| WTAI Model | Profit Model | Plain Model | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Main Card | Undercard | Full | Main Card | Undercard | Full | Main Card | Undercard | Full |
| 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 60.0% | 50.0% | 57.14% | 60.0% | 100.0% | 71.43% |
Ian Machado Garry
Win
-290
Asu Almabayev
Win
-225
Total Odds
1.94x
Return on $10 Bet
$9.43
The tables below show how the model predictions performed. Confidence scores indicate the model's certainty.
Correct predictions are shown in normal text, incorrect predictions are highlighted in red.
Click on any fight below to expand the detailed AI analysis and SHAP chart explaining the prediction.
Score: 29
Odds:
Arman Tsarukyan: -530
Dan Hooker: +360
Tsarukyan brings a complete mixed martial arts package that's evolved significantly through his UFC tenure. His wrestling base remains elite—averaging 3.6 takedowns per fight recently with a 40% accuracy rate—but it's the seamless integration with his striking that makes him dangerous. Against Charles Oliveira, he neutralized one of the sport's most dangerous submission threats through smart defensive grappling and relentless ground control. When Oliveira threatened with a guillotine and triangle-armbar in Round 1, Tsarukyan's wrestling allowed him to survive and turn the tide.
His kicking game has become a primary weapon. The left kick he deployed against Oliveira drew counters, but Tsarukyan's ability to mix kicks with forward pressure keeps opponents guessing. Against Beneil Dariush, he showcased tactical brilliance—using an overhand right (unusual for him) to disrupt Dariush's rhythm, then securing a double collar tie in the clinch to land devastating knees. The finish came via a short right hand off a knee at 1:28 of Round 1, demonstrating his ability to chain techniques seamlessly.
The calf kick remains a staple. Against Mateusz Gamrot, Tsarukyan's body kicks in Round 1 paid dividends later when Gamrot's cardio faded under accumulated damage. His pressure never relents—he walks opponents down with calculated aggression, forcing them into defensive shells. When Gamrot extended his combinations (throwing four-punch sequences instead of his typical one-two), the third or fourth strike consistently found Tsarukyan, but "Ahalkalakets" immediately created space to prevent follow-up takedowns.
Defensive striking gaps under sustained pressure: Against Gamrot, extended combinations broke through Tsarukyan's relatively basic defensive shell. The disjunction between absorbing strikes and preventing takedown chains suggests opponents who can blend boxing with wrestling entries could exploit this. Oliveira's creative striking also found success when Tsarukyan's forward pressure left him exposed to counters.
Front kick dependency creates takedown entries: While effective for range management, Tsarukyan's reliance on the front kick becomes readable. Against Gamrot, after landing five or six successfully in Round 1, Gamrot began timing the technique—every subsequent successful takedown stemmed from parrying or catching the front kick. This represents a pattern: Tsarukyan uses the front kick as his primary answer to forward pressure, and once opponents recognize this, they can time their entries accordingly.
Cardio questions in five-round fights: The only five-round fight in his UFC career was the Gamrot loss, where Tsarukyan's pace dropped in the championship rounds. Against Oliveira (three rounds), he maintained output, but whether he can sustain his relentless pressure across 25 minutes against elite competition remains uncertain. His recent win percentage is perfect at 100%, but that's built on three-round performances.
Hooker's evolution into a tactical pressure fighter represents his most significant technical growth. Against Mateusz Gamrot, he showcased refined defensive wrestling built around intelligent guillotine threats. His guillotine game operates at an elite level—specifically utilizing a high-risk variation where he punches through to place the crook of his elbow directly on the opponent's Adam's apple, creating a V-choke that forces opponents to abandon position entirely. Gamrot shot head-outside singles to avoid Hooker's knee strike threat, but this fed directly into the guillotine trap.
The front kick to the body serves as his primary range-management tool. Against Gamrot, it drained the wrestler's gas tank early, though it also created exploitable takedown entries once Gamrot timed it. Hooker's cage generalship has improved markedly—rather than creating separation and resetting against Gamrot, he maintained close proximity when backing him to the fence, crowding immediately to deny counter-striking windows. His body attack intensified in Round 3, a tactical adjustment that prevented Gamrot from ducking under punches and escaping along the cage.
Against Jalin Turner, Hooker demonstrated his ability to recover from adversity. After being hurt with strikes in Round 2, he used his jab-dip-left hook-right straight combination to regain control. The knee he landed against the cage—which Turner acknowledged as the hardest shot of the fight—showed Hooker's ability to get his hips up without telegraphing. His striking remains his bread and butter: 3.1 head strikes landed per minute with 100% of his strikes coming at distance against Gamrot.
Front kick timing becomes readable under sustained pressure: Against Gamrot, after landing the front kick successfully early, Gamrot began parrying and catching the technique as an entry point. Hooker's first takedown concession came off a caught front kick. This pattern repeats—he uses the front kick as his primary defensive answer, and once opponents solve it, the same technique becomes his liability. If Tsarukyan recognizes this early, he can time takedown entries off the kick throughout the fight.
Limited defensive wrestling diversity: While Hooker's escape sequences proved effective against Gamrot, his initial takedown defense showed vulnerabilities. He lacks the heavy hip pressure and sprawl mechanics that would prevent shots from progressing to the mat in the first place. His 27.6% takedown defense ratio is alarming—his system operates reactively (allow the takedown, then escape) rather than proactively stuffing attempts. Against Tsarukyan's relentless wrestling, this approach becomes unsustainable.
Cardio deterioration in later rounds: Against Arnold Allen at featherweight, Hooker's defensive responsibility declined significantly in the championship rounds. Allen's speed overwhelmed him late. Against Michael Chandler, the body shot that dropped his hands came after sustained pressure. Hooker's recent striking output differential is strong (20.09), but that's built on fights where he banked early rounds. Can he maintain output when Tsarukyan's pace never relents?
Tsarukyan's wrestling directly attacks Hooker's most glaring weakness. Hooker's 27.6% takedown defense ratio suggests he'll hit the mat repeatedly, and while his get-up mechanics are solid, Tsarukyan's top control is suffocating. Against Joaquim Silva, Tsarukyan employed a leg shelf technique that prevented Silva from standing off the wizzer, maintaining control on the ground. Hooker's guillotine threat is real—it saved him against Gamrot—but Tsarukyan has faced and neutralized elite submission artists like Oliveira.
The front kick battle will be critical. Both fighters use it as a primary weapon, but Tsarukyan's ability to time entries off kicks (as Gamrot demonstrated against Hooker) gives him the advantage. Hooker's front kick to the body drains cardio, but if Tsarukyan catches and converts even two or three into takedowns, Hooker's defensive system breaks down. The guillotine becomes less threatening when Tsarukyan can dictate when and how grappling exchanges occur.
Hooker's best path involves early body work to slow Tsarukyan's pace. Against Gamrot, the body kicks in Round 3 kept Gamrot stationary and available for follow-up strikes. If Hooker can replicate this against Tsarukyan—mixing body kicks with his improved cage craft—he might force Tsarukyan into later rounds where cardio questions emerge. But Tsarukyan's recent performances show no such vulnerability in three-round fights.
Early rounds (1-2): Tsarukyan establishes his wrestling threat immediately. Hooker's front kick will land early, but Tsarukyan times it by the midpoint of Round 1. First takedown comes around the 3-minute mark. Hooker escapes, but the pattern is set—Tsarukyan mixes striking pressure with takedown attempts, forcing Hooker into reactive mode. Hooker's jab and body kicks score, but Tsarukyan's forward pressure limits their effectiveness.
Mid-fight adjustments (3): Hooker recognizes the front kick is compromised and increases body attack volume when he has Tsarukyan against the fence. This is his best round—similar to Round 3 against Gamrot—where tactical adjustments pay dividends. But Tsarukyan's wrestling remains a constant threat. If Hooker threatens a guillotine, Tsarukyan's defensive grappling (proven against Oliveira) allows him to survive and reset.
Championship rounds (4-5 if applicable): This is a three-round fight, eliminating Hooker's late-round cardio concerns. But it also removes his ability to bank early rounds and survive late. Tsarukyan's perfect recent win percentage in three-round fights (100%) suggests he knows how to close shows. Hooker needs a finish or dominant rounds—close rounds favor the fighter with wrestling control and forward pressure.
The model's confidence stems from several key statistical advantages:
The model sees a fighter (Tsarukyan) who excels in the exact areas where his opponent (Hooker) is most vulnerable. The wrestling disparity alone justifies the prediction, but Tsarukyan's superior striking metrics and recent form make this a comprehensive mismatch on paper.
WolfTicketsAI has been remarkably accurate on Tsarukyan, going 5-1 in predictions with the only loss coming against Mateusz Gamrot in a five-round fight (this is a three-round bout). The model correctly predicted victories over Oliveira (split decision), Dariush (first-round KO), Silva (third-round TKO), Ismagulov (unanimous decision), and Alvarez (second-round KO). This track record suggests the model understands Tsarukyan's skill set and how it translates to victories.
For Hooker, the model is 1-2, correctly predicting his win over Claudio Puelles but incorrectly favoring his opponents against Gamrot and Jalin Turner (both split decisions Hooker won). The model may undervalue Hooker's heart and late-round adjustments, but those factors matter less against an opponent who can control where the fight takes place through wrestling.
Tsarukyan's wrestling will be the story. Hooker's 27.6% takedown defense can't withstand Tsarukyan's 9.9 takedown attempts per fight. The guillotine threat keeps it interesting—Hooker's elite variation could catch Tsarukyan in a scramble—but Tsarukyan's defensive grappling against Oliveira proves he can survive submission specialists. Hooker's best path involves early body work and tactical adjustments, but he needs to execute perfectly while Tsarukyan can win through sheer wrestling volume. The three-round format eliminates Tsarukyan's only question mark (five-round cardio) while preventing Hooker from banking on a late surge. Tsarukyan by decision, likely unanimous, with 2-3 takedowns per round controlling the narrative. Hooker's toughness ensures it goes the distance, but the wrestling disparity is insurmountable.
Score: 8
Odds:
Belal Muhammad: +215
Ian Machado Garry: -290
Muhammad enters this fight coming off a devastating title loss to Jack Della Maddalena, where his entire gameplan crumbled against a fighter who implemented jab-and-dip sequences that completely disrupted his counter-punching rhythm. That fight exposed fundamental flaws in how Muhammad initiates offense against range-switching opponents who maintain distance.
Muhammad's success has always hinged on integrated striking-to-wrestling near the cage. His most effective sequence involves pressuring opponents to the fence through boxing combinations, then shooting while simultaneously securing his hands between the opponent and the cage wall. Against Gilbert Burns, he pounded an injured arm while mixing body kicks. Against Leon Edwards in their rematch, he stayed closer throughout instead of rushing from distance, using modified double legs after engaging in striking exchanges near the fence.
His close-range orthodox boxing works best at smothering range—he positions himself directly on top of opponents rather than maintaining distance with his jab. In open-stance matchups, he employs the classic lead hand slap to the leg followed by overhand right, often chaining into immediate shot attempts. Against Stephen Thompson, he backed Wonderboy to the fence repeatedly and secured multiple takedowns, gaining back control and flattening him out in Round 1.
But Muhammad's wrestling effectiveness is position-dependent. He excels at the up-down dynamic near the fence, mixing striking feints with reactive shots, but struggles with prolonged grinding once opponents are already compressed against the cage. Against Vicente Luque, he controlled pace through relentless pressure and high-volume boxing combinations mixed with takedown attempts, winning a clear decision by wearing Luque down over five rounds.
Defensive reactions to jab-and-dip sequences: Against Della Maddalena, Muhammad showed fundamental vulnerability to opponents who employ preemptive head movement after jabbing. When JDM threw his jab or rear straight then immediately dipped his head before Muhammad could counter, it disrupted Muhammad's entire offensive rhythm. Muhammad's counter-punching relies on opponents keeping their head stationary after attacking. The jab-and-dip breaks this pattern because by the time Muhammad loads his counter, his opponent has already moved and is positioned to throw their own counter with Muhammad now exposed. Muhammad attempted head kicks toward where JDM's head was moving during the dip, but these adjustments were inconsistent.
Inability to initiate offense against range-switching opponents: Muhammad's close-range striking game completely breaks down against opponents who maintain distance and force him to cover ground to engage. Della Maddalena's constant stance-switching (orthodox to southpaw and back) combined with maintaining striking distance meant Muhammad couldn't establish his preferred smothering range. When forced to jab from actual jabbing distance rather than arm's length, Muhammad's entries became telegraphed and timing-dependent in ways that were easily read. The lack of successful striking entries meant Muhammad couldn't organically flow into his fence-wrestling.
Southpaw adjustment failures: Against Della Maddalena's southpaw stance, Muhammad found success with his overhand right behind the lead hand but could not build complete offensive sequences from this success. He repeatedly landed the overhand right but failed to chain additional offense, allowing JDM to reset without consequence. This represents a broader pattern—his technique arsenal is individually effective but lacks the sequential depth needed against high-level switch-hitters who can alter defensive requirements mid-exchange.
Garry brings a sophisticated understanding of range management and hand fighting that could prove devastating against Muhammad's pressure-heavy approach. Against Carlos Prates, Garry demonstrated his jab-feint to lead uppercut combination as his most effective weapon—extending his lead hand toward Prates, drawing a parry attempt, then retracting and firing the jab over the top of the missed defensive gesture. When Prates adopted a covering guard, Garry transitioned seamlessly to the lead hand uppercut with thumb orientation toward himself.
His right high kick as range control functioned not merely as a strike but as a strategic constraint, keeping Prates's dangerous left straight at home by forcing him to keep his left hand high for defensive coverage. Garry operated primarily from orthodox stance with intelligent lateral movement, consistently stepping outside Prates's lead foot and firing the jab down the side—a fundamental but expertly executed tactic that created angles while maintaining defensive soundness.
Garry's wrestling integration serves dual purposes—actual takedowns and feints that create striking opportunities. Against Prates, he attempted 12-13 takedowns, but many were reaches toward the leg—not committed shots but feints designed to plant the seed of wrestling threat. Against Shavkat Rakhmonov, Garry showcased remarkable defensive wrestling, particularly his judo background which allowed him to neutralize much of Shavkat's vaunted grappling offense. When Rakhmonov attempted his "trap hook dump" technique in Round 5, Garry ducked under the clubbing arm and secured a "claw grip" on Rakhmonov's back.
Against Michael Page, Garry employed timed level changes, using MVP's forward momentum against him, ducking under attacks to secure takedowns or clinch positions multiple times. He achieved back control with hooks in and nearly secured a rear-naked choke in Round 1. Against Geoff Neal, Garry's intercepting knees when Neal tried to close distance showed excellent timing and fight IQ, while his defensive awareness in clinch situations allowed him to quickly disengage and return to his preferred fighting distance.
Predictable stance-switch exits: Garry exhibits a concerning pattern when exiting exchanges—he steps straight backward while switching stances. This linear retreat, while creating distance, leaves him vulnerable to body kicks during the transition phase. Against Prates, while Prates connected with shin checks during these moments, he failed to systematically target this weakness with body kicks. Future opponents who recognize this pattern could accumulate significant damage.
Commitment on failed takedowns: In Round 5 against Prates, Garry's head-outside double leg attempt went wrong, resulting in him ending up on bottom position. This suggests that when his preferred takedown entries don't materialize cleanly, he can overcommit and find himself in compromised positions. Against opponents with stronger top games or better scrambling abilities, this could prove costly.
Defensive adjustments when pressured: When Prates successfully pressured Garry to the fence in Round 5 and landed clean one-twos, Garry showed some difficulty managing sustained backward pressure. While he survived and ultimately won the round, the sequence revealed that aggressive, sustained forward pressure with combination punching can disrupt his preferred range and rhythm. Against Rakhmonov, when Shavkat did manage to land cleaner, more impactful shots in the first and second rounds, it secured him those rounds on the scorecards.
This fight presents a fascinating technical puzzle. Muhammad needs to establish his smothering range and back Garry to the fence to implement his wrestling-heavy gameplan. But Garry's jab-feint combinations and stance-switching create exactly the type of range-management problems that Della Maddalena exploited so devastatingly.
Garry's jab-and-dip sequences vs Muhammad's counter-punching: Muhammad's entire offensive system relies on timing counters against opponents who keep their head stationary after attacking. Garry's preemptive head movement after jabbing—the exact technique Della Maddalena used—will disrupt Muhammad's counter-punching timing. When Garry extends his lead hand, draws a parry, then retracts and fires the jab over the top, Muhammad won't be able to time his overhand right the way he does against static opponents.
Garry's stance-switching vs Muhammad's southpaw struggles: Muhammad has shown he can land his overhand right against southpaw stances but cannot build complete offensive sequences from this success. Garry's constant stance-switching (similar to Della Maddalena) will force Muhammad to recalculate his entries and defensive priorities repeatedly. Each time Muhammad identifies a counter to Garry's current stance, Garry can switch stances, requiring Muhammad to start over.
Garry's intercepting knees vs Muhammad's pressure entries: Muhammad's takedowns require momentum and positional advantage created by striking pressure. When he attempts to close distance, Garry's intercepting knees (as demonstrated against Neal) will punish these entries. Muhammad's predictable forward movement with right hands before level changes becomes exploitable when Garry can time knees as Muhammad ducks.
Muhammad's fence-wrestling vs Garry's judo defense: If Muhammad does manage to back Garry to the fence, Garry's judo background (demonstrated against Rakhmonov) gives him sophisticated defensive tools. Garry can turn defensive positions into offensive opportunities through technical awareness rather than pure athleticism. When Rakhmonov attempted upper-body clinch attacks, Garry effectively defended and created scrambles that led to advantageous positions.
Early rounds (1-2): Garry will establish his jab and range control, using his right high kick to keep Muhammad's pressure at bay. Muhammad will attempt to close distance with his orthodox boxing combinations, but Garry's lateral movement and stance-switching will prevent Muhammad from establishing smothering range. Garry's intercepting knees will punish Muhammad's predictable forward entries. Expect Garry to win these rounds through cleaner striking and superior range management.
Mid-fight (3): Muhammad will increase his urgency, attempting more takedowns as his striking entries continue to fail. Garry's takedown defense and judo-based counters will neutralize most attempts. When Muhammad does secure clinch positions, Garry will quickly disengage using his defensive awareness. Muhammad's frustration will grow as he cannot establish the fence position necessary for his wrestling to function. Garry continues to land his jab-feint combinations and lead uppercuts against Muhammad's covering guard.
Championship rounds (4-5): Muhammad's cardio remains strong, but his technical approach hasn't evolved—he'll continue attempting the same pressure-wrestling entries that haven't worked. Garry's output may decrease slightly, but his technical superiority and ability to maintain range will keep Muhammad at bay. If Muhammad does manage sustained pressure (similar to what Prates achieved in Round 5), Garry has shown he can survive and adjust. Muhammad's lack of sequential depth in his combinations means he cannot capitalize even when he does land his overhand right against Garry's southpaw stance.
Recent form contrast: Muhammad just suffered a devastating loss where his entire gameplan was dismantled by jab-and-dip sequences and stance-switching—exactly what Garry specializes in. Garry is coming off a dominant win over Prates where he showcased these exact techniques.
Stylistic nightmare: Garry's range management, stance-switching, and preemptive head movement create the exact puzzle Muhammad cannot solve. Della Maddalena proved this blueprint works against Muhammad at the highest level.
Wrestling neutralization: Muhammad's wrestling requires fence position established through striking pressure. Garry's lateral movement, intercepting knees, and judo-based defensive wrestling prevent Muhammad from achieving the positions where his grappling becomes effective.
Hand fighting dominance: Garry's sophisticated hand fighting (demonstrated against Prates) will allow him to establish outside and top hand position, creating a barrier that prevents Muhammad from implementing his close-range boxing.
Output disparity: Garry maintains consistent output across positions, while Muhammad hunts for specific sequences that require positional advantages he won't achieve. Garry's ability to accumulate damage through volume and technical precision will win rounds consistently.
Cardio advantage: Both fighters have excellent cardio, but Garry's technical efficiency means he expends less energy maintaining range than Muhammad expends trying to close it.
The model's confidence in Garry stems from several key statistical factors:
Odds decreased the prediction score by 11.0—the betting market heavily favors Garry at -290, and the model respects this assessment of his superiority.
Recent Takedowns Attempted per Fight increased the score by 5.0—Garry's wrestling threat (2.1 attempts per fight recently) creates the multi-dimensional offense that prevents opponents from focusing solely on his striking.
Recent Win Percentage increased the score by 3.0—Garry's 67% recent win rate (including wins over Prates, Page, and Neal) demonstrates consistent performance against elite competition.
Striking Defense Percentage increased the score by 1.0—Garry's 46.18% striking defense (vs Muhammad's 52.56%) might seem like a disadvantage, but combined with his superior range management, it indicates he can avoid damage while landing cleaner shots.
Average Striking Output Differential increased the score by 1.0—Garry's +49.3 differential shows he consistently outlands opponents, while Muhammad's +66.25 comes from grinding opponents against the fence—a position Garry won't allow him to establish.
WolfTicketsAI has a mixed record with Muhammad, going 3-5 in predictions. Most notably, the model incorrectly predicted Muhammad to beat Della Maddalena (0.64 confidence), failing to anticipate how completely JDM's jab-and-dip sequences would dismantle Muhammad's gameplan. The model also incorrectly predicted Edwards to beat Muhammad in their rematch (0.62 confidence), underestimating Muhammad's tactical adjustments. However, the model correctly predicted Muhammad's wins over Burns (0.65) and was correct about Sean Brady losing (though it predicted Brady to win with only 0.27 confidence).
For Garry, WolfTicketsAI has been perfect, going 9-0 in predictions. The model correctly predicted Garry's wins over Prates (0.53), Page (0.56), Neal (0.71), Magny (0.20), Rodriguez (0.23), Kenan (0.85), Green (0.77), and Weeks (0.80). The model did correctly predict Rakhmonov to beat Garry (0.70), showing it can accurately assess when Garry faces superior opposition. This perfect track record on Garry suggests the model has excellent understanding of his technical approach and how it matches up against different styles.
Ian Machado Garry dismantles Belal Muhammad through superior range management, sophisticated hand fighting, and the exact technical approach that Della Maddalena used to expose Muhammad's fundamental vulnerabilities. Muhammad's pressure-wrestling gameplan requires establishing smothering range and backing opponents to the fence—positions Garry's lateral movement, stance-switching, and intercepting knees will prevent him from achieving. Garry's jab-feint combinations and preemptive head movement disrupt Muhammad's counter-punching timing, while his judo-based defensive wrestling neutralizes Muhammad's takedown attempts when they do occur. Muhammad's lack of sequential depth in his combinations means he cannot capitalize even when landing individual techniques, allowing Garry to accumulate damage through volume and technical precision across five rounds. WolfTicketsAI predicts Garry wins by decision, likely unanimous, outstriking Muhammad in every round while defending the majority of takedown attempts and quickly escaping any clinch positions Muhammad manages to secure.
Score: 18
Odds:
Volkan Oezdemir: -250
Alonzo Menifield: +190
Oezdemir enters this matchup with a refined striking game built on patience and precision. His recent performances show a fighter who's learned to pick his moments rather than brawl recklessly. Against Johnny Walker in June 2024, he secured a first-round knockout by timing Walker's aggressive entries with a devastating left hook—the same weapon that's carried him through his UFC tenure.
His signature techniques revolve around three core weapons. First, his counter left hook remains lethal. Against Walker, he caught the Brazilian rushing in and put him away at 2:28 of round one. Second, his low kick arsenal—particularly the oblique kick followed by traditional calf kicks—effectively slows opponents and compromises their base, as seen against Bogdan Guskov in September 2023. Third, his clinch control along the fence allows him to neutralize aggressive opponents while landing short uppercuts and hooks.
Oezdemir's technical evolution is evident in his improved patience. Against Guskov, he systematically dismantled his opponent by slipping outside the right hand and countering with precise left hooks. He's developed a slick double-leg entry after slipping punches, showing he can mix levels when needed. His defensive wrestling has improved significantly—he stuffed Guskov's takedown attempts and even threatened with a guillotine when the fight hit the mat.
The Swiss veteran's striking accuracy sits at 55.53%, landing 4.95 significant strikes per minute while absorbing 2.99. His recent significant striking defense percentage of 61.30% shows improved head movement and counter awareness. At 35 years old, he's fighting smarter, not harder.
Oezdemir's most glaring weakness emerged against Carlos Ulberg in November 2024—he struggles against longer, technical counter-strikers who can manage distance. Ulberg exploited Oezdemir's two-inch reach disadvantage by consistently jabbing his nose bloody in round two. When Oezdemir tried to close distance with his trademark forward pressure, Ulberg circled away and landed clean counters as the Swiss fighter lunged in predictably.
His second vulnerability is fading cardio in the third round. Against Ulberg, Oezdemir visibly slowed down and shot desperation takedowns with under a minute left—a clear sign he recognized he was losing the striking battle. His explosive style requires careful energy management, and when forced to chase mobile opponents, his output drops significantly.
Third, Oezdemir resets with his chin high after combinations, particularly after throwing his power left hook. Against Jiri Prochazka in July 2020, this habit got him knocked out in round two when Prochazka timed his reset and landed a devastating counter. His predictable straight-line pressure makes him vulnerable to patient counter-strikers who can time his entries.
Menifield brings explosive power and surprising grappling improvements to this matchup. His recent split decision over Julius Walker in February 2025 and unanimous decision over Oumar Sy in June 2025 show a fighter who's learned to steal rounds through veteran savvy rather than pure power. Against Sy, he wisely avoided grappling exchanges in rounds one and three, winning the striking battles despite low output.
His signature weapon is the overhand right, which he throws with minimal telegraph after establishing his jab. Against Jimmy Crute in July 2023, Menifield landed a perfectly timed counter right hook that stunned Crute, then seamlessly transitioned to clinch control against the fence to finish with uppercuts and hooks. This sequence showcased his improved fight IQ—recognizing when opponents are hurt and capitalizing without overcommitting.
Menifield's second key technique is his explosive blitz combinations when opponents are backed to the fence. He throws rapid 1-2-3 sequences (jab-cross-hook) with significant power, overwhelming opponents who can't match his explosiveness. Against Dustin Jacoby in December 2023, he landed a single powerful shot that "dinged him and turned him all the way around" despite being technically outworked for extended periods.
His defensive wrestling has evolved dramatically. Against Azamat Murzakanov in August 2024, Menifield displayed excellent hand-fighting to separate grips when Murzakanov secured body locks. He effectively uses wrist control to prevent locked hands around his waist, making him difficult to take down along the fence. His takedown defense sits at 78%, a massive improvement from earlier in his career.
At 37 years old, Menifield lands 3.77 significant strikes per minute with 53.60% accuracy, but absorbs 3.92 significant strikes per minute with only 50.58% significant striking defense. His recent performances show a fighter who's learned to conserve energy and steal rounds rather than hunt for early finishes.
Menifield's most exploitable weakness is his defensive positioning when advancing. Against Carlos Ulberg in May 2024, he charged forward in straight lines after seeing openings, making his attacks predictable. When he rushed after Ulberg's lazy jab, Ulberg leaned back and landed a left hook counter. Menifield's bull-rush approach carried him directly into the cage wall, forcing him to turn around in a compromised position where Ulberg unleashed the finishing combination.
His second vulnerability is his tendency to turn the back of his head toward incoming punches during exchanges. This technical error not only increases knockout vulnerability but exposes him to illegal strikes. Against Ulberg, this habit combined with his linear entries made him an easy target for the more technical striker.
Third, Menifield's striking output is concerningly low in decision fights. Against Oumar Sy, he landed only 34 of 91 total strikes over 15 minutes—a volume problem that makes him vulnerable to higher-output opponents. His sub-50% striking defense means fighters who throw with volume can overwhelm him, especially as he ages and his explosive finishing ability declines.
This matchup pits Oezdemir's patient counter-striking against Menifield's explosive power-punching. Oezdemir's left hook counter is perfectly designed to exploit Menifield's tendency to charge forward in straight lines. When Menifield rushes in—as he did against Ulberg—Oezdemir can time the entry with his signature left hook, the same weapon that knocked out Walker.
Menifield's overhand right could catch Oezdemir during his predictable forward pressure. Against Crute, Menifield timed aggressive entries with his counter right hook—a technique that could work when Oezdemir marches forward with his chin exposed. However, Oezdemir's improved patience means he's less likely to rush recklessly into Menifield's power.
The clinch battle favors Oezdemir. His superior clinch control and ability to land short strikes against the fence contrasts with Menifield's tendency to stall in the clinch for energy conservation. Oezdemir's underhook work and head position control will likely frustrate Menifield's attempts to disengage and reset.
Oezdemir's low kicks will be crucial. Against Guskov, his oblique kicks and calf kicks compromised his opponent's base and limited mobility. Menifield's tendency to plant his feet when loading up on power shots makes him vulnerable to having his lead leg chopped out from under him, similar to how Oezdemir dropped opponents with leg kicks in the past.
Early rounds: Menifield will look to establish his overhand right early, hoping to catch Oezdemir before the Swiss veteran finds his rhythm. Oezdemir will likely start cautiously, using his jab and low kicks to gauge distance while looking for Menifield's predictable entries. Expect a feeling-out process where both fighters respect each other's power.
Mid-fight adjustments: If Menifield fails to land his power shots early, he'll likely increase his output to steal rounds—but this plays into Oezdemir's hands. As Menifield becomes more aggressive, Oezdemir's counter left hook becomes increasingly dangerous. Conversely, if Oezdemir can't solve Menifield's explosiveness, he may resort to more clinch work to control the pace.
Championship rounds: Cardio becomes the deciding factor. Oezdemir's history of slowing in round three (as against Ulberg) could give Menifield opportunities if the fight stays competitive. However, Menifield's own declining output in later rounds (34 strikes over 15 minutes against Sy) suggests neither fighter will maintain high pace. The winner will be whoever can impose their gameplan most effectively in rounds two and three.
The model heavily favors Oezdemir based on several key statistical factors:
The model's confidence score of 18 reflects a clear but not overwhelming advantage for Oezdemir, suggesting the fight could be competitive but ultimately favors the Swiss veteran's technical superiority.
WolfTicketsAI has a mixed record predicting both fighters. For Oezdemir, the model correctly predicted Carlos Ulberg to win (0.72 confidence) and Nikita Krylov to win (0.29 confidence), but incorrectly favored Johnny Walker (0.58 confidence) and Paul Craig (0.73 confidence). The model's 2-2 record on Oezdemir shows it sometimes underestimates his ability to land fight-ending power shots.
For Menifield, the model has been more accurate, going 4-2 overall. It correctly predicted his wins over Jimmy Crute (0.35 confidence), Misha Cirkunov (0.38 confidence), and his losses to Azamat Murzakanov (0.68 confidence) and Carlos Ulberg (0.69 confidence). However, it incorrectly favored Oumar Sy (0.76 confidence) and Dustin Jacoby (0.27 confidence).
The model's tendency to underestimate both fighters' knockout power is notable, but its recent accuracy on Menifield's performances against technical strikers (correctly predicting losses to Murzakanov and Ulberg) suggests it's properly identifying his vulnerabilities against patient counter-strikers—exactly what Oezdemir brings to this fight.
Oezdemir takes this fight through superior technical striking and improved patience. Menifield's explosive power makes him dangerous in any exchange, but his tendency to charge forward in straight lines plays directly into Oezdemir's counter left hook. The Swiss veteran's low kicks will compromise Menifield's base early, limiting his ability to generate power on his overhand right. As Menifield's output drops in the later rounds, Oezdemir's consistent jab and counter-striking will pull ahead on the scorecards. Expect Oezdemir to either catch Menifield with a counter hook in round two or cruise to a unanimous decision victory by outpointing the aging power-puncher over three rounds. WolfTicketsAI's prediction of Oezdemir by decision or late finish is spot-on—the Swiss veteran's technical superiority and improved fight IQ make him the clear pick at -250.
Score: 22
Odds:
Jack Hermansson: +200
Myktybek Orolbai: -265
Hermansson enters this fight at a career crossroads after consecutive brutal losses. The recent Gregory Rodrigues knockout marked his third stoppage loss in his last five fights, creating a dangerous pattern. Against Rodrigues, Hermansson's defensive vulnerabilities were fully exposed—his right-side remained unprotected during jab attempts, and he walked directly into power shots despite his shoulder roll system. That fight ended at 1:18 of Round 1 via knockout, continuing a troubling trend of early finishes against aggressive strikers.
His signature techniques remain his chain wrestling entries and suffocating top control. Against Joe Pyfer, Hermansson demonstrated his step-off lateral jab—circling to the lead side at 30-degree angles, then pivoting and jabbing as opponents squared up. This movement pattern worked against Pyfer's limited ring-cutting ability, allowing Hermansson to land 51 low kicks largely unopposed. From top position, he employs the pin-and-attack system: securing one wrist to the mat, forcing the opposite hand across to defend, then dropping chest pressure for arm triangles or gift wrap positions.
But Hermansson's recent evolution shows concerning regression. His takedown success rate has plummeted—against Dolidze, his high-entry singles were easily reversed, and he showed zero familiarity with modern leg entanglement systems. When Dolidze established the K-guard anchor position, Hermansson attempted to stand while his leg remained trapped, gifting back control and the finish. Against Vettori, he absorbed 164 significant strikes while landing 122, repeatedly walking into Vettori's straight left by circling directly into its path—a fundamental southpaw defense error he never corrected.
Right-Side Exposure During Offensive Sequences: Hermansson's most exploitable gap appears when initiating offense. His right hand swings wildly outward when attempting jabs or body jabs, leaving his entire right side exposed to left hooks and high kicks. Against Pyfer, multiple left hooks found success through this opening. A technically sound opponent could systematically target this vulnerability—baiting the reaching right hand, then timing left-side attacks to the exposed temple or jaw. Rodrigues exploited this perfectly, landing the knockout blow as Hermansson reached.
Predictable Lateral Movement Pattern: Hermansson circles exclusively to his left—the same direction every time. While effective against limited opponents like Curtis, this one-dimensional escape route becomes a liability against fighters with cage generalship. He shows no counter-clockwise movement, no stance switches to reverse the pattern, and no feints to disguise direction changes. Opponents can cut the cage to his left side, positioning themselves to intercept with power shots along his predictable path.
Vulnerability to Modern Guard Systems: The Dolidze loss exposed catastrophic gaps in Hermansson's bottom game awareness. When opponents establish leg-based control systems—the anchor position, high cross, K-guard—Hermansson lacks the defensive awareness and extraction techniques needed. He failed to recognize the danger of the leg anchor until too late, attempting to stand while the position remained locked. This represents a generational gap in grappling knowledge that modern submission artists will exploit ruthlessly.
Orolbai brings dangerous finishing ability with 14 wins and only 2 losses, showcasing knockout power and submission skills. His recent unanimous decision over Elves Brener demonstrated his ability to overwhelm grappling-heavy opponents with aggressive striking pressure. Orolbai averages 5.36 takedowns per fight with 8.88 in recent performances, showing an evolved wrestling game that could trouble Hermansson's compromised takedown defense.
His signature approach centers on relentless forward pressure and volume striking. Against Brener, Orolbai maintained consistent forward momentum, throwing power shots through sheer aggression rather than sophisticated combinations. His willingness to engage in firefights and his solid conditioning allow him to maintain pace across three rounds, even when absorbing damage. The submission victory over Uros Medic showcased his opportunistic finishing instincts—when openings appear, Orolbai capitalizes quickly.
However, the Mateusz Rebecki loss revealed critical technical limitations. Orolbai's striking defense remains porous against disciplined counterpunchers. His recent stats show he absorbs 2.17 head strikes per minute while landing 2.65—a concerning ratio against power punchers. His 47.16% striking defense percentage and 53.25% significant striking defense indicate he gets hit frequently, relying on durability rather than evasion.
Susceptibility to Overhand Counters: The Rebecki fight exposed Orolbai's most glaring defensive gap—he walks into the same overhand counter repeatedly without adjustment. Against Rebecki's orthodox stance, Orolbai ate overhand lefts consistently, suffering catastrophic orbital bone damage by continuing to pressure in straight lines. His forward-leaning posture when pressuring and failure to establish effective hand positioning create clean paths for power counters. He moves in predictable straight lines, making his entries easy to time for opponents with disciplined counterpunching.
Limited Kicking Game Integration: Orolbai shows minimal integration of kicks into his arsenal, making his approach one-dimensional. Against Rebecki, the single low kick he threw was beautifully countered—Orolbai landed a punch that badly hurt Rebecki while he was balanced on one leg. But this revealed both his counter-striking instincts and his failure to develop a varied kicking attack. Opponents need only prepare for boxing-range exchanges, simplifying their defensive responsibilities.
Tactical Inflexibility Under Fire: The most concerning aspect of the Rebecki loss wasn't getting hit—it was getting hit with the same punch repeatedly without adjustment. Even as his orbital bone swelled grotesquely and his vision deteriorated, Orolbai continued employing identical tactics. This suggests either poor coaching adjustments between rounds or an inability to process and adapt to patterns during live combat. Against technical strikers, this inflexibility becomes catastrophic.
This matchup presents a fascinating clash between Hermansson's declining technical skills and Orolbai's aggressive but defensively flawed pressure game. The key battleground will be the early exchanges—can Hermansson establish his lateral movement and low kicks before Orolbai's forward pressure overwhelms him?
Orolbai's Pressure vs Hermansson's Movement: Orolbai's relentless forward pressure directly targets Hermansson's recent vulnerability to aggressive strikers. Rodrigues, Dolidze, and Cannonier all finished Hermansson by pressuring forward and landing power shots. Orolbai's 8.88 recent takedowns per fight and 16.60 attempts show he'll mix levels, preventing Hermansson from settling into his lateral circling rhythm. When Hermansson circles left (his only direction), Orolbai can cut the cage and unload power shots along the predictable path.
Hermansson's Right-Side Exposure vs Orolbai's Power: Orolbai's 0.37 knockdowns per fight and finishing history suggest he possesses the power to exploit Hermansson's right-side defensive gap. When Hermansson reaches with his jab attempts, his right hand drifts out of position—exactly when Orolbai will be loading up left hooks and overhands. The Rebecki fight showed Orolbai can land the same power shot repeatedly; Hermansson's predictable defensive lapses create perfect opportunities.
Grappling Exchanges: If Hermansson secures takedowns, his top control remains dangerous. But his recent 29.85% takedown accuracy and Orolbai's 58% recent takedown accuracy suggest the grappling exchanges may favor the younger fighter. Orolbai's 0.97 recent submissions per fight indicates he's comfortable attacking from various positions. If the fight hits the mat with Orolbai on top, Hermansson's vulnerability to modern submission systems becomes critical—he lacks the defensive awareness against leg entanglements and creative attacks.
Early Rounds (0-5 minutes): Hermansson will attempt to establish his lateral movement and low kicks, looking to frustrate Orolbai's forward pressure. But recent history shows Hermansson struggles early against aggressive opponents—Rodrigues finished him at 1:18 of Round 1, Dolidze at 4:59 of Round 2. Orolbai's tendency to pressure immediately plays directly into this vulnerability. If Orolbai can land early power shots through Hermansson's right-side gap, the fight could end quickly.
Mid-Fight Adjustments (5-10 minutes): If Hermansson survives the early onslaught, his experience and tactical intelligence could create opportunities. Against Pyfer, he broke rhythm in Round 5 with an unexpected 1-2-3 combination after establishing single-strike patterns. But Orolbai's solid conditioning (maintaining output even with orbital damage against Rebecki) suggests he won't fade, preventing Hermansson from capitalizing on cardio advantages.
Championship Rounds (10-15 minutes): Hermansson's recent 33% win percentage indicates he's struggled to close fights. His cardio remains solid, but accumulating damage affects his technical execution. Orolbai increased output in Round 3 against Rebecki despite catastrophic facial damage, showing championship-round heart. If the fight reaches this phase, both fighters will be compromised, but Orolbai's youth (less accumulated damage over career) and recent activity advantage favor him.
Recent KO/TKO Warning: Hermansson was knocked out by Rodrigues in June 2024, creating serious vulnerability to another early finish. His chin has been tested repeatedly, and consecutive knockouts often indicate declining durability.
Age and Decline: At 36, Hermansson shows clear signs of athletic decline. His takedown accuracy has dropped from peak 63.43% to recent 27.55%. His striking defense has deteriorated from peak 86.42% to recent 48.50%.
Welterweight Debut Concerns: This represents Hermansson's first fight at 170 pounds after a career at middleweight. Weight cuts at 36 with recent knockout losses create serious questions about his physical condition and durability.
Orolbai's Finishing Ability: With 0.38 knockdowns per fight, 0.38 submissions per fight, and 5.36 takedowns per fight, Orolbai possesses multiple paths to victory. His recent evolution shows 0.97 submissions per fight—he's becoming more dangerous on the mat.
Stylistic Nightmare: Aggressive pressure fighters with power have consistently finished Hermansson. Orolbai's forward-pressure style, combined with his wrestling threat, creates the exact conditions where Hermansson has failed recently.
The model heavily favors Orolbai despite Hermansson's experience advantage, driven by several key statistical factors:
Odds decreased the prediction score by 14 points—the betting market strongly favors Orolbai at -265, and the model respects this assessment of his advantages.
Recent Takedowns Attempted per Fight decreased the score by 5 points—Orolbai's 16.60 recent attempts compared to Hermansson's 4.80 shows Orolbai will control where the fight takes place.
Recent Win Percentage decreased the score by 2 points—Hermansson's 33% recent win rate compared to Orolbai's 67% reflects the dramatic difference in current form.
Reach increased the score by 1 point—Hermansson's 77-inch reach versus Orolbai's 74 inches provides minor advantages in distance management, though recent performances suggest he can't capitalize on this edge.
The model identifies Orolbai's recent activity, finishing ability, and stylistic advantages as overwhelming Hermansson's technical experience and reach advantages.
WolfTicketsAI has mixed history with Hermansson. The model correctly predicted Rodrigues to defeat Hermansson (score 0.60), accurately identifying his vulnerability to aggressive strikers. It incorrectly favored Pyfer (score 0.37), underestimating Hermansson's ability to implement his lateral movement gameplan against limited opposition. The model incorrectly favored Hermansson against Dolidze (score 0.75), failing to account for modern grappling systems exploiting his bottom game gaps.
For Orolbai, the model incorrectly predicted his victory over Rebecki (score 0.57), underestimating how Rebecki's disciplined counterpunching would systematically dismantle Orolbai's pressure game. It correctly predicted his victory over Brener (score 0.68), accurately assessing his ability to overwhelm grappling-heavy opponents.
The model's recent accuracy with both fighters suggests moderate confidence, though it has shown vulnerability to underestimating technical strikers against aggressive fighters.
Orolbai represents everything that has troubled Hermansson recently—youth, aggression, finishing ability, and relentless forward pressure. Hermansson's defensive vulnerabilities, declining athleticism, and recent knockout losses create a perfect storm for another early finish. While Hermansson's experience and lateral movement could frustrate Orolbai's straight-line pressure, his predictable patterns and right-side exposure give Orolbai clear targets. The weight class change adds another variable to an already compromised fighter facing a dangerous, ascending opponent. WolfTicketsAI predicts Orolbai finishes Hermansson inside two rounds, likely via knockout exploiting the right-side defensive gap that has plagued Hermansson's recent performances.
Score: 18
Odds:
Alex Perez: +172
Asu Almabayev: -225
Perez enters this fight in a precarious position, having lost two of his last three UFC bouts and coming off a brutal KO/TKO loss to Tatsuro Taira in June 2024. That Taira fight exposed critical flaws that remain unaddressed: his forward-leaning posture makes him a sitting duck for uppercuts, and his offensive counterpunching—built around inside slips to throw cross counters and left hooks—creates perfect windows for opponents to secure collar ties and clinch control.
His signature techniques include the cross counter over the jab (slipping inside and throwing his right hand across the top) and the left hook off inside slip. Against Nicolau, these counters worked beautifully because Nicolau is a pure counter-puncher who circles the cage waiting to time single strikes. Perez disrupted that rhythm with constant feinting, lateral steps, and body attacks—particularly his right hand to the body—that forced Nicolau out of his comfort zone. The knockout came in Round 2 when Perez cut off the cage and landed a four-punch combination (right to body, right hook to chin, left hand, final right hook) as both fighters exchanged.
But against grapplers, Perez's system collapses. Taira repeatedly caught his head during slip sequences, established double collar ties, and attacked with knees and elbows. When Perez tried to escape using his over-tie counter (grabbing over Taira's arms and rotating his shoulder to pop off the grips), Taira adjusted by throwing right uppercuts that exploited Perez's forward-leaning posture. The finish came via a body triangle that torqued Perez's knee laterally until it buckled—a position-induced injury rather than a traditional submission.
Against Mokaev, Perez showed excellent defensive cage wrestling, preventing hand-locking and threatening ninja chokes that forced Mokaev to abandon proper takedown mechanics. But Perez offered zero offensive grappling, never attempting his own takedowns or capitalizing when Mokaev sat to poor positions. His striking has regressed to calf-kick spam from an extremely short stance with poor recovery positioning. He absorbed a devastating body knee in the clinch that visibly folded him, exposing gaps in his guard structure when tied up.
1. Collar Tie Susceptibility During Offensive Counterpunching
Every time Perez slips inside to throw his cross counter or left hook, his head is available and forward-positioned. Against Taira, this became the defining vulnerability—Taira would flash the jab, then immediately secure a double collar tie (both hands behind the head with forearms against collarbones) and attack with knees and elbows. Perez's over-tie escape worked occasionally, but he couldn't solve the problem completely. Any opponent with competent clinch skills can exploit this window.
2. Uppercut Vulnerability from Forward-Leaning Posture
Perez consistently runs into his shots with his head forward of his hips. When opponents give ground, he steps forward (often while attempting to slip), and his head comes forward over his hips, creating a massive target for upward-angled uppercuts. Taira landed these cleanly multiple times by deliberately giving ground and launching right uppercuts as Perez pressed forward. This postural flaw compounds when combined with his tendency to bend at the waist during defensive movements.
3. Body Attack Susceptibility in the Clinch
Mokaev landed a body-folding knee during a clinch exchange that Perez never recovered from. His defensive shell collapses when pressured into the clinch, leaving his midsection exposed. Against Pantoja, Perez turned his hips and shoulders during pocket exchanges in ways that allowed immediate back takes—a fundamental failure to maintain proper hip alignment and shoulder positioning when exiting combinations.
Almabayev is a grappling specialist who has built his entire system around compensating for being undersized even at flyweight. His signature technique is the back body lock with a jump-over-the-back transition: from the rear clinch, he off-balances opponents, then jumps over their back to secure hooks. His compact frame makes this geometry work where larger fighters would struggle. He attempts this multiple times per fight, accepting the risk of falling off over the top as a reasonable trade-off for the high-percentage finishing position.
Once on top, Almabayev's pressure is suffocating. Against Ochoa, he drove his hips forward relentlessly, pressing Ochoa's heels into his glutes to neutralize butterfly guard hooks. This prevented Ochoa from extending his legs to create leverage for off-balancing or sweeps. Ochoa threatened triangle chokes but couldn't generate the angles necessary because Almabayev's forward hip pressure pinned him in a mechanically disadvantaged position. The fight ended with a convincing decision built on positional dominance.
Against Nicolau, Almabayev implemented a systematic pressure-passing system that prevented Nicolau from creating scrambles or submission opportunities. His control is described as "smothering"—he maintains heavy hip pressure and tight connection, driving his weight into opponents to minimize space and exhaust them. When opponents establish butterfly guard, he counters by driving forward and pressing their heels into their glutes, neutralizing the mechanical advantage butterfly hooks typically provide.
His striking exists purely as a vehicle to access grappling. Against Kape, Almabayev showed adaptive striking—using circular footwork combined with leg and body kicks to maintain distance. When Kape used level changes to discourage takedowns, Almabayev began throwing body kicks and high kicks that punished this defensive posture, forcing Kape to remain more upright. He also demonstrated the "Sanchai catch" technique, absorbing Kape's left kick on his right forearm while scooping underneath with his left hand, then converting it into a single-leg takedown attempt.
1. Predictable Striking-to-Grappling Entries
Almabayev's limited power and reach disadvantage mean he cannot credibly threaten knockout strikes. Opponents can focus defensive attention almost entirely on takedown defense rather than worrying about managing striking threats simultaneously. Without feints, level changes, or combination striking that genuinely threatens damage, opponents can position themselves optimally to defend takedowns. Against Kape, the fight ended controversially when Kape made contact with Almabayev's eye during a flurry along the fence—highlighting his vulnerability when transitioning between striking and grappling in close quarters.
2. Size and Power Disadvantage on the Feet
Standing at approximately 5'3", Almabayev faces significant height and reach disadvantages against virtually every opponent. His reach deficit forces him to enter dangerous ranges to land strikes, exposing him to counters during entries. Against Kape, commentators noted the matchup resembled "a man fighting a child" in terms of size disparity. This dimensional disadvantage limits his ability to control range or threaten finishes on the feet.
3. Back Control Transition Risk
While his jump-over-the-back technique is innovative, it carries inherent vulnerability. He fell off over the top multiple times against Ochoa, surrendering top position and potentially ending up in bottom position. Against opponents with limited bottom games like Ochoa, this calculation works. But against high-level grapplers who can capitalize on scrambles or threaten submissions from guard, this tendency could prove costly.
This matchup presents a fascinating clash: Perez's offensive counterpunching system versus Almabayev's grappling-focused pressure game. The critical question is whether Almabayev can secure clinch positions during Perez's slip sequences—the exact windows that Taira exploited to devastating effect.
Perez's inside slips to throw cross counters and left hooks create perfect opportunities for collar tie captures. When he slips inside, his head is already leaned forward and available. Almabayev doesn't need to be as technically sophisticated as Taira with double collar ties and knee attacks—he just needs to secure the back body lock and execute his jump-over-the-back technique. Perez's forward-leaning posture during these sequences makes him vulnerable to this exact entry.
Almabayev's pressure-passing system should neutralize Perez's defensive grappling. While Perez showed excellent hand-fighting against Mokaev (preventing hand-locking and threatening ninja chokes), Almabayev's approach is different. He doesn't rely on body-lock takedowns that require hand-locking; he uses his compact frame to jump over the back from clinch positions. Perez's ninja choke threats work against traditional penetration-step takedowns, but they're less effective against someone who's already secured a back body lock and is jumping over the top.
Perez's striking regression to calf-kick spam from an extremely short stance plays directly into Almabayev's hands. Almabayev demonstrated against Kape that he can catch kicks using the Sanchai technique and convert them into takedown attempts. Perez's poor recovery positioning on kicks means he'll be vulnerable to these conversions. And once Almabayev establishes top position, Perez's offensive grappling abandonment (zero takedown attempts against Mokaev despite facing a gassing opponent) suggests he won't threaten from bottom.
The body attack vulnerability Perez showed against Mokaev is concerning, but Almabayev's striking lacks the power to exploit it. However, Almabayev doesn't need to hurt Perez on the feet—he just needs to create clinch opportunities during Perez's offensive counterpunching sequences.
Early Rounds (1-2):
Perez will likely start cautiously, throwing calf kicks from his short stance while Almabayev uses circular footwork and leg/body kicks to maintain distance. Almabayev typically starts cautiously, taking time to establish rhythm, which could allow Perez to build early momentum. But the first time Perez attempts his cross counter or left hook off inside slip, Almabayev has the opportunity to secure a clinch position. If Almabayev can catch Perez's head during these sequences—even once—he can establish the back body lock and attempt his jump-over-the-back technique.
Mid-Fight Adjustments (2-3):
If Almabayev secures top position, Perez's defensive grappling will be tested. Against Mokaev, Perez showed excellent cage wrestling and crotch lock defense from side control. But Almabayev's pressure-passing system is more sophisticated than Mokaev's sit-to-front-headlock approach. Almabayev will drive his hips forward, press Perez's heels into his glutes if he establishes butterfly guard, and maintain suffocating top pressure that prevents scrambles. Perez's lack of offensive grappling means he won't threaten sweeps or submissions—he'll be purely defensive, trying to survive and stand up.
Championship Rounds (if applicable):
This is a three-round fight, but if it goes the distance, Perez's cardio concerns become relevant. His run-and-swing pressure against Taira was inefficient and left him exposed. Almabayev's grappling-heavy approach is cardio-intensive, but his recent performances (five straight decisions) suggest he can maintain pace. Perez's striking output declined in Round 3 against Mokaev, allowing Mokaev to find success on the feet despite being exhausted. If Almabayev can maintain top control into the third round, Perez's defensive reserves will be depleted.
The model heavily favors Almabayev based on several key statistical factors:
The model sees this as a grappling-focused fight where Almabayev's pressure-passing system and takedown volume overwhelm Perez's defensive grappling and limited offensive threats.
WolfTicketsAI has a mixed record on both fighters:
Alex Perez (1-3):
- Correctly predicted Taira to win (KO/TKO R2)—the collar tie exploitation blueprint
- Incorrectly predicted Nicolau to win (Perez won by KO/TKO R2)—underestimated Perez's ability to disrupt counter-punchers with feinting and lateral movement
- Correctly predicted Mokaev to win (Decision R3)—Perez's defensive grappling kept it competitive but he offered zero offense
- Correctly predicted Pantoja to win (Submission R1)—Perez's back exposure during pocket exchanges led to immediate finish
Asu Almabayev (4-1):
- Correctly predicted Almabayev to win vs Ochoa (Decision R3)—pressure-passing system dominated
- Incorrectly predicted Kape to win (KO/TKO R3)—underestimated Almabayev's adaptive striking, though the finish was controversial due to eye poke
- Correctly predicted Almabayev to win vs Nicolau (Decision R3)—grappling control neutralized striking
- Correctly predicted Almabayev to win vs Johnson (Decision R3)—consistent pressure grappling
- Correctly predicted Almabayev to win vs Vergara (Decision R3)—striking and footwork controlled pace
The model has been more reliable on Almabayev (80% accuracy) than Perez (25% accuracy), though the Nicolau miss on Perez shows the model can underestimate his ability against pure counter-punchers. However, Almabayev is not a counter-puncher—he's a pressure grappler, which is exactly the style that has given Perez the most problems (Taira, Mokaev, Pantoja).
Almabayev's grappling-focused pressure system is a nightmare matchup for Perez's current technical state. Perez's offensive counterpunching—built around inside slips to throw cross counters and left hooks—creates perfect windows for Almabayev to secure back body locks and execute his jump-over-the-back technique. The Taira fight established the blueprint: catch Perez's head during slip sequences, establish dominant clinch positions, and attack. Almabayev doesn't need Taira's technical sophistication with double collar ties and knee attacks—he just needs to secure the back body lock once and implement his pressure-passing system.
Perez's striking regression to calf-kick spam, combined with his forward-leaning posture and lack of offensive grappling, leaves him with no clear path to victory. His defensive cage wrestling kept him competitive against Mokaev, but Almabayev's approach is more sophisticated and better suited to exploit Perez's specific vulnerabilities. Expect Almabayev to secure clinch positions during Perez's offensive sequences, establish top control, and grind out a decision victory through suffocating pressure and positional dominance. WolfTicketsAI's pick of Almabayev is well-founded—this is a stylistic mismatch that favors the grappler over the compromised striker.
Score: 17
Odds:
Bekzat Almakhan: -104
Aleksandre Topuria: -122
Almakhan enters this fight having won 2 of his last 3 UFC bouts, but the context matters. His most recent performance against Brad Katona at UFC 315 was a statement—a devastating right uppercut at 1:04 of Round 1 that made him the first person to ever finish Katona. The timing was textbook: Katona attempted a level change, and Almakhan caught him right up the middle with perfect placement to the jaw, followed by hammerfists to seal the finish.
That performance showcased what Almakhan can do with a full camp. His karate background (8 years, black belt) translates into explosive power generation, particularly with his right hand. Whether it's a hook, straight, overhand, or off a one-two, that right hand is his best weapon. Against Katona, his blistering in-and-out movement confused the opponent before the finish. He also demonstrated excellent follow-up aggression—the moment Katona dropped, Almakhan was on him with ground strikes.
But his UFC debut against Umar Nurmagomedov exposed critical flaws. Almakhan buzzed Nurmagomedov 30 seconds in with an overhand, but then became predictable. Every time Nurmagomedov jabbed, Almakhan threw the same committed overhand counter. Nurmagomedov read this pattern easily, timing his level changes to perfection. Almakhan spent most of the fight defending wrestling, showing decent survival skills—timely bridges from mount, scrambling back to his feet—but couldn't generate enough offense to win rounds.
His striking stats reveal a power-puncher profile: 1.87 knockdowns per fight historically, but only 0.68 significant strikes landed per minute. He throws usually in twos, creating predictable patterns. His straight-left-to-right-hand combination is his bread and butter.
1. Predictable Counter-Punching Pattern
Against Nurmagomedov, Almakhan's tendency to throw committed overhands in response to jabs became his downfall. Every jab from Nurmagomedov triggered the same overhand counter, allowing Umar to time his single-leg takedowns perfectly. This one-dimensional approach makes him readable against fighters who can pump jabs and change levels. The transcript specifically noted that if Almakhan had mixed in uppercuts instead of overhands when Nurmagomedov shot, he might have defended the takedowns more effectively.
2. Defensive Hand Positioning and Striking Defense
Almakhan's striking defense sits at just 27.36% overall and 16.49% recently—alarmingly low numbers. He's been clipped multiple times throughout his career because he doesn't keep his hands up consistently, particularly vulnerable to kicks. He absorbs 4.05 head strikes per minute while landing only 0.50, creating a massive defensive liability. Against Nurmagomedov, he absorbed 2.55 head strikes per minute in recent data, showing this vulnerability persists.
3. Ground Positioning and Grappling Advancement
While Almakhan showed strong survival instincts against Nurmagomedov's elite wrestling—executing bridges from mount and recovering half guard—his biggest weakness is improving positions on the ground. His takedown defense sits at 0% overall and 30.67% recently. Once taken down, he's strong on top with good ground-and-pound, but struggles to advance position. Against Nurmagomedov, he was repeatedly told to get up while on top, highlighting this positional stagnation issue.
Topuria brings a refined boxing-centric system that's proven effective in his 6-1 UFC run. His most recent performance against Colby Thicknesse showcased his systematic approach: high-guard positioning, ramrod jab behind a raised lead shoulder, and relentless cage-cutting pressure. He doesn't hunt for home run shots—he constructs openings through positional dominance.
His signature sequence starts with the jab as both offensive weapon and positional tool, forcing opponents toward the fence. Once there, he capitalizes on predictable escape patterns. Against Thicknesse, every time Colby tried to circle off the fence while jabbing, Topuria tracked him with overhand rights that crossed the top of the extended jab. The timing exploited weight distribution—Thicknesse's feet were in transition during lateral movement, maximizing impact while minimizing defensive options.
Topuria's body jab is another staple, driven directly in front of his shoulder while maintaining high lead shoulder position. This creates consistent threat levels that force opponents into static defensive postures, opening power punching opportunities. His wrestling integration shows sophistication—he landed a spectacular suplex against Thicknesse and demonstrates strong scrambling ability. He understands positional wrestling as a striking setup rather than a separate discipline.
His stats reflect a complete fighter: 69.47% striking defense overall (70.08% significant), 59.09% striking accuracy, and 4.33 strikes landed per minute. He's landed 2.73 significant strikes per minute while maintaining 100% takedown defense in his UFC career. His striking impact differential sits at +25, showing he's winning the damage exchanges.
1. Static Head Movement Creating Counter Windows
When Topuria slips punches in open space—particularly against doubled jabs—he roots his feet completely and moves his head in predictable side-to-side patterns. Against Thicknesse, this allowed consistent right hand counters when doubled jabs prompted Topuria's slip sequences. The technical issue: he prioritizes head movement over footwork, planting to slip rather than maintaining a mobile base. This same pattern appeared against Bryce Mitchell, where it facilitated takedown entries.
2. Low Kick Exposure During Slip Sequences
The rooted foot positioning during head movement creates extended windows for low kicks. When opponents feint upper body attacks to trigger his slip response, his planted lead leg becomes a static target. Thicknesse exploited this repeatedly, landing low kicks as Topuria completed his slip movements. This accumulated damage could theoretically compromise his pressure game over championship distance.
3. Takedown Susceptibility From Static Positions
Most critically, this planted head movement created a clean double leg opportunity for Bryce Mitchell. The takedown wasn't completed through overwhelming wrestling skill but because Topuria's feet were planted and weight was distributed for striking defense, not takedown defense. Mitchell shot as Topuria slipped, and the compromised base position allowed completion of a technique Topuria would normally stuff with his 100% takedown defense rate.
This matchup presents a fascinating clash: Almakhan's explosive power-punching against Topuria's systematic pressure boxing.
Topuria's Advantages:
Topuria's double jab system could be devastating here. Almakhan has shown a tendency to throw committed overhands in response to jabs—exactly the pattern Topuria can exploit. By pumping doubled jabs, Topuria can trigger Almakhan's predictable overhand counter, then either slip and counter with his own right hand or time a level change as Almakhan commits to the punch. This mirrors what Nurmagomedov did, except Topuria will punish with boxing counters rather than wrestling.
Topuria's cage-cutting pressure neutralizes Almakhan's in-and-out movement. Against Katona, Almakhan used blistering movement to create openings, but Topuria specializes in reducing cage space and forcing opponents into predictable escape patterns along the fence. Once Almakhan is backed up, his defensive vulnerabilities become magnified—he absorbs 4.05 head strikes per minute and has only 27.36% striking defense.
Topuria's body jab will find a home. Almakhan absorbs body strikes (0.0 per minute absorbed recently suggests limited data, but historically he's been hit to the body), and Topuria's systematic body attack creates additional layers that force more complex defensive reads. Almakhan's tendency to throw in twos means he's not mixing up his defensive looks enough to handle Topuria's varied attack.
Almakhan's Paths to Victory:
Almakhan's right uppercut—the same shot that finished Katona—could exploit Topuria's static head movement. When Topuria plants his feet to slip doubled jabs, that's the exact moment Almakhan's uppercut becomes available. The transcript from the Nurmagomedov fight specifically noted that uppercuts would have been more effective than overhands when opponents dropped levels. If Almakhan can recognize Topuria's slip pattern and time the uppercut, his power could end the fight.
Topuria's 0.0 knockdowns per fight in the UFC suggests he hasn't faced someone with Almakhan's one-punch power. That right hand dropped Nurmagomedov—one of the division's elite—and obliterated Katona. If Almakhan lands clean, Topuria hasn't shown the ability to recover from that kind of power.
The early blitz could work. Almakhan finished Katona in 64 seconds and dropped Nurmagomedov 30 seconds in. If he comes out aggressively and lands before Topuria establishes his systematic pressure, the fight could end early. Topuria's fights typically build over time as he establishes cage position—he hasn't been tested by someone who can end things in the first exchange.
Critical Technical Clash:
The key sequence will be Topuria's double jab versus Almakhan's overhand counter. If Almakhan throws the same predictable overhand he showed against Nurmagomedov, Topuria will slip and counter or time a takedown. But if Almakhan mixes in uppercuts or varies his timing, he can catch Topuria's static slip pattern.
Topuria's pressure game forces Almakhan into the worst possible position: backing up with poor striking defense. Almakhan's 16.49% recent striking defense percentage means he's getting hit constantly when under pressure. Topuria's systematic fence-cutting will put Almakhan in extended defensive sequences where his vulnerabilities compound.
Early Rounds:
Topuria will immediately establish his jab and begin cage-cutting. Almakhan will look for the early power shot—he's most dangerous in the first minute when opponents haven't adjusted to his speed and power. If Almakhan doesn't land early, Topuria's pressure will begin forcing him backward.
The first time Topuria pumps a double jab will reveal Almakhan's adjustment. If he throws the predictable overhand, Topuria will recognize the pattern and exploit it repeatedly. If Almakhan shows discipline and mixes in uppercuts or varies his responses, the fight becomes more competitive.
Mid-Fight Adjustments:
Topuria's systematic approach means he'll continue pressuring regardless of early success or failure. Against Thicknesse, even when Colby found success with counters in open space, Topuria immediately reestablished forward pressure to minimize those exchanges. He'll do the same here—any Almakhan success will be met with renewed pressure to force the fight back to the fence.
Almakhan's cardio and defensive durability become questions. He's absorbed massive striking volume in his UFC career (4.05 head strikes per minute), and Topuria lands 4.33 strikes per minute overall. If Almakhan can't establish his power early, he'll be defending extended sequences where his poor striking defense creates accumulating damage.
Late Rounds:
Topuria's gas tank and systematic approach favor him in later rounds. He maintained pressure against Thicknesse for three full rounds, never slowing his cage-cutting or combination output. Almakhan hasn't shown the same durability—his recent win percentage of 33% suggests he's struggled in his UFC run when fights extend.
Almakhan's power remains a threat throughout, but his predictable patterns become more exploitable as fatigue sets in. Topuria's superior striking defense (69.47% vs 27.36%) means he'll be fresher and sharper late, while Almakhan will have absorbed significant volume.
Almakhan's power is real: That right hand dropped Nurmagomedov and obliterated Katona. Topuria hasn't faced this level of one-punch power in the UFC.
Predictable patterns doom Almakhan: Against Nurmagomedov, his tendency to throw the same overhand counter in response to jabs allowed Umar to time takedowns perfectly. Topuria will exploit this same pattern with boxing counters.
Striking defense disparity is massive: Topuria's 69.47% striking defense versus Almakhan's 27.36% means Almakhan will absorb far more damage in extended exchanges.
Topuria's systematic pressure neutralizes Almakhan's movement: The in-and-out movement that confused Katona won't work against Topuria's cage-cutting. Once backed up, Almakhan's defensive vulnerabilities become magnified.
Almakhan's uppercut could exploit Topuria's static slips: The same uppercut that finished Katona is available when Topuria plants his feet to slip doubled jabs. This is Almakhan's clearest technical path to victory.
Topuria's double jab system is tailor-made for this matchup: Almakhan's tendency to counter jabs with overhands gives Topuria the exact pattern he exploits with slips and counters.
Almakhan's recent UFC struggles: He's 2-1 in his last three, but the loss to Nurmagomedov exposed his predictability against elite opposition. His 33% recent win percentage suggests he's struggled more than his overall record indicates.
The model heavily favors Topuria based on several key statistical disparities:
Striking Defense Percentage decreased the prediction score by 6 points—the largest single factor. Topuria's 69.47% striking defense versus Almakhan's 27.36% creates a massive advantage in extended exchanges.
Odds increased the score by 4 points, reflecting Topuria's -122 line versus Almakhan's -104. The betting market recognizes Topuria's technical advantages.
Significant Striking Impact Differential decreased the score by 3 points. Topuria's +3 differential versus Almakhan's -29 shows who's winning damage exchanges consistently.
Recent Significant Striking Impact Differential decreased the score by 2 points, confirming this trend continues in recent performances.
Recent Win Percentage decreased the score by 2 points. Topuria's 86% recent win rate versus Almakhan's 33% shows who's been more effective in the UFC recently.
Striking Impact Differential decreased the score by 2 points, with Topuria at +25 versus Almakhan at -66.5, showing Topuria consistently wins striking exchanges.
The model recognizes that Topuria's superior striking defense, consistent performance, and positive impact differentials create significant advantages over Almakhan's power-punching but defensively vulnerable style.
WolfTicketsAI has limited history with both fighters. It predicted Brad Katona to win against Almakhan with a 0.74 confidence score, and that prediction was incorrect—Almakhan finished Katona in 64 seconds. This shows the model can underestimate Almakhan's finishing power when he has a full camp.
However, that same performance revealed Almakhan's best attributes: explosive power, excellent timing on the uppercut, and finishing instinct. The question is whether those attributes can overcome Topuria's systematic pressure and superior defensive fundamentals.
The model has no prediction history with Topuria, creating some uncertainty. But his technical profile—refined boxing system, excellent striking defense, systematic cage-cutting—aligns with fighters who consistently outperform expectations against power-punchers with defensive vulnerabilities.
Topuria takes this fight through systematic pressure boxing and superior defensive fundamentals. Almakhan's power is real—that right hand can end any fight—but his predictable counter-punching patterns and alarming striking defense percentage (27.36%) create too many opportunities for Topuria to exploit. The double jab system that troubled Thicknesse will trigger Almakhan's overhand counter repeatedly, allowing Topuria to slip and counter or time level changes. Once Topuria establishes cage position, Almakhan's defensive vulnerabilities compound as he absorbs volume he can't defend. Almakhan's best chance is landing the uppercut early when Topuria plants his feet to slip, but Topuria's systematic approach and superior striking defense make him the clear pick. WolfTicketsAI's confidence score of 17 reflects the technical advantages that favor Topuria's refined system over Almakhan's explosive but flawed approach.
Score: 7
Odds:
Ismail Naurdiev: -138
Ryan Loder: +108
Naurdiev enters this middleweight bout having lost two of his last three UFC fights, including a recent unanimous decision loss to JunYong Park at UFC Baku in June 2025. That fight exposed critical flaws—an illegal knee that cost him two points, cardio collapse after Round 1, and complete helplessness in bottom position as Park dominated with ground control and submission attempts.
Before that disaster, Naurdiev looked sharp against Bruno Silva in October 2024, landing 66 of 116 significant strikes at 56% accuracy with three takedowns. His signature techniques remain dangerous when he's fresh: the double jab to right hand combination that he used to measure distance and land power shots against Silva, and his cross-hand check to counter sequence where he positions his lead hand across his body to bait right hands before slipping and countering. Against Silva in Round 2, Naurdiev chained a devastating "1-3-2" (jab-hook-cross) after reading Silva's defensive shell, showing high-level offensive awareness.
His V-step counter system—jabbing then stepping back to draw opponents in before punishing their overextension—worked beautifully against Silva but failed against Park's relentless pressure. Naurdiev's wrestling background showed against Michel Prazeres in 2019, where he stuffed takedowns and controlled distance with leg kicks. Against Siyar Bahadurzada that same year, he mixed spinning back kicks and flying knees with wrestling entries, earning a unanimous decision.
But the Sean Brady fight in 2020 foreshadowed his current struggles: Brady's takedowns neutralized Naurdiev's striking, exposing his weak bottom game and conditioning issues. That blueprint remains relevant.
1. Catastrophic cardio collapse after Round 1: Against Park, Naurdiev "was fatiguing from his output in round one" and became "miserable and exhausted in bottom position" by Round 3. This isn't new—he visibly tired against Brady and Rencountre. When his explosive first-round pace doesn't finish fights, he fades dramatically, losing technical sharpness and defensive responsibility.
2. Bottom position helplessness: Park dominated him on the ground in Rounds 2-3, threatening rear-naked chokes and isolating arms while Naurdiev had no answers. Against Brady in Round 3, he was taken down and ended up with Brady on his back attempting a guillotine. Naurdiev lacks sweeps, submission defense, and escape sequences—once grounded, he's stuck.
3. Lead leg vulnerability during jabbing entries: When Naurdiev commits to his signature double jab, he extends his stance with his lead leg sideways (toed-in), creating openings for low kicks. Silva didn't exploit this, but technically aware opponents can disrupt his rhythm and mobility by attacking that exposed leg during his primary offensive sequence.
Loder comes in having lost his last fight—a brutal first-round TKO to Azamat Bekoev at UFC Des Moines in May 2025. That fight exposed everything wrong with his game: Loder "struggled to get inside to grab a hold of Bekoev," and when he did manage clinch position, "it was Bekoev who reversed position to prevent any trips to the canvas." A big right hand put Loder "on skates," and a follow-up flurry finished him at 2:44 of Round 1.
Before that disaster, Loder looked competent against Robert Valentin in August 2024, winning by second-round TKO with elbows to the head while landing 80% of his significant strikes (42 of 52, with 41 aimed at the head). That performance showcased his wrestling-based approach—the 33-year-old NCAA Division I wrestler immediately looks for body locks and takedowns, attempting 10.99 takedowns per fight with only 14.29% accuracy but 100% takedown defense historically.
Loder's offensive wrestling sequences involve shooting for takedowns after feinting with overhand strikes, similar to Kamaru Usman's approach. When he secures position, he threatens 1.57 submissions per fight and lands heavy ground strikes. Against Valentin, his transition from takedowns to striking proved effective, finishing with elbows from dominant position.
But Loder is a one-dimensional fighter whose entire game plan depends on implementing his wrestling. He lands 5.76 significant strikes per minute at 71.43% accuracy, but absorbs 2.30 head strikes per minute with only 50% significant striking defense. His recent striking defense has collapsed to 30.67%, and he allows 0.75 head strikes absorbed per minute in recent fights—numbers that got worse against Bekoev's power.
1. Distance management failure against strikers: Loder's entries are predictable and poorly timed. Against Bekoev, he couldn't "get inside to grab a hold" safely, exposing poor footwork and telegraphed takedown attempts. His 14.29% takedown accuracy reflects this—he shoots often but rarely finishes because his setups are transparent. When facing mobile strikers who can circle and counter, Loder walks into power shots.
2. Striking defense collapse under pressure: That 30.67% recent significant striking defense is abysmal. Loder's defensive positioning is fundamentally flawed—he keeps his chin high, shows limited head movement, and can't create angles to escape once hurt. Against Bekoev, the initial right hand hurt him badly, and he had no defensive footwork to circle away from danger. "Bekoev put Loder on the ropes, then didn't stop until a final knockdown led to the TKO finish."
3. Inability to handle reversals and scrambles: When Loder does secure clinch position, skilled grapplers reverse him. Bekoev "reversed position to prevent any trips to the canvas," showing Loder's wrestling superiority means nothing against fighters with sambo/judo backgrounds or strong scrambling ability. His cage craft is poor—he can't use footwork to escape pressure or maintain advantageous positions once opponents counter his initial entries.
This matchup heavily favors Naurdiev's technical striking against Loder's one-dimensional wrestling. Here's why:
Naurdiev's double jab to right hand combination exploits Loder's chin-high defensive posture. Loder walks forward with minimal head movement, exactly the type of stationary target Naurdiev carved up against Silva. When Loder shoots his predictable takedown attempts, Naurdiev's V-step counter system allows him to step back, make Loder overextend, then punish with power shots as Loder's momentum carries him forward off-balance.
Loder's wrestling entries are perfectly suited for Naurdiev's cross-hand check counters. Loder feints overhands before shooting—Naurdiev can read this, use his cross-hand check to control Loder's lead hand, then land devastating counters as Loder commits to level changes. Against Prazeres in 2019, Naurdiev stuffed takedowns while landing clean shots during entries—Loder's 14.29% accuracy suggests he'll struggle similarly.
The orthodox vs. southpaw dynamic favors Naurdiev. Loder got finished by an orthodox right hand from Bekoev, showing specific vulnerability to conventional power. Naurdiev as a southpaw presents different angles, and his left hand power (the mirror of what finished Loder) should find Loder's chin repeatedly.
Loder's only path is early takedowns, but Naurdiev's 36.67% takedown defense isn't terrible against Loder's 14.29% accuracy. Even if Loder secures early position, Naurdiev's submission threat (0.17 per fight) and ability to scramble back up (as he did briefly against Park) gives him escape options. Loder's ground control isn't suffocating like Park's—he's more submission-oriented than position-dominant.
Early rounds (1-2): Naurdiev establishes his jab immediately, using the double jab sequence to measure distance while Loder marches forward predictably. Loder shoots early takedowns that Naurdiev sprawls on or circles away from, landing counters as Loder resets. Similar to the Silva fight, Naurdiev lands clean combinations—expect the 1-3-2 sequence when Loder shells up defensively. Loder's chin gets tested early, and unlike Valentin, Naurdiev has the power and accuracy to capitalize. If Naurdiev doesn't finish in Round 1, he still controls with volume striking.
Mid-fight adjustments (Round 2): This is where Naurdiev's cardio becomes relevant, but against Loder's limited offensive striking, Naurdiev can manage pace better than against Park's relentless pressure. Loder's desperation increases as his takedowns fail, leading to sloppier entries that Naurdiev counters. Loder's recent striking defense (30.67%) means he's absorbing significant damage, and Naurdiev's 3.69 significant strikes landed per minute add up. Expect Naurdiev to target the body (0.97 body strikes per minute) to further drain Loder's cardio and slow his wrestling attempts.
Championship rounds (if applicable): This fight likely doesn't see Round 3. If it does, both fighters are compromised—Naurdiev's cardio is fading, but Loder's face is damaged and his wrestling is exhausted from failed attempts. Naurdiev's technical striking still outclasses Loder's basic boxing, and Loder's defensive vulnerabilities are fully exposed. Naurdiev coasts to decision or catches Loder with a finish as Loder desperately shoots.
Naurdiev's striking accuracy (52.87%) and volume overwhelm Loder's collapsing defense (30.67% recent significant striking defense)—similar to how Bekoev landed freely before the finish
Loder's 14.29% takedown accuracy against Naurdiev's 36.67% defense means most wrestling attempts fail, forcing Loder into prolonged striking exchanges where he's outclassed
The orthodox vs. southpaw matchup favors Naurdiev—Loder got finished by orthodox power from Bekoev, and Naurdiev's left hand presents similar threats from different angles
Naurdiev's recent loss to Park doesn't translate here—Park's pressure wrestling and cardio are elite; Loder's one-dimensional approach is far less sophisticated
Loder's recent KO loss creates vulnerability—fighters coming off brutal finishes often show defensive hesitation, and Naurdiev's power can exploit that mental scar tissue
Both fighters are 1-2 in their last three, but Naurdiev's losses came against superior competition (Park's 9-3 UFC record, Brady's current ranking), while Loder lost to a fellow prospect and lacks elite-level experience
Naurdiev's 74-inch reach matches Loder's 76 inches, neutralizing any physical advantage Loder might claim
The model heavily favors Naurdiev based on several key factors:
Odds increased the prediction score by 5.0—Naurdiev's -138 line reflects market confidence in his technical superiority over Loder's one-dimensional approach
Striking Defense Percentage increased the score by 4.0—Naurdiev's 64.82% significant striking defense dwarfs Loder's 50% (and recent 30.67%), showing he can avoid damage while landing his own
Recent Win Percentage increased the score by 3.0—despite both being 1-2 recently, Naurdiev's overall 75% win rate and quality of competition outweigh Loder's 80% against weaker opposition
Significant Striking Impact Differential increased the score by 1.0—Naurdiev's +28.83 differential shows he consistently outlanding opponents in meaningful strikes, while Loder's +15.50 comes against lower-level competition
Recent Significant Striking Defense Percentage increased the score by 1.0—Naurdiev's 61.29% recent defense, while declining, still exceeds Loder's catastrophic 30.67%
TrueSkill decreased the score by 2.0—Loder's uncertainty (Sigma: 8.333) due to limited UFC experience creates model hesitation, but other factors override this
Recent Takedowns Attempted per Fight decreased the score by 1.0—Loder's 5.40 recent attempts suggest desperation wrestling that could create scrambles, but his 14.6% accuracy means these attempts mostly fail
WolfTicketsAI correctly predicted Naurdiev's loss to JunYong Park with a 0.56 confidence score, showing the model accurately assessed Naurdiev's vulnerabilities against elite pressure wrestlers. That loss doesn't diminish confidence here—Loder isn't Park.
The model also correctly predicted Loder's loss to Azamat Bekoev with a 0.60 confidence score, accurately identifying Loder's striking defense collapse and inability to implement his wrestling against skilled opponents. This successful prediction of Loder's recent KO loss adds confidence to the current pick—the model understands Loder's limitations.
With a 7.0 confidence score for Naurdiev, the model shows strong conviction based on the stylistic mismatch and statistical advantages.
Naurdiev finishes Loder inside two rounds. Loder's predictable wrestling entries walk him directly into Naurdiev's counter-striking system, and his 30.67% recent striking defense means he absorbs clean power shots early. The first time Loder shoots a telegraphed takedown, Naurdiev sprawls and lands the double jab to right hand combination that drops Loder or badly hurts him. Loder's recent KO loss to Bekoev showed he can't recover once hurt—expect similar results here. Even if Naurdiev's cardio becomes a factor, Loder lacks the technical striking or defensive fundamentals to capitalize. WolfTicketsAI's pick of Naurdiev by finish is the smart play.