediction.
The model's 4-2 record on Petrino shows it understands his offensive capabilities but has overestimated his defensive soundness against technical strikers (Jacoby) and submission artists (Smith). However, Petersen fits neither profile—he's a wrestler with knockout vulnerability, playing directly into Petrino's strengths.
Petrino takes this fight through superior athleticism, submission prowess, and tactical advantages in the style matchup. Petersen's systematic leg-kick approach—his primary weapon—plays directly into Petrino's kick-catching ability demonstrated against Lane. Once Petrino secures top position, his submission chain wrestling and ground-and-pound create finishing sequences Petersen's wrestling credentials haven't shown the ability to defend. While both fighters have chin concerns, Petrino's counter-striking, reach advantage, and explosive power create more finishing opportunities. Petersen's inability to hold Gaziev down despite securing his back suggests he'll struggle to control Petrino's superior athleticism on the ground. Expect Petrino to catch an early leg kick, secure dominant position, and finish by submission in Round 1 or early Round 2, continuing his heavyweight ascent and exposing Petersen's top control deficiencies against elite athletes.
Score: 5
Odds:
Lucas Rocha: -130
Stewart Nicoll: +102
Rocha enters this matchup coming off a brutal UFC debut loss to Clayton Carpenter at UFC Vegas 98, where he was submitted by rear-naked choke in Round 2. The Brazilian showed flashes of his striking potential early in that fight, landing his right hand with combinations to the body and connecting with a flying knee in Round 2 that briefly shook Carpenter. But once Carpenter blitzed forward and tackled him to the mat, Rocha's night turned into a nightmare.
The 24-year-old's striking carries legitimate power. Against Carpenter, he was already landing clean right hands early and mixing in body kicks effectively. When Carpenter rushed into a brawl, Rocha obliged and traded volume, showing he's willing to stand and bang. His flying knee in Round 2 demonstrated explosive timing, and he's capable of generating fight-ending power from unorthodox angles.
But here's the reality: Rocha has zero takedowns in his lone UFC appearance, attempted zero takedowns, and his 66% takedown defense proved catastrophic against Carpenter's wrestling. Once on his back, Rocha absorbed devastating elbows that opened cuts on both eyebrows and his nose. He scrambled madly but couldn't escape Carpenter's heavy shoulder pressure. When he finally worked to his knees, Carpenter immediately dragged him back to half guard. Rocha never got back to his feet in Round 1.
His stats paint an ugly picture on the ground. He's landing just 2.36 significant strikes per minute while absorbing 3.06 head strikes per minute. His striking defense sits at 41.94%, and his significant striking defense is barely better at 43.33%. The Brazilian is getting hit more than he's landing, and his -17 significant striking impact differential shows he's losing exchanges badly.
1. Catastrophic Takedown Defense & Scramble Awareness
Rocha's takedown defense completely collapsed against Carpenter. When he slowed things down hunting for a jump knee, Carpenter suddenly blitzed forward and tackled him to the mat. Rocha landed in half guard and scrambled madly but couldn't get the American off him. His 15% takedown accuracy and inability to stuff Carpenter's entries exposed fundamental wrestling deficiencies. Even when he bucked his hips and briefly sat up, Carpenter met him with a front choke and bowled him back down. Rocha attempted to spring back up in Round 2 after another takedown, but Carpenter jumped on his back with a body triangle and sunk in the rear-naked choke. His inability to recognize back exposure and defend transitions is exploitable.
2. Bottom Position Helplessness
Once on his back, Rocha remained nullified by Carpenter's heavy shoulder pressure. He absorbed multiple elbows that ripped his left eyebrow open and caused additional cuts under his opposite eye and on his nose. Blood leaked into his eye, compromising his vision, yet he couldn't create space or initiate meaningful escapes. He fought off one arm-triangle setup but immediately got stuck in mount, where Carpenter jackhammered more elbows. Rocha thought about a leglock from his back but never came close to threatening. His guard retention is non-existent, and his hip mobility under pressure is severely limited.
3. Distance Management on Wrestling Entries
Rocha's flying knee in Round 2 had Carpenter shooting for a takedown, but it was from too far out, indicating poor timing and distance control. He can't recognize when opponents are setting up level changes, and his footwork doesn't allow him to circle away from the cage when pressure fighters close distance. This leaves him vulnerable to anyone who can mix strikes with takedown threats.
Nicoll suffered a devastating UFC debut loss to Jesus Aguilar at UFC 305, getting guillotined unconscious at 2:39 of Round 1. But before that fatal error, the Australian showed exactly why he was an 8-0 prospect with serious hype. He used a kimura sweep to reverse position and put Aguilar on his back, then advanced to back mount and landed solid ground-and-pound. His Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu pedigree (bronze medal at 2015 Gi World's at purple belt) was on full display.
The problem? Nicoll got overaggressive. As Aguilar scrambled up, Nicoll changed levels without protecting his neck, and Aguilar—a guillotine specialist with five career guillotine wins—jumped on it. The choke got tighter and tighter until Nicoll went unconscious, refusing to tap.
Nicoll's wrestling is his bread and butter. He averages 5.66 takedowns per fight on 100% accuracy. He's landing 3.02 significant strikes per minute while absorbing just 1.13 head strikes per minute. His striking output differential is +24, his significant striking impact differential is +5, and his striking accuracy sits at 51.72%. The Australian pressures opponents with leg kicks (0.75 landed per minute) and head strikes (1.51 per minute) before crashing into grappling exchanges.
His takedown defense is perfect at 100%, though that's only been tested in one UFC fight. He's shown solid positional awareness when not over-pursuing finishes, and his ability to advance from guard to back mount demonstrates high-level grappling IQ.
1. Neck Exposure During Scrambles
Nicoll's most glaring weakness was exposed against Aguilar. As he scrambled up from bottom position, Nicoll left his neck out, and Aguilar jumped on the guillotine. Nicoll was trying to keep his hold but left his head out there too long. As he changed levels, his head position and posture were compromised, allowing Aguilar to lock in the choke. This represents a fundamental defensive error in grappling transitions that any submission-aware opponent can exploit. Given that Rocha has shown submission awareness (he thought about a leglock against Carpenter), this vulnerability could be tested again.
2. Over-Aggression in Dominant Positions
Nicoll did plenty of good work early against Aguilar, landing ground-and-pound from back mount and controlling position. But his desire to finish compromised his positional awareness. Instead of maintaining control and grinding out damage, he pursued the finish and left openings during transitions. This over-aggression cost him the fight when Aguilar capitalized on the scramble. Against an opponent who's desperate to avoid the mat like Rocha, Nicoll might repeat this mistake if he secures dominant position early.
3. Limited UFC Sample Size & Regional Competition Level
Nicoll's 8-0 record came entirely from the Australian regional scene, which is generally subpar in terms of churning out high-level wrestlers. His lone UFC appearance exposed gaps between regional dominance and UFC-caliber competition. While his grappling fundamentals are sound, his defensive awareness in chaotic exchanges needs refinement. Rocha's explosive striking and willingness to throw flying knees could create the kind of scrambles where Nicoll's neck becomes available.
This matchup hinges entirely on where the fight takes place. Nicoll's 5.66 takedowns per fight on 100% accuracy directly targets Rocha's catastrophic 66% takedown defense. When Carpenter blitzed forward and tackled Rocha to the mat, Rocha scrambled madly but couldn't escape. Nicoll's pressure-heavy approach—mixing leg kicks and head strikes before crashing into grappling exchanges—mirrors Carpenter's blueprint for success.
Rocha's best path to victory is landing his explosive right hand or flying knee before Nicoll closes distance. Against Carpenter, Rocha's flying knee in Round 2 briefly shook his opponent, and his early right hands found their mark. But Carpenter shot from too far out, giving Rocha time to react. Nicoll's wrestling entries are more calculated, and his 100% takedown accuracy suggests better timing and setup.
Once on the ground, Nicoll's kimura sweeps and back control directly exploit Rocha's inability to escape bottom position. Rocha remained nullified by Carpenter's shoulder pressure and never got back to his feet in Round 1. Nicoll's ground-and-pound from back mount would replicate the damage Carpenter inflicted, potentially opening cuts and compromising Rocha's vision again.
However, Rocha's submission awareness (he fought off an arm-triangle and thought about a leglock against Carpenter) could threaten Nicoll if the Australian over-pursues finishes. Nicoll's neck exposure during scrambles is a legitimate vulnerability. If Rocha can survive the initial takedown and create a scramble, Nicoll's tendency to leave his head out could provide an opening for a guillotine or front choke.
The striking exchanges favor Rocha's power but Nicoll's output. Rocha lands 2.36 significant strikes per minute with 41.46% accuracy, while Nicoll lands 3.02 significant strikes per minute with 47.06% accuracy. Nicoll's leg kicks (0.75 per minute) set up his wrestling entries, while Rocha's body kicks and right hands carry more finishing power. But Nicoll absorbs just 1.13 head strikes per minute compared to Rocha's 3.06, indicating better defensive awareness on the feet.
Early Rounds (0-5 minutes):
Nicoll will pressure immediately with leg kicks and head strikes, looking to close distance and secure his first takedown. Rocha will try to establish his right hand and body kicks, hunting for the flying knee that briefly troubled Carpenter. If Nicoll shoots from distance like Carpenter did in Round 2, Rocha might time a knee. But Nicoll's 100% takedown accuracy suggests better entries. Once Nicoll secures the first takedown, Rocha's night becomes a grind. Nicoll will advance to back mount or half guard and land ground-and-pound, replicating Carpenter's blueprint.
Mid-Fight Adjustments (5-10 minutes):
If Rocha survives the first round, he'll need to keep Nicoll at range with leg kicks and body shots. But his -17 significant striking impact differential shows he's losing exchanges, and Nicoll's +5 differential indicates he's winning them. Rocha's cardio is untested beyond two rounds, and the accumulation of takedowns and ground-and-pound will sap his energy. Nicoll's wrestling pace (5.66 takedowns per fight) is relentless. If Rocha gets desperate and over-pursues a finish, Nicoll's scrambling ability could create opportunities for transitions, though his neck exposure remains a risk.
Championship Rounds (10-15 minutes, if applicable):
This fight likely doesn't see championship rounds. Rocha's inability to get back to his feet against Carpenter suggests he'll accumulate damage on the ground until a finish occurs. Nicoll's ground-and-pound from back mount could open cuts like Carpenter's elbows did, potentially forcing a doctor's stoppage or TKO. If Nicoll over-pursues a submission and leaves his neck exposed during a scramble, Rocha could capitalize with a guillotine, but his submission rate (0.00 per fight) suggests this is unlikely.
Rocha's wrestling deficiencies are catastrophic: His 66% takedown defense and inability to escape bottom position against Carpenter directly feed into Nicoll's 5.66 takedowns per fight on 100% accuracy.
Nicoll's blueprint mirrors Carpenter's success: Pressure with strikes, crash into grappling exchanges, advance to dominant positions, and grind out damage. Rocha has no answers for this approach.
Rocha's explosive striking is his only path: His flying knee and right hand carry fight-ending power, but he needs to land them before Nicoll closes distance. Carpenter's blitz takedown came after Rocha slowed things down hunting for a jump knee—Nicoll will exploit the same opening.
Nicoll's neck exposure is a legitimate concern: His guillotine loss to Aguilar exposed poor head position during scrambles. If Rocha survives the initial onslaught and creates chaos, Nicoll's over-aggression could backfire.
Both fighters are coming off submission losses: Rocha was choked unconscious by rear-naked choke; Nicoll was guillotined unconscious. Both have shown vulnerability to neck attacks, but Nicoll's offensive grappling makes him the aggressor here.
Limited UFC sample size for both: Rocha is 0-1, Nicoll is 0-1. Both are unproven at this level, but Nicoll's wrestling credentials and statistical advantages suggest better adaptability.
The model heavily favors Nicoll based on several key factors:
Odds increased the prediction score by 5.0: Nicoll is a +102 underdog despite superior wrestling stats and a more favorable stylistic matchup. The betting market is undervaluing his grappling advantage.
Recent Win Percentage increased the prediction score by 3.0: Both fighters are 0-1 in the UFC, but Nicoll's 8-1 overall record (88.9% win rate) edges Rocha's 17-2 (89.47% win rate) when accounting for recent performance trends.
Significant Striking Impact Differential decreased the prediction score by 3.0: Rocha's -17 differential is worse than Nicoll's +5, but the model accounts for Rocha's power striking and explosive finishing ability, which could end the fight early.
Recent Significant Striking Impact Differential decreased the prediction score by 2.0: Similar reasoning—Rocha's striking carries more finishing threat despite lower output.
TrueSkill decreased the prediction score by 1.0: Both fighters have identical TrueSkill ratings (Mu: 25.0, Sigma: 8.333), indicating the model sees them as evenly matched in overall skill, though stylistic factors favor Nicoll.
The model's confidence score of 5 reflects a close fight with Nicoll holding a slight edge due to his wrestling advantage and Rocha's proven inability to defend takedowns or escape bottom position.
WolfTicketsAI has no prior prediction history for either Lucas Rocha or Stewart Nicoll. Both fighters are making their second UFC appearances after debut losses, so there's no track record to evaluate the model's accuracy on these specific athletes. This adds uncertainty to the prediction, but the stylistic analysis and statistical differentials provide strong justification for favoring Nicoll.
Nicoll's wrestling will be the difference. Rocha's 66% takedown defense and inability to escape bottom position against Carpenter directly feed into Nicoll's 5.66 takedowns per fight on perfect accuracy. Once Nicoll secures the first takedown, he'll replicate Carpenter's blueprint: advance to back mount, land ground-and-pound, and grind out damage until Rocha breaks. Rocha's explosive striking gives him a puncher's chance early, but his defensive liabilities on the ground are too severe. Nicoll's neck exposure during scrambles is a concern, but Rocha's 0.00 submissions per fight suggests he won't capitalize. WolfTicketsAI backs Stewart Nicoll to rebound from his debut loss and hand Rocha his second straight defeat, likely by submission or TKO in Round 2.
Score: 19
Odds:
Julia Polastri: -430
Karolina Kowalkiewicz: +300
Polastri enters this matchup with momentum issues after dropping two of her last three UFC fights, most recently a unanimous decision loss to Loopy Godinez in March 2025. But don't let that record fool you—her performances revealed a fighter with serious technical upside.
Her signature weapon is the double collar tie, which she uses to devastating effect. Against Cory McKenna in October 2024, Polastri would flash a jab and immediately secure the collar tie as McKenna moved her head to slip, then unload knees and elbows in close quarters. When opponents like Knutsson tried to break free with over-ties, Polastri countered with perfectly timed uppercuts, catching them leaning forward. Against Godinez, she landed 58 significant strikes in Round 3 alone—one of the highest outputs in recent women's strawweight history—showing her ability to maintain volume under pressure.
Her clinch-to-takedown game is equally dangerous. She doesn't force takedowns but catches opponents when they're out of position, then transitions smoothly to dominant positions. Against Knutsson, she secured back control with a body triangle and used leverage against the leg to force a verbal submission from injury. Her submission rate of 0.33 per fight backs this up.
Polastri's opportunistic striking shines when she commits to forward pressure. That third round against Godinez saw her march forward throwing uppercuts and right hands, practically ignoring Godinez's jabs to land heavy shots that bloodied the ranked veteran. Her recent significant strikes landed per minute (4.49) might seem modest, but when she turns up the heat, the output explodes.
Takedown defense remains exploitable (54% career rate). Against Godinez, she was slammed to the mat powerbomb-style 90 seconds into Round 1 after throwing a kick with poor hand positioning. Godinez landed three takedowns across the first two rounds, repeatedly beating Polastri's hip positioning and sprawl timing. When opponents catch her kicks or time reactive shots off her aggression, she struggles to defend.
Early round passivity costs her fights. Polastri often waits until she's down on scorecards to unleash her best work. Against Godinez, she lost the first two rounds (14-11 and 15-15 in significant strikes) before exploding in Round 3. This pattern of slow starts against wrestlers who can control early rounds puts her in constant comeback mode.
Cage generalship in opening frames is problematic. She allows herself to be backed to the fence repeatedly, where opponents like Godinez can initiate clinch work and pursue takedowns. Her footwork and lateral movement when pressured need refinement—she doesn't establish center control early, giving wrestlers the positional advantage they need.
The 39-year-old Polish veteran brings experience but carries the weight of age and decline. She's lost two straight and four of her last six, with recent defeats to Denise Gomes and Iasmin Lucindo exposing serious erosion in her physical tools.
Kowalkiewicz's clinch work was once elite—she broke down Rose Namajunas with relentless knees to the body in 2016, forcing her way into the clinch repeatedly and delivering short uppercuts that hurt Namajunas in the final frame. Her ability to control opponents against the cage and deliver damage from the clinch earned her a title shot. She lands 1.06 clinch strikes per minute with solid accuracy.
Her volume striking (6.83 strikes per minute overall, 5.54 significant) keeps opponents busy. Against Vanessa Demopoulos in May 2023, she landed 30 of 33 strikes at 90.9% efficiency, maintaining pressure throughout. Her jab-heavy approach and body work create openings, and she's shown adaptability by mixing in front kicks to manage distance.
The submission threat (0.19 per fight) adds another dimension. She submitted Felice Herrig in 2022, showing she can capitalize when fights hit the mat. Her grappling background allows her to stay offensive from bad positions and threaten with armbars when opportunities arise.
Speed and athleticism have abandoned her. Against Gomes in November 2024, the 15-year age gap was glaring. Gomes caught Kowalkiewicz "on both sides of her temple with looping punches" repeatedly, and Kowalkiewicz couldn't avoid or counter effectively. She was "out-gunned at range" with Gomes firing "long, straight kicks and left/right hands, exploding forward." Her declining reflexes show in poor distance judgment—she threw kicks "out of range" multiple times.
Takedown defense has collapsed (34% career rate, 32% recent). She's being reversed even in the clinch—her supposed strength. Against Gomes, Kowalkiewicz "grabbed a body lock and went back to the fence, only to be reversed by Gomes." When your clinch game gets dominated by younger, stronger opponents, you're in trouble. She absorbs 3.24 head strikes per minute, up from her peak defensive percentages.
Cardio and late-round execution falter. Against Yan Xiaonan in February 2020, Kowalkiewicz started aggressively but "struggled to sustain" the pace, with "cardio beginning to decline" as the fight progressed. She suffered an eye injury in Round 1 that "clearly bothered her throughout the second round," and her inability to maintain output allowed Xiaonan to take over. At 39, championship-round cardio is gone.
This matchup heavily favors Polastri's strengths against Kowalkiewicz's declining tools. Polastri's double collar tie entries will exploit Kowalkiewicz's tendency to lean forward when slipping punches—exactly how she caught McKenna. When Kowalkiewicz tries her pressure game, Polastri will flash the jab and immediately secure the clinch position, then unload knees and elbows.
Kowalkiewicz's collapsed takedown defense (34%) meets Polastri's opportunistic takedown game (1.0 per fight at 75% accuracy). While Polastri doesn't spam takedowns, she catches opponents out of position. Kowalkiewicz's poor hip positioning and failed sprawls against Gomes suggest Polastri will find openings, especially when Kowalkiewicz tries to establish her own clinch work.
The speed differential is massive. Kowalkiewicz couldn't avoid Gomes' looping punches and got caught repeatedly. Polastri's aggressive forward pressure—marching forward throwing uppercuts and right hands while "practically ignoring" opponent's jabs—will overwhelm the slower veteran. Kowalkiewicz's 49.7% recent striking defense won't hold up against Polastri's volume when she commits.
Kowalkiewicz's clinch reversals by younger opponents spell disaster here. If she can't control Gomes in the clinch, she won't control Polastri, who specializes in clinch warfare. Polastri's knees and elbows from the collar tie will punish any clinch exchanges Kowalkiewicz initiates.
Early rounds (1-2): Polastri must avoid her typical slow start. If she lets Kowalkiewicz establish rhythm with jabs and volume striking, the veteran could steal early rounds. However, Kowalkiewicz's declining speed means Polastri's jab-to-collar-tie entries should work immediately. Expect Polastri to secure the clinch early and land knees to the body, draining Kowalkiewicz's gas tank. Kowalkiewicz may land some volume, but the damage will favor Polastri.
Mid-fight adjustments (Round 2-3): As Kowalkiewicz's cardio fades—a pattern in her recent fights—Polastri's pressure will intensify. This mirrors the Godinez fight where Polastri rallied late, but here she won't need a comeback. Kowalkiewicz will try to establish her clinch game, but Polastri's superior positioning and youth will allow her to reverse and dominate. Expect Polastri to increase output, potentially matching that 58-strike Round 3 against Godinez.
Championship rounds (if applicable): This is a three-rounder, but if it goes deep, Polastri's youth (13-5 overall) trumps Kowalkiewicz's 39-year-old body. Kowalkiewicz's cardio decline against Xiaonan and physical struggles against Gomes suggest she'll be survival mode by Round 3. Polastri should be hunting a finish, either by submission from back control or TKO from accumulated damage.
The model's confidence stems primarily from Odds (increasing score by 19 points)—the -430 line on Polastri reflects the massive skill and physical gap. TrueSkill adds 3 points, recognizing Polastri's higher competitive level despite recent losses. Recent Win Percentage adds 2 points, as Polastri's 33% recent rate actually exceeds Kowalkiewicz's identical 33%, but Polastri's losses came against tougher competition.
Recent Average Striking Output Differential (+2) and Recent Takedowns Attempted per Fight (+1) highlight Polastri's activity advantage. She attempts 1.94 takedowns per fight recently compared to Kowalkiewicz's 1.28, and her striking differentials show she's competitive even in losses.
The negative factors are minimal: Recent Significant Striking Impact Differential (-2) reflects Polastri absorbing damage in the Godinez fight, but that was against a ranked opponent. Striking Defense Percentage (-1) acknowledges Polastri's 45.3% defense isn't elite, but it's better than Kowalkiewicz's declining 49.7%.
WolfTicketsAI has a perfect 2-0 record predicting Polastri, correctly calling her win over McKenna (0.57 score) and her loss to Godinez (0.73 score for Godinez). The model understands Polastri's tendencies and accurately assessed her level against both prospects and ranked fighters.
For Kowalkiewicz, the model is 6-0 in recent predictions, correctly calling her losses to Gomes (0.64 for Gomes) and Lucindo (0.69 for Lucindo), plus her wins over Belbita (0.70), Demopoulos (0.75), Juarez (0.64), and Herrig (0.31). The model has dialed in Kowalkiewicz's decline, consistently predicting outcomes that reflect her diminishing physical tools.
This track record suggests high confidence in the Polastri pick—the model knows both fighters intimately and recognizes the mismatch.
Julia Polastri takes this fight with authority. Her double collar tie will neutralize Kowalkiewicz's clinch game, her youth and speed will overwhelm the 39-year-old veteran, and her opportunistic grappling will find openings against Kowalkiewicz's 34% takedown defense. Expect Polastri to secure the clinch early, land damaging knees to the body, and either finish by submission from back control or cruise to a decision as Kowalkiewicz's cardio fades. The -430 odds tell the story—this is a showcase fight for Polastri to get back in the win column against a fading legend. WolfTicketsAI's prediction of Polastri by decision or submission is money.
Score: 17
Odds:
Luan Lacerda: -265
Saimon Oliveira: +200
Lacerda brings a submission-heavy game built around modern leg entanglement systems, averaging 0.63 submissions per fight with 1.26 takedowns per contest. His signature sequence involves rolling into saddle positions from leg attacks—specifically transitioning from outside ashi entries into inside sankaku control. Against Cody Stamann, he demonstrated his second major weapon: parrying kicks across his body and immediately countering with power hooks. In Round 3 of that fight, Lacerda caught Stamann's left kick, swept it across his body, and drove a left hook directly into Stamann's orbital while the leg was still retracting. The strike caused immediate swelling, and Lacerda intelligently ground his glove cuff into the damaged eye from top position until the doctor stoppage.
His reactive striking shows legitimate finishing power when opponents feed him kicks. Lacerda operates comfortably from both orthodox and southpaw stances, looking to exploit openings created by opponents' stance transitions. The kick-catch-to-counter sequence requires excellent timing—he's not grabbing and holding (which would be illegal) but using quick parrying motions to redirect momentum before exploding forward with hooks to the head or body.
But here's the problem: Lacerda's game is entirely reactive. He's lost 2 of his last 3 UFC fights, sitting at 0% recent win percentage. Against Da'Mon Blackshear, his leg lock obsession became his downfall. After achieving saddle position in Round 2, Lacerda remained face-down on his knees holding the leg without the constant rolling motion that elite leg lockers use to off-balance opponents. This static positioning allowed Blackshear to establish base and rain down ground strikes. Lacerda absorbed clean punches to his exposed face while maintaining his grip on the leg—textbook tunnel vision—and got knocked out at 4:38 of Round 2.
His takedown accuracy sits at just 25%, and his striking defense (45.3%) leaves him vulnerable when opponents refuse to kick or engage on his terms. The recent stats are alarming: he's absorbing 3.87 head strikes per minute while landing only 1.97, creating a -23.46 recent significant striking impact differential.
1. Positional Stagnation During Leg Attacks (Blackshear, Round 2)
When Lacerda secures leg control, he becomes dangerously static. Against Blackshear in Round 2, he achieved knee-and-face-down positioning while controlling a leg—fundamentally compromised for MMA. Elite leg lockers like Craig Jones continuously roll and off-balance opponents, but Lacerda stayed on his knees, face toward the mat, holding the leg without rotational pressure. This allowed Blackshear to establish stable base and counter with strikes. Lacerda absorbed multiple clean punches to his exposed face while refusing to abandon the position, leading directly to his KO loss. Any opponent who achieves balance during Lacerda's leg attacks can punish him with ground strikes.
2. Zero Proactive Offense (Stamann Fight, All Rounds)
Lacerda showed minimal ability to initiate offensive sequences beyond reactive counters. Against Stamann, this worked because Stamann threw numerous kicks throughout. But Lacerda lacks combination work, ring-cutting ability, or sustained pressure. Against opponents who establish range with jabs, use feints effectively, or employ conservative kicking strategies, Lacerda struggles to create any offensive opportunities. His striking output differential of -49.5 overall reflects this fundamental limitation—he simply doesn't generate offense unless opponents feed him specific looks.
3. Recent KO/TKO Loss Creates Vulnerability (Blackshear, Round 2, 4:38)
Lacerda was knocked out just two fights ago via ground strikes while pursuing leg locks. This represents both a technical and psychological vulnerability. The knockout came from accumulated damage in a compromised position—exactly the type of situation he might find himself in again if he over-commits to submissions. Fighters returning from knockout losses often show hesitation or defensive awareness issues, and Lacerda's 0% recent win percentage suggests he hasn't solved the problems that led to that stoppage.
Oliveira enters this fight on a brutal 0-3 UFC skid with three consecutive stoppage/decision losses, sitting at 0% recent win percentage. He's a switch-hitting striker who relies on unpredictable movement and explosive attacks, but his technical foundation has crumbled under UFC-level competition. His most recent appearance against David Martinez at UFC Mexico City (March 29, 2025) ended in catastrophic fashion—knocked out at 4:38 of Round 1 via knee and ground strikes after a two-year layoff.
That layoff stemmed from a training accident where Oliveira took a spinning kick to the stomach, causing an intestinal rupture requiring emergency surgery and 11 days hospitalization. He couldn't train for six months afterward. Despite two years of preparation including psychological work, Oliveira looked completely shot against Martinez. He rushed in without setups, struggled to find range against Martinez's kicks and lateral movement, and got blitzed with a right hook and knee that ended his night instantly.
Before that, Daniel Marcos systematically broke him down at UFC 283 (January 21, 2023) with body attacks. Marcos deployed kicks and punches to Oliveira's midsection with relentless consistency while Oliveira escalated to spinning techniques when his primary offense stalled—a classic sign of technical bankruptcy. When his power shots failed, Oliveira had no Plan B beyond increasing output intensity rather than adjusting approach. Marcos kept "digging kicks to the body, punches to the body," telling Oliveira "you just keep going wild, I'm gonna keep doing this and we'll see how quickly you just collapse." Oliveira collapsed.
His UFC debut against Tony Gravely exposed the blueprint: Oliveira launched flying knees that fell short, got taken down repeatedly (Gravely accumulated 11 takedowns), and spammed guillotine chokes that never finished. Oliveira caught Gravely in guillotines after nearly every takedown but showed zero submission variety. All three judges scored it 30-27 for Gravely.
Oliveira's stats paint a grim picture: 0.0 takedowns per fight despite 2.78 attempts, 40.7% striking defense, and he's absorbing 3.27 head strikes per minute while landing only 1.15. His -20.33 significant striking impact differential shows he's getting systematically outstruck.
1. Complete Defensive Collapse Against Body Attacks (Marcos, All Rounds)
Oliveira demonstrated zero countermeasures against systematic body work. Marcos attacked his midsection with kicks and punches throughout their fight, and Oliveira showed no kick-checking technique, counter timing, or shell defense. He doesn't adjust range to make body attacks more difficult—he simply absorbs them. As fatigue set in from these body shots, Oliveira's cardio collapsed entirely. His 0.93 body strikes absorbed per minute might seem low, but opponents have learned to target this area specifically because he offers no defensive resistance. Any fighter with disciplined body attack strategy can replicate Marcos's blueprint.
2. Technical Bankruptcy Under Pressure—Spinning Into Oblivion (Marcos, Rounds 2-3)
When Oliveira's initial explosiveness fails, he escalates to spinning techniques rather than simplifying. Against Marcos in Rounds 2-3, after his power shots produced nothing, Oliveira began throwing spinning backfists and spinning kicks—techniques requiring enormous energy with low success rates. Each missed spinning attempt represented massive energy investment with zero return. This pattern suggests either poor fight IQ or insufficient technical depth. Elite fighters revert to fundamentals when tired; Oliveira does the opposite, accelerating his own collapse.
3. Recent Catastrophic KO/TKO Loss After Two-Year Layoff (Martinez, Round 1, 4:38)
Oliveira's most recent fight ended in disaster. After two years away recovering from intestinal rupture surgery, he looked completely unprepared against Martinez. He rushed in desperately without setups, couldn't find range, and got dropped by a right hand followed by a knee that sent his head bouncing off the canvas. Martinez piled on ground strikes for the finish. The combination of ring rust, previous injury trauma, and advancing age (33 years old) has clearly diminished his capabilities. The betting market accurately assessed this—Oliveira swelled to +500, the largest underdog on the entire card. This recent knockout creates both technical and psychological vulnerabilities heading into his next fight.
This matchup creates a fascinating dynamic where both fighters' primary weapons could theoretically work—but both are also deeply flawed in execution.
Lacerda's Leg Locks vs. Oliveira's Submission Game:
Lacerda averages 0.63 submissions per fight with modern leg entanglement systems, while Oliveira averages 2.23 submissions per fight (primarily guillotines). However, Oliveira's submission game is one-dimensional and has never finished anyone in the UFC. Against Gravely, he spammed guillotines after every takedown with zero success. Lacerda's leg attacks are more sophisticated technically, but his tendency to become static in compromised positions creates vulnerability.
If this fight hits the ground, Lacerda's leg entanglement knowledge should give him advantages. Oliveira has shown zero leg lock defense in his UFC career, and his guillotine-only approach means he won't threaten Lacerda with alternative submissions. However, Lacerda must avoid his Blackshear mistake—remaining face-down holding legs while absorbing strikes.
Striking Exchanges Favor Lacerda's Reactive Game:
Oliveira's tendency to rush in without setups and throw spinning techniques when frustrated plays directly into Lacerda's counter-striking system. Lacerda's signature kick-catch-to-counter-hook sequence could be devastating if Oliveira throws leg kicks. Against Stamann, Lacerda caught a left kick, parried it across his body, and drove a left hook into Stamann's orbital for the finish in Round 3.
But here's the problem for Lacerda: Oliveira might not kick much. After getting his body systematically destroyed by Marcos's kicks, Oliveira may have abandoned kicking entirely. If Oliveira stays in boxing range and refuses to kick, Lacerda's reactive game produces nothing. Lacerda showed zero proactive offense against Stamann when kicks weren't available.
Cardio and Durability Concerns:
Both fighters have shown cardio issues, but Oliveira's are far more severe. Against Marcos, his explosive style created unsustainable energy expenditure, and the body attacks accelerated his collapse. Lacerda's cardio problems stem from over-committing to submissions, but he's never been finished due to pure exhaustion—his losses came from strikes while pursuing submissions.
Oliveira's recent knockout loss to Martinez, combined with his previous intestinal rupture injury, raises serious durability questions. He's been stopped in 2 of his last 3 UFC fights, while Lacerda has only been stopped once (the Blackshear KO).
Early Rounds (1-2): Oliveira's Desperation vs. Lacerda's Patience
Oliveira will likely come out aggressively, knowing he's on a three-fight skid and possibly fighting for his UFC career. Expect flying knee attempts (which have consistently failed in his UFC run) and explosive rushing entries. Lacerda's best strategy is remaining patient, parrying any kicks Oliveira throws, and countering with power hooks when openings appear.
If Oliveira lands early and hurts Lacerda, he could finish—he has shown explosive power in regional competition. But his 0-3 UFC record suggests he struggles to implement this against UFC-level opposition. Lacerda's striking defense (45.3%) is poor, but Oliveira's striking accuracy (39.4%) is worse.
The grappling exchanges in early rounds will be critical. If Lacerda secures takedowns (he averages 1.26 per fight at 25% accuracy), he can work toward leg entanglements. Oliveira has never successfully defended leg attacks in his career, and his 0.0% takedown success rate means he won't threaten offensive wrestling.
Mid-Fight Adjustments (Round 2-3): Technical Bankruptcy vs. Submission Hunting
This is where Oliveira historically collapses. Against Marcos in Rounds 2-3, when his initial offense failed, he began spinning wildly and exhausted himself. Against Gravely, he spammed the same guillotine attempts repeatedly despite them never working.
Lacerda's tendency is to over-commit to leg attacks even from compromised positions. If he secures leg control in Round 2, he must maintain dynamic movement and off-balancing motion—not the static face-down positioning that got him knocked out against Blackshear.
Oliveira's body strike defense (0.93 absorbed per minute) could become a target. If Lacerda establishes any offensive rhythm, systematic body attacks would accelerate Oliveira's cardio deterioration. However, Lacerda has never shown this type of systematic striking approach—his game is entirely reactive.
Championship Rounds (If Applicable—This is Likely 3 Rounds):
If this reaches Round 3, both fighters will be compromised, but Oliveira significantly more so. His pattern is complete technical collapse under sustained pressure. Lacerda's cardio issues stem from submission over-commitment, but he's never been finished purely from exhaustion.
Expect Oliveira to be throwing desperation spinning techniques if the fight is competitive entering Round 3. Lacerda should be able to capitalize on these low-percentage attacks with counters or takedowns into submission attempts.
Lacerda's Recent Struggles: Lost 2 of last 3 UFC fights (0% recent win percentage), including knockout loss to Blackshear when over-committing to leg locks from compromised position
Oliveira's Catastrophic Decline: 0-3 in UFC with three consecutive stoppage/decision losses, most recently knocked out by Martinez after two-year layoff recovering from intestinal rupture surgery
Submission Advantage Lacerda: Modern leg entanglement systems vs. Oliveira's one-dimensional guillotine spam; Oliveira has never shown leg lock defense and has 0.0 takedown success rate
Striking Matchup Favors Lacerda: Reactive counter-striking system (kick-catch-to-hook sequence finished Stamann in Round 3) matches well against Oliveira's rushing entries and spinning desperation techniques
Critical Vulnerability for Both: Lacerda becomes static during leg attacks (knocked out by Blackshear in Round 2); Oliveira escalates to spinning techniques when tired (systematically broken by Marcos)
Experience and Durability: Lacerda has only been stopped once; Oliveira stopped in 2 of last 3 UFC fights and showed zero durability against Martinez after layoff
Cardio Concerns: Both fighters show cardio issues, but Oliveira's technical bankruptcy under fatigue (spinning wildly, rushing without setups) is far more exploitable than Lacerda's submission over-commitment
The model's confidence in Lacerda stems primarily from the betting odds, which increased the prediction score by 15 points—the dominant factor. Lacerda's -265 line versus Oliveira's +200 reflects the market's accurate assessment of Oliveira's 0-3 UFC skid and recent knockout loss.
Recent Win Percentage added 3 points to Lacerda's score. While both fighters sit at 0% recent win percentage (both lost their last fights), Lacerda's overall 80% win rate versus Oliveira's 75% provides slight edge.
Several statistical categories each added 1 point: Significant Striking Impact Differential (+1), TrueSkill (+1), Recent Significant Striking Impact Differential (+1), Striking Impact Differential (+1), Recent Striking Impact Differential (+1), Recent Takedowns Attempted per Fight (+1), and Striking Defense Percentage (+1).
These incremental advantages reflect Lacerda's superior grappling threat (1.26 takedowns per fight vs. Oliveira's 0.0) and slightly better defensive metrics (45.3% striking defense vs. Oliveira's 40.7%). While neither fighter has impressive defensive numbers, Lacerda's submission finishing rate (0.63 per fight) versus Oliveira's zero UFC submission finishes creates a meaningful grappling advantage.
The model sees this as a fight between two flawed fighters, but Lacerda's flaws are more correctable mid-fight (don't stay static during leg attacks) while Oliveira's flaws are systemic (technical bankruptcy under pressure, poor durability after injury, zero takedown success).
WolfTicketsAI correctly predicted Da'Mon Blackshear to defeat Lacerda at UFC Fight Night (June 3, 2023) with a confidence score of 0.73. The fight ended exactly as the model suggested—by KO/TKO in Round 2 when Lacerda over-committed to leg locks from compromised position and absorbed ground strikes.
This successful prediction demonstrates the model's ability to identify Lacerda's specific vulnerability: positional stagnation during submission attempts. The model recognized that Blackshear's superior grappling awareness and striking from top position would exploit Lacerda's tendency to remain static while hunting legs.
The model has no prediction history for Oliveira, which introduces slight uncertainty. However, Oliveira's 0-3 UFC record with three consecutive losses provides substantial historical data suggesting he's not UFC-caliber. His most recent knockout loss to Martinez, combined with the two-year layoff and previous intestinal injury, creates a clear downward trajectory that the model's statistical features capture through recent performance metrics.
The successful Blackshear prediction increases confidence in this pick. The model identified Lacerda's submission over-commitment as exploitable, and while Oliveira isn't the grappler Blackshear is, he won't need to be—Lacerda's reactive striking game and submission threats should be sufficient against an opponent who's been finished twice in his last three UFC appearances.
This bantamweight scrap features two fighters desperately needing wins but carrying significant flaws. Lacerda's modern leg entanglement systems and reactive counter-striking give him multiple paths to victory against an opponent who's never defended leg attacks and rushes in without setups. Oliveira's 0-3 UFC skid, recent knockout loss after two-year injury layoff, and pattern of technical collapse under pressure create a fighter ripe for exploitation.
When Oliveira rushes forward with his predictable flying knees or throws leg kicks, Lacerda's kick-catch-to-counter-hook sequence—the same one that finished Stamann in Round 3—will be waiting. If the fight hits the ground, Oliveira has zero answers for leg entanglements and hasn't successfully completed a takedown in his entire UFC career.
Lacerda must avoid his Blackshear mistake of becoming static during leg attacks, but Oliveira's striking from top position (if he even achieves it) won't match Blackshear's effectiveness. More likely, Lacerda secures leg control, maintains dynamic movement, and either finishes the submission or transitions to more dominant position.
WolfTicketsAI's pick of Luan Lacerda is sound. Expect Lacerda to exploit Oliveira's rushing entries with counter strikes or secure takedowns into leg entanglement finishes, likely earning a stoppage victory in Rounds 2-3.